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Abstract 
Analogical Reasoning (AR) is the ability to find a relationship between two 
objects that is not based on featural (attribute-based) similarities.   As such, 
reasoning by analogy is thought to be crucial in learning and scientific 
discovery.  
 
Analogies have played an important role in the conceptualisation of both IQ 
(Spearman, 1927) and cognitive development (Piaget, Montangero & 
Billeter, 1977).  Yet very little is understood regarding the component 
processes which underlie analogical thought.   Recently, there has been a 
resurgent interest in the field: one brought about by modern computational 
methodologies which purport to model the cognitive architecture of 
analogical thinking.   A prominent feature has been the introduction of 
capacity based processing constraints claimed to arise in the reasoning 
processes from limited Working Memory Capacity (WMC) resources 
(Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Morrison, Doumas, 
& Richland, 2011; Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2004, 2006, 2010).    
 
Adopting a Working Memory (WM) perspective (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Baddeley 2000) the aim of this research is to investigate whether individual 
differences in WM mediate AR, as well as critically assessing the current 
theories of AR in relation to this.    
 
In chapter 1 the research behind AR-WM is reviewed with reference to 
modern interpretations of what analogy is and how it might be measured.   
2 
In chapter 2 (Experiment 1), a flexible new scene-based measure of 
analogical ability, the Richland Picture Analogies (RPA; Richland, et al, 
2004, 2006) is introduced, the data confirming effects of complexity and 
distraction hypothesized by Richland and her colleagues.  Experiment 2 
related performance on the RPA with quantitative measures of WM, 
concluding that IQ was related to relational responding in the RPA over and 
above that of WMC. Experiment 3 further explored the role of WM, 
observing an effect of processing/storage (WMC) but not storage (STS). 
 
In chapter 3, the role of WMC was further examined. Experiment 4 using a 
reaction time (RT) paradigm demonstrated that featural responding was 
unlikely to be a prepotent response, and instead related to conflict 
resolution.   Experiment 5 adopted a dual-task methodology and attempted 
to explore the involvement of WMC under load in conditions of complexity 
and distraction. Unfortunately, the low level of variance proved an 
insurmountable problem.  Experiment 6 examined Executive Functions 
(EFs) as a potential explanation for both IQ and WMC effects in the RPA.    
Overall, it is concluded that WM does indeed mediate analogical 
performance within the RPA, but that effects of relational-complexity, as 
suggested by Halford (1992, 1993, 1998) are not as evident as might have 
been supposed.   
 
Instead the data from Experiments 2-6 suggests that individual differences 
in processing efficiency as well as the ability to divide and control attention 
in novel circumstances may explain the variance in relation responding 
3 
reported by Richland et al. (2004, 2006) and found in Experiment 1.  It is 
hypothesized that one of the core aspects of AR is task relevance, the 
research concluding that other interpretations of how WM affects AR 
should be considered beyond the traditional theories. 
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 “…and yes, I invented for them numbers, too, the most important science; 
and the stringing up of letters, the art of Memory, the mother of the Muses.” 
(Prometheus: on memory as the source of creative wisdom) 
- Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, Line 459.  
 
“Whether or not [we] talk of discovery or of invention, analogy is inevitable 
in human thought because we come to new things in science with what 
equipment we have, which is how we have learned to think, and above all 
how we have learned to think about the relatedness of things.”  
-Oppenheimer (1956), Analogy in science, p. 129-130 
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Chapter one 
 
1.0 Introduction  
Reasoning by analogy has been described as “pervasive in everyday 
experience” (Sternberg, 1977, p. 353); a “crucial factor in knowledge 
acquisition at all ages” (Brown, 1989, p. 370).   
 
“Most of our ordinary mental work - that is, our commonsense 
reasoning - is based more on thinking by analogy” (Minsky, 1988, p. 
329) 
 
It is generally believed that AR is essential to cognitive growth, facilitating 
learning by allowing us to understand difficult concepts, solve novel 
problems, discover new facts and make scientific discoveries (Chen, 1999; 
DeLoache, Miller & Pierroutsaks, 1998; Donnelly & McDaniel, 1993; Gick 
& Holyoak, 1980; Glynn, 2007, 1995; Glynn & Takahashi, 1998; Goswami, 
1994; Hallyn, 2000; Col, France & Taylor, 2005; Hayes & Tierney, 1982; 
Holyoak, Junn & Billman, 1984; Idling, 1997; James & Scharmann, 2007; 
Novick, 1988. For reviews see Gentner, Holyoak & Boicho, 2001; 
Goswami, 1991; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989). 
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1.0.1 Origin of the term analogy.  The term analogy comes from 
the ancient Greek αναλογια which is also „analogia‟ in Latin but is often 
translated as „proportio‟ or „proportionalitas', „an understanding of 
proportionality‟ (Ashworth, 2008).  The stem for analogy is probably from 
the root word λόγος [reckoning/relation/explanation/debate/verbal-
statement/subject-matter] (Liddell & Scott, 1996).    
 
1.0.2 Defining analogical reasoning.  Despite AR‟s perceived 
importance in cognition, there is considerable debate as to how the 
processes underlying AR might be represented, analogy being famously 
described as both “a notoriously difficult term to define” (Goswami, 1991, 
p. 1) and “a fuzzy concept that means different things to different people.” 
(Dejong, 1989, p. 346).   Such criticisms are not unusual in psychological 
theory however, and these statements remain true of other scientific 
concepts, notably intelligence, which as Dejong (1989) points out is still 
considered a valid concept.   Consequently, the first problem facing any 
analogical researcher is identifying aspects of the term „AR‟ which most 
theorists can agree upon. 
 
One such point appears to be that the core of AR is, at least in part, the 
ability to find a similarity between two or more objects/arguments, a process 
known as Relational Reasoning (RR) and which may be seen as the more  
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Gentner‟s representation of analogy (Gentner, 2001).  Pair A is the 
same as the standard, but Pair B is not.  The relationship is not based on the 
standard having the same shape (or „featural similarities‟) as Pair A. 
 
 
general process of identifying (any) relations between objects, regardless of 
outcome or process
1
. 
 
AR appears disparate from RR in that, in an analogical comparison, the 
relationship that is utilized is supposedly not based upon physical 
properties
2
 (see Figure 1).   A relationship based upon observable physical 
attributes is known as a „featural‟ relation, whilst a relationship based upon 
non-physical attributes is a „relational‟ relation.   
 
                                                 
1
 Here the term „object‟ implies a conceptual chunking of meaningfully bound information. 
„Relations‟ can be identified as “predicates that link two or more arguments” (Markman & 
Gentner, 1993).   
2 An idea that shares much in common with Plato‟s theory of forms (Watt, 1997) and the 
concept of lower order (a posteriori) as opposed to higher order (conceptualist, or a priori) 
thinking.  Plato described ideas of things (forms) as being the highest form of reasoning 
possible, whilst observations made about the material world were illusions”, made from 
metaphorical shadows (Watt, 1997), an idea expanded upon by Piaget in his stage theory of 
analogical development. 
 
Standard 
Pair A Pair B 
21 
From the literature, whether a featural relationship is required for a problem 
to be „analogical‟ remains fuzzy and defining the boundaries of featural 
similarity is an obvious step in defining analogical thinking.  However, as 
has already been indicated, a number of radically different perspectives of 
AR exist, which have led to competing definitions of analogy. 
 
1.1 Measurement of analogical reasoning. 
Traditionally AR has played a key role in the development of psychological 
theory, some theorists going so far as to postulate that AR either 
encompasses “all of” (Spearman, 1923, p. 66), or is a “central component 
of” (Goswami, 1992, p. 1) human cognition.  It is therefore perhaps not 
surprising to discover that the term has long been understood to be 
synonymous with the concept of intelligence (Sternberg 1977; Spearman, 
1923), with AR tasks making up core components of early measures of 
general ability or „g‟ (Raven, 1938; Miller, 1947). 
 
Today the most frequently encountered measurements of analogical ability 
typically can be divided into three domains. Those using a variation of the 
classical analogy (probably the most common form of analogical test), those 
using variations on the problem analogy format, and a third paradigm, scene 
based analogies has recently seen a growing interest among researchers.  It 
is this methodology that will be adopted for this thesis. 
 
1.1.1 The classical analogy.    Names most commonly associated 
with analogy include Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Francis Bacon, and John 
22 
Stewart Mill as well as numerous others (see Shelly, 2003 for a review), 
their philosophies forming fundamental concepts which have helped define 
the direction of analogical research to this day.   However it is from 
Aristotle and his analysis of analogical structure that we define what is 
known as the classical analogy which is described by Collins and Burstein 
(1989) as a 4 figure model using 2 pairs of arguments/objects. 
 
These object-pairs are called „terms‟, the individual objects/arguments being 
called „figures‟: hence in the classical format there are four figures (a, b, c 
and d) and two terms comprising of two figures each (term i: with figures a 
& b, and term ii: with figures c and d: being written a:b::c:d), the objective 
being to imply one of the figures through the induction of the other three by 
correctly identifying the best fitting relation between terms ( what Gentner, 
1992 calls the similarity-constraint).   The classic analogy becomes a test of 
reasoning when participants are asked to identify one or more missing 
term/terms, the missing term (in most cases this is usually only the 4
th
 „d‟ 
term) is known as the „target term.‟  Answers are either i) open choice 
where participants are required to make up their own term without help, or 
ii) multiple (restricted) choice where participants are given a limited number 
of options, most commonly 4.  The classical analogy is exemplified by the 
U.S based Miller analogies test (Miller 1947), which uses the multiple 
choice, 4 term, 4 option verbal analogies.   
 
Classical analogies of both forced and open choice formats can also be 
divided into quasi or non quasi analogies (Levinson & Carpenter, 1974).  In 
23 
quasi analogies (which according to Levinson and Carpenter, are easier), the 
analog is given to the participant (i.e. a bicycle is steered with handlebars, 
but a boat is steered with…) however in non quasi analogies (bicycle is to 
handlebars as rudder is to…) the similarity-constraint needs to deduced 
independently. 
 
From the classical analogy format four different types of analogy may be 
commonly derived: that of the verbal analogy (using words for each term), 
the pictorial analogy (using pictures for each term), pattern based analogies 
(using shapes and/or proportions for each term.), and numerical analogies 
(using numbers or formula for each term).   Verbal and pictorial analogies 
are usually the most commonly encountered out of all classic analogy types.    
 
Some similarity-constraints are apparently easier than others, particularly 
antonyms and functions (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Willner, 1964), however 
generally the difficulty of the classical analogy framework may be altered 
by varying which term is the target, increasing the number of terms, 
increasing the number of target terms, and for multiple choice questions 
varying the number of possible answers.  Multiple choice (forced) answers 
can be made more difficult by increasing/decreasing the similarity between 
the options available (Piaget et al., 1977), similar but not „correct‟ objects 
creating what are known as „distracters‟, an important term within AR, and 
which usually have featural similarities to the target but not relational ones.  
 
24 
1.1.2 The problem analogy.   The problem analogy follows 
directed, situational, goal-driven reasoning, where appropriate behaviour is 
abstracted through the cueing of a „base‟ situation to a novel „target‟ 
situation.  Usually through a story in which the initial conditions, legal 
operations, and goal states of a problem are explicitly specified in one 
domain before being applied in another (Glick & Holyoak, 1980, Holyoak et 
al., 1984): i.e. having to listen to a story and then complete a physical tool 
based task to replicate the „lesson‟.    An example of this is Duncker‟s 
(1945) famous radiation problem
3
, or Glick and Holyoak‟s (1983) „Red 
Adair‟ tasks4. 
 
Typically however, success at problem analogies depends not on whether 
the participant can come up with a solution, but whether they can 
successfully transfer the (experimenter) intended solution from the base to 
the target problem, therefore it is not a strict measure of creativity but of 
interpreting experimental demand. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
Where a cancer must be removed via targeted radiation rays, but the rays themselves will 
be fatal unless applied in smaller doses.  The solution is to administer several smaller rays, 
rather than the one big one.  This solution is then applied to new situations, such as Glick & 
Holyoak‟s (1983) „Red Adair‟ tasks. 
4
 I.e. „The General‟ problem (where a number of armies must attack a fortress down several 
mined roads in order to be successful), „The Commander‟ problem (where an island must 
be attacked over several bridges at once), „The Fire Chief‟ problem (where water must be 
applied to save a house all at once rather than one bucket at a time) and the „The Red Adair‟ 
problem itself (where a fire could only be extinguished if enough foam was used through 
lots of smaller hoses as no large hose was available).    
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The cross mapping task (Markman & Gentner 1993).   
Participants are asked to cross map an object from the base scene (left) onto 
the target scene (right).   In this case the woman in the base can be mapped 
onto the woman in the target (a featural answer) or the squirrel (a relational 
answer) as they are both receiving food. 
 
1.1.3 Scene based analogies (cross mapping paradigm).  The 
„scene based analogy‟ task was originally developed by Markman and 
Gentner (1993) and expanded upon by other researchers such as Waltz et al. 
(2000) and Richland et al. (2006).   This form of analogy uses a visual cross 
mapping paradigm with pictorial scenes as both the base and target 
problems (Figure 2).  Participants are shown a „target object‟ in the base 
scene and asked to identify the „best fitting relation‟ from a list of objects in 
the target.  In scene based analogies, mappings (representations of relations) 
can be increased or decreased by adding interacting objects to pictures.   
 
In Markman and Gentner‟s paradigm there are both featural answers 
(answers that physically resemble the target object) and relational answers 
(answers that rely on attributes other than appearance).  These can both be 
represented simultaneously within the same scene if desired (Morrison et 
26 
al., 2010; Richland et al., 2006), with featural answers taking on the role of 
„distracters‟.  
 
Scene based analogies have the advantage over classical analogies in that 
they better define the relational interactions intended by the experimenter 
and isolate featural distracters within a relevant context, featural objects 
being more obvious. 
 
Research using this paradigm has shown that younger children are less 
likely to choose relational answers (as opposed to featural ones) than their 
older siblings (Richland et al., 2004; 2006; 2010), and that if participants are 
encouraged to build an integrated representation (Waltz et al., 2000) of the 
scene, by being asked to map multiple objects from the base onto the target 
(called multiple mapping as opposed to “one shot” mapping where the 
participant is asked to map just one object), then more relational answers 
will also be chosen. 
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Table 1.  An example of Piaget‟s classical analogies (Piaget et al., 1977).   
 
Bicycle: Handlebars: Ship [Rudder/Sail/Bird] 
 
If the participant chooses sail as the d term, is it because they are associating 
the term with a ship, or is it because they understand that sails can also be 
manipulated in order to change the direction? 
 
 
1.1.4 Fundamental problems within analogical testing. 
(i) The associative dilemma. According to Willner (1964), most tests of 
classical analogy do not follow a pre-determined set of rules for dealing 
with correct answers not anticipated by the researcher (a fact apparently true 
even today), thus may not be measuring analogical thinking.   Instead it is 
common for participants to use what Gentile (1977) calls an „associative 
mechanism‟: what Goldman and colleagues (Goldman, Pellegrino, 
Parseghian & Sallis, 1982) describe as a simpler associative understanding 
of the classical analogy. 
  
This works when we analyse just the c and d figures in an analogy and 
produce an answer based on them alone.  As Willner (1964) points out, it is 
entirely possible for well over half the number of correct answers in 
classical analogies to be derived via purely associative responses from the c 
and d terms, without even considering a and b.   According to Wilner it is 
possible to create a classical analogy using a rigorous methodology 
28 
accounting for the a:b terms, however most researchers do not seem to have 
adopted this.   
 
(ii) The validity dilemma.  In order for a relationship to be analogical we 
must dismiss non relevant attribute based information, this means that such 
forms of response must be present.   However, what makes this information 
irrelevant has been the source of much debate, authors such as Goswami 
(1992, 1991) suggesting that it is in fact the question, not any innate 
analogical skill, which determines what we are looking for within a 
relational problem.    
 
This goes against the traditional understanding of analogical thinking which 
assumes featural responses to be „undesirable‟ in analogical tasks. But this 
may not always be correct, and sometimes the most basic answer may be the 
best one.  As Dedre Gentner (one of the main proponents of featural/relation 
separation) points out:  “If something looks like a tiger, it probably is one”. 
(Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993, p. 567). 
 
What this means is that if the question is open ended (i.e. “how are these 
two the same?”, a method applied in many early forms of analogical 
research, most notably Piaget) and no goal state has been decided upon prior 
to the task, then theoretically any relational answer is correct so long as we 
ourselves can justify the response given.   On many occasions an answer 
may not have been accounted for by the experimenter yet still fulfil the 
criteria for higher order thought (Table 1)…and so is marked „wrong‟.  
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There is no real way of identifying such responses quantitatively; rather we 
must rely on more traditional qualitative based methods of research, such as 
asking why a particular answer is chosen.   Yet this is sadly a practice 
adopted by few researchers.  
 
One possible conclusion from these conceptual issues is that analogical 
„reasoning‟ differs from analogical „thinking‟; the former essentially being 
relational thought that arrives at a specific pre-defined goal-state, which the 
latter lacks. 
 
1.2 Definitions of analogy 
The main theories of AR may be broadly divided into three different 
domains: Classical Structuralism, Modern Structuralism and Domain 
Knowledge theories.  
 
1.2.1 Classical structuralism.  For most of last century the idea of 
structuralism in analogy (i.e. that there was more than one form of reasoning 
involved in analogies) has dominated analogical research.  
 
Although Piaget can be seen as the definitive structuralist, the idea of 
structuralism - that relational thought represents a higher form of reasoning 
than lower featural forms - is an old one that dates back to Plato and 
Aristotle and the theory of forms.    
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Figure 3.  Piaget‟s hierarchical view of analogical reasoning.  Taken from 
Goswami (1992) and adapted to show Piaget‟s overlying theory of 
abstraction. 
 
 
Here true meaning is not found in actual physical objects, but the idea of 
objects, comprehension of which is assumed to be extremely difficult. 
“Truth”, as Plato puts it, is “literally nothing but the shadows of the images” 
(Plato, 1999, p. 68).  The structuralist view simply extends this one step 
further and applies it to reasoning.    
 
Classical structuralism is centred around Piaget et al.‟s (1977) use of the 
classical analogy format (see page 21). According to the structuralists 
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Lunzer, 1965; Piaget et al., 1977; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1969) the process of empirically abstracting a relationship between 
figures a:b and c:d represents „lower-order‟ thought (see Figure 3), requiring 
less complicated (and early developmental) processes then the „higher 
order‟ establishment of further connections between terms. If the participant 
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can understand what the similarity-constraint underlying the terms is- then 
they have achieved true „higher order‟ thinking. 
 
To Piaget, analogical thinking is therefore establishing “relations of 
relations, but without the equality of cross products.” (Piaget et al., 1977).   
A process which Piaget calls „reflecting abstraction‟ 
 
 Young children are apparently unable to grasp higher order functioning as 
they are not cognitively developed enough to be able to comprehend the 
similarity-constraint (Piaget, 2001; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980).  In terms of 
Piagetian theory this may be because young children are naturally 
egocentric and cannot expand their viewpoint of an object to include a 
relationship with which they are not familiar, or which they consider less 
immediate.   
 
1.2.2 Piagetian structuralist theory.  Although Piaget is often 
quoted as being the definitive structuralist his work is presented here as a 
subset. This is because Piaget makes a number of assertions about 
analogical thinking that may be considered particular to his developmental 
theories.  Although structuralism originated through Piaget‟s work, it has 
since been applied across scientific and academic disciplines and has gone 
beyond the claims originally made by Piaget, particularly regarding his 
stage theory. 
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Piaget is accredited with the formation of the formal theory of 
constructivism which proposes that humans create meaning from operative 
processes by experiencing rules and testing them rather than through 
observation or passive repetition.  To Piaget, rather than being a symbolic 
system made up of static representations of real world structures, knowledge 
is a hierarchical and „active‟ process.  Campbell (2000) interpreted this 
perspective as knowing what to do with something under certain possible 
conditions.  
 
Piaget emphasises that alone mere figural representations („figural‟ being 
described as declarative representations which cannot be generalized: Piaget 
uses perception and language as examples) are not sufficient to explain an 
organism‟s world knowledge unless they are intrinsically „embedded‟ with 
other transformational/operative data. This equates to figurative knowledge 
having very little influence on a child‟s cognitive development.  
Instead meaningful „high-level‟ knowledge is determined by both 
application and interaction. 
5Crucial to Piaget‟s structuralist perspective is 
the belief that key developmental changes occur in our reasoning ability 
throughout childhood.  Piaget famously categorizing cognitive development 
into stages (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Analogy is a critical component of 
this developmental framework, with its own developmental timetable. 
                                                 
5
Piaget describes his methodology through his cognitive-structural theory of „assimilation‟ 
and „accommodation‟ wherein an individual comprehending the world assimilates it into 
schemes that must then be accommodated for application with non identical objects or 
situations  (for more information see Campbell, 2000).  The key point in Piaget‟s work is 
that knowledge is never viewed in isolation, rather it is judged with reference to the 
individual comprehending the object and how they have accommodated its position in the 
world.    
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Piaget and his colleagues used a pictorial version of the classical analogy 
(see p. 21) in which children of different ages were asked to put together 
pictures that “seemed to go well together.” (Piaget et al., 1977).  After first 
establishing that children were already familiar with all the pictorial terms 
presented, Piaget‟s task required the participant to bring together pairs of 
pictures and then use them again to create an analogical answer that 
comprised of four pictures in total, mimicking what we now know as the 
classical analogy.  If the participant did not immediately identify an analogy 
then the problem was metamorphosed into a quasi-analogy with the 
experimenter verbally specifying three of the terms and querying the 
participant regarding the fourth (thus prompting an easier solution). If this 
still did not result in the analogy being successfully solved, then a forced 
choice solution was given with three possible pictures being used as answers 
for the 4
th
 unidentified term.  When the participant correctly answered, the 
experimenter then proposed a number of counter-examples (i.e. “Would a 
bell or a bicycle go as well as the tiller” in the handlebars:bike:tiller:boat 
analogy).   
 
Piaget noted that by using this methodology three stages of analogical 
development within AR could be identified, all of which fitted sequentially 
within his developmental stage theory and which predicted a gradual 
increase in AR ability over time.   Piaget concluded that this was due to the 
child‟s growing ability to project qualitative information onto a higher level 
process where it could be reorganized and analysed for meaning, a process 
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he termed abstraction réfléchissante (reflecting abstraction): a “higher level” 
ability not accessible or fully developed at a younger age.  According to 
Goswami (1992) Piaget made three prevalent claims about analogy from 
this research. 
 
(i) Stage based reasoning.  Analogy is a developmentally sophisticated 
skill.  Young children find it difficult to reason analogically before they 
have passed the required developmental milestone, which for Piaget was the 
formal operational period of development. This means that a fundamental 
change occurs around the ages of 11-12 years, wherein children fully 
understand analogical thinking. Importantly, prior to this, children are 
usually unable to reason in this way.   There is good evidence for this 
change (Gallagher & Wright, 1977; Piaget et al, 1977) and it is well 
documented that success in analogy is associated with age (Holyoak et al, 
1984; Gentner, 1988). 
 
(ii) Counter suggestions.  Piaget noted that generally, older children could 
dismiss counter suggestions (alternative solutions to the analogy that did not 
represent what Piaget saw as a correct form of reasoning) far more 
consistently than younger children.  As a direct result, the Piagetian theory 
of analogy purports that the ability to dismiss counter suggestions is a key 
developmental stage that must be reached in order for successful AR to 
develop.  If this stage is not reached then analogies can still be solved but 
without a correct understanding as to why the solution has been reached. 
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Table 2. Piaget’s stages of analogical development. 
STAGE I:  
With the exception of just a few “advanced cases” Stage I (occurring during 
the preoperational development stage) constituted children aged 5-6 who 
failed to construct any analogies, the majority of children using either 
egocentric or associative behaviour to define their answers. Despite this, 
Piaget was optimistic that children were beginning to be able to reason 
about relations, suggesting that the second half of this stage (stage IB) was 
defined from its counterpart by what he called more “stable” relations at the 
elementary level (i.e. at the 2 picture comparisons, not the 4 pictures).  
 
STAGE II: 
Stage II constituted children aged 7-8 and 10-11.  Roughly coinciding with 
Piaget‟s stage of concrete operations, this stage in analogical reasoning is 
highlighted by children‟s willingness to accept counter suggestions as 
alternate answers.  While the children were able to solve the analogies 
through “groping attempts” (trial and error) they frequently showed an 
inability to grasp the overall analogy, offering alternate explanations for 
why pictures go together instead of the one intended by Piaget.  In the latter 
half of Stage II, Stage IIB children appeared to be more willing to reject 
alternate answers, and also were more likely to show an understanding of 
the overriding analogy combining terms. However they were still unable to 
construct them without feedback from the experimenter.  
 
STAGE III: 
It was only at Stage III (11-12 years) at the formal operational stage of 
development that children were able to do this on a more regular basis, with 
more rational solutions and a more frequent willingness to refute counter 
suggestions.   
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(iii) Proportional reasoning. A third claim of Piaget‟s is that analogies 
involve proportional reasoning.  Piaget implies that all proportions are 
preceded by an “understanding of the corresponding analogy” (Piaget, 
2001) implying that analogies are just “logical proportions”.   However, the 
claims appear to have been fitted around his earlier work on stages (where 
the understanding of proportions plays a large role in defining the formal 
operational period of development), and appears to have been made in order 
to cement AR in a wider developmental context. As a result little was 
written about this particular issue and Piaget‟s thoughts on proportions and 
analogies remain largely unsupported.   
 
1.2.3 Modern structuralism. Models of analogy such as those 
formed by Piaget and his structuralist colleagues have enjoyed moderate 
success in their field since their original inception (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; 
Lunzer, 1965; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Piaget et al, 1977).  However, 
towards the end of the last century there was mounting pressure from a 
cognitive, neuropsychological, as well as computational standpoint, to show 
that a workable definition of the representations involved in analogical 
thinking could be achieved through mathematically structured hierarchical 
systems of predicates that could be modelled either computationally or 
neurologically.    
 
The ensuing theories are the post-modern structuralists, defined by the work 
of Dedre Gentner and her colleagues in a direct response to classical 
structuralism.   
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Figure 4. A simplified version of Gentner‟s Similarity Space (Gentner, 
1989).  The axis represent whether the entity shares relational or featural 
similarities, not the number of relations/features. 
 
 
These are based around two core principles, structural mapping and the 
relational shift/systematicity principle, both of which are for practical 
purposes inseparable. 
 
Structural mapping theory.   For Gentner, knowledge is defined as a 
propositional network of nodes and predicates, which interact to form 
concepts about objects, systems and the world in general.  Predicates are 
descriptive arguments about a concept, the number of predicates defining its 
complexity (see Gentner‟s taxonomy of relations, p. 38). 
 
This understanding forms the basis of what is known as Gentner‟s 
„Structural Mapping Theory‟ of analogical reasoning (SMT,), „mapping‟ 
being defined here as a series of “one-to-one correspondences”, the aim of 
which is obtain the best match possible (Gentner, 1983).    
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“The basic intuition of structural mapping theory is that an analogy 
is a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base) into another 
(the target) which conveys that a system of relations that holds 
among the base objects also holds true among the target objects” 
(Gentner, 1988, p. 43). 
 
Gentner’s taxonomy of relations.    The structural aspect of SMT comes 
from the Piagetian concept that certain forms of analogical response 
represent higher order forms of thought over others.  For Gentner, this is 
also true, describing what she calls attributional and relational relationships 
(see below), and which she defines by the number of predicates associated 
with each concept.  Yet she clearly refutes the traditional structuralist 
assertion that featural responses are cognitively inferior to other forms of 
relations.  Instead she claims that superficial properties are as useful as their 
„higher order‟ counterparts (Gentner et al., 1993, p. 567), a statement which 
has obvious evolutionary validity given how important, immediate and 
readily-accessible relational information might be (as Goswami points out 
when she highlights the advantage of quickly recognizing a tiger). 
 
Attributional relations are unitary predicates used to describe properties or 
entities such as LARGE, RED, SQUARE or FURRY.   Relational relations 
are used to describe events, comparisons, or states applying to two or more 
entities or arguments (binary or greater) such as HIT, INSIDE, FASTER-
THAN, or LARGER-THAN (Gentner, 2001).    
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For example, take the above relational predicate „LARGER-THAN‟ when 
discussing the relationship between a badger and a skunk.  In order to 
understand this we would need i) the predicate i.e. „x is LARGER-THAN y‟ 
ii) the first argument, i.e. „BADGER‟ iii) the second argument i.e. 
„SKUNK‟ and iv) the binding of the similarity-constraint to these, i.e. 
BADGER is larger than SKUNK).   This is a binary „lower order‟ relational 
relationship (lower-order relations take objects as arguments, for example 
HIT [ball, table] and INSIDE [ball, table]) but it could also be reduced to a 
unitary argument such as „BLACK and WHITE‟ which requires only the 
knowledge of one relational object.   Higher order relations such as 
IMPLIES or CAUSE take other predicates as their argument.   For example 
CAUSE, when discussing pocketing a ball in snooker requires the two 
predicates HIT [cue, stick, ball] and ENTER [ball, pocket].  
 
This method of categorization has proved to be highly successful 
computationally, providing theorists with a practical concept of how 
analogical relations may be represented (Halford, 1992, 1993; 1998; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, see „complexity-constraint theory‟; p. 89).   In 
SMT Gentner further compartmentalizes analogy, breaking relational 
reasoning down into several overlapping areas of what she calls „similarity 
space‟ (Figure 4), a hypothetical meta-region dominated by four areas of 
similarity:  analogical, literal, mere appearance, and anomaly.   Thus we are 
able to separate different forms of analogy (relational and featural), but also 
define the type of dimensions that defines analogy as opposed to similarity 
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in the real world.  „Analogical‟ relations are when objects share a majority 
of relational but not featural attributes (i.e. a ball and a ship [floats]).  Mere 
appearance relations are the opposite of analogies when objects share 
featural but not relational attributes (i.e. a golf ball and a football 
[spherical]).  Literal similarities are when objects share both featural and 
relational attributes, and so are highly similar in different ways (i.e. a ship‟s 
wheel and a steering wheel [round] & [controls direction]).   Anomalies are 
so called because they do not share any form of relation and therefore do not 
encompass the definition of similarity
6
.   Hierarchical presentation of 
relationships in this manner has given rise to what may be called 
„complexity theory‟ (the word „complexity‟ implying that more processing 
power may be required in decoding „complex‟ (relational) over „simple‟ 
(featural) information). I will discuss in detail how complexity may 
constrain analogical thinking later. 
 
Structural mapping: the relational shift.  Gentner (1983) argues that there 
is sufficient support in the literature to show that young children are 
inherently limited in their reasoning abilities compared to their older peers. 
Using evidence from a series of studies based on the types of answer given, 
                                                 
6 According to Gentner (2001) some definitions do not always fit the perspective, namely 
„impure similarities‟ or similarities that cross the boundaries within similarity space. 
Probably the most frequently associated impure term with analogy is that of the metaphor.  
Figures of speech such as metaphors or similes are terms frequently (often mistakenly) 
interposed with analogy, particularly within education circles.  Depending on what is being 
reasoned, figures of speech are forms of relational reasoning that overlap into different 
categories of similarity but are not ones that should automatically be classed as analogy 
unless they fulfil certain criteria. This is because figures of speech can be used to describe 
attributes such as “a football is like a golf ball” [spherical] as well as relational concepts 
such as “a football is like a boat” [floats].    
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Gentner showed that younger children (usually aged between 3 and 7 years) 
are more likely to respond featurally than relationally if given the choice, 
despite relational responses being preferable overall (Gentner, 1998; 
Sternberg & Downing, 1982; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980).   Gentner refers to 
the gradual change in preference as “relational shift” but calls the 
preferential process of selecting relational information as „systematicity‟ 
 
“The systematicity principle states that a base predicate that belongs to 
a mappable system of mutually interconnecting relations is more 
likely to be imported into the target than is an isolated predicate.” 
(Gentner & Toupin, 1986, p. 280). 
 
Within the mapping process systematicity is crucial, offering a potential 
resolution to many long-standing questions, particularly as to why 
analogical ability emerges at very different times in different individuals 
and environments (Gentner, 1998).   
 
Like the knowledge based accounts (see p.60) Gentner predicts that young 
children can successfully reason analogically only if the similarity-
constraint (i.e. the relationship sought) being used is within a familiar 
domain (Gentner, 1977a, 1977b, Ratterman & Gentner, 1998), the kind of 
similarity children can perceive being “determined by the nature of their 
domain representation, and, in particular, by the amount and kind of 
relational knowledge they possess in the domain” (Ratterman & Gentner, 
1998, p. 455).   As children get older their pool of domain-experience 
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broadens, allowing them to compare objects on levels other than those 
which are immediately obvious (systematicity).  Yet Gentner claims that 
maturation has nothing to do with this experiential gain, instead drawing a 
line between general maturation and the experiential accretion of relational 
knowledge, relevant to the AR problems domain.  If they do not have 
relevant knowledge, they must rely on featural similarity to solve analogies.  
 
1.2.4 The knowledge based account.  Driven by the theories of 
Usha Goswami and Anne Brown (Brown 1989; Brown, & Kane, 1988; 
Crisafi & Brown, 1986; Goswami 1992; Goswami & Brown 1989), the 
knowledge based account of AR stems from the idea that the classical 
structural models of analogy fail to account for analogical success in 
children who have not yet reached the formal operational stage of 
development.     
 
Although Piaget himself had stated that children could, and frequently did, 
solve analogies outside of the later developmental stages (Piaget is often 
misquoted in this respect) he firmly believed they were doing so mainly by 
chance, and were often not showing higher order thinking.    
 
Goswami and her colleagues noted that a large body of children are 
consistently able to reason analogically outside of these boundaries, noting 
that authors have historically shown that children as young as 4 years and in 
some cases even as young as 2 and 3 (Crisafi & Brown, 1986) can complete 
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analogies
7
 so long as the analogies are within the domain of their experience 
and task understanding (Alexander, Willson, White & Fuqua 1987; Gentner, 
1989; Goswami & Brown, 1989; Vosniadou, 1989).  By giving children 
relational tasks they can understand and therefore complete (such as 
analogies based on physical causalities), Goswami and Brown demonstrated 
that analogical failure in young children results not from a lack of 
“cognitive competence” (Goswami & Brown, 1989) but a lack of 
knowledge.  
 
The knowledge based theory therefore proposes that the ability to give 
analogical responses is available from birth and that structuralists may be 
incorrect in assuming that you require complex levels of thought in order to 
solve an analogy.  Global age related improvements are not necessary, as 
domain specific knowledge of the specific relations can account almost 
entirely for analogical success (Goswami 1992).  This is fundamentally 
intuitive: the first stage in any AR task should be an understanding of what 
the basic figures and terms are.  If we are unfamiliar with any of them, then 
we will not succeed, or at the very least be able to give an adequate 
explanation of the correct answer (thereby being unable to show true 
analogical understanding in the eyes of the experimenter). 
 
                                                 
7
 This depends on whether you class much of the research presented in this section as true 
analogical studies or not.  It is extremely hard to get valid explanations from a notoriously 
unreliable year group.  Brown and Kane (1988) in particular frequently talk about 
analogical “transfer”, the ability to “extract and apply rules over examples”  
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This can be seen in Piaget‟s famous handlebars:bike::rudder:boat: analogy. 
In order to understand this analogy, you will have to have experienced the 
terms before; but a rudder is often partially below the water line on a boat, 
and therefore out of sight.  In this instance, it would not be unreasonable to 
suspect that a child who lives near the coast, or who is otherwise familiar 
with boats, would be better able to solve the analogy than a child who is not.  
This does not mean that such a child has better analogical skill… just more 
relational experience.      
 
Since the knowledge based approach has been adopted by post-classical 
theorists such as Gentner, it is unfair to assume that all non-knowledge 
based theorists reject the assumptions made above.   Goswami (1992) 
however, has adopted a self-titled “extreme approach” to the knowledge 
based theories, one that rejects structuralism entirely.     
 
1.2.5  Relational primacy perspective.  Despite being instrumental 
in forming the modern interpretation of the knowledge perspective, 
Goswami is keen to distance herself from the mainstream interpretation of 
relational primacy, offering instead what she calls a more “extreme version 
of the knowledge based view.” (Goswami, 1992).   
 
Like her colleague Anne Brown, Goswami rejects Piaget‟s claims that only 
older children can reason analogically, but goes further by suggesting that 
everything within analogy can be explained by either i) performance factors  
(i.e. task understanding and meta knowledge of the task), or ii) domain 
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knowledge.   Goswami argues that if children do not know or comprehend 
the analogical problem presented, then their analogical ability (i.e. their 
knowledge of the relations being used) is hidden, but is not absent.     
 
In order to account for success or failure outside of performance, Goswami 
proposes what she calls the relational difficulty hypothesis, which states 
that:  
 
“…the constraint on the development of AR is the recognition or 
discovery of relationships in the developing knowledge base, rather 
than the recognition and use of relational similarity itself.” 
(Goswami, 1992, p. 13-14).     
 
Importantly, in relational primacy this process is automatic, the entire 
process being reliant on whether the child does or does not have the 
information required to solve the task.  To this end Goswami makes an 
important prediction: 
 
“If the relations in an analogy are already part of conceptual 
knowledge, then recognizing their similarity should not constitute an 
extra cognitive load.” (Goswami, 1992, p. 13-14).   
 
Any idea of hierarchical relationships as proposed by the structuralists is 
therefore meaningless.  Designating some relationships as „higher‟ or 
„lower‟ order is a purely arbitrary process defined by the experimenter, a 
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classification that is made only after the solution has been obtained.  
“Higher order analogies” in the Piagetian sense are always exactly the same 
as the lower order, any attempt to differentiate them syntactically (or 
proportionally) being doomed to failure because the relationship can always 
be reduced to a single argument. 
 
Age based changes in the relational primacy theory.  A central feature of 
relational primacy theory is that it does not predict global age related shifts 
in analogical ability (i.e. the „relational shift‟ hypothesis), which Goswami 
argues is an artefact of the analogical test.   Goswami is keen to point out 
that despite this claim, age related changes in ability can and do take place 
but the change is entirely an ideographic one, centred round whether or not 
the child has experience of the specific analogy.   The fact that other authors 
have detected such relational changes is due to either the child‟s full or 
partial understanding of the relations involved within the particular analogy. 
 
In cases that are ambiguous, Goswami proposes that children will use other 
forms of reasoning, falling back on self-descriptive observables (featural 
relations) or other associations that they have acquired. This accounts for 
the distraction effect observed by Piaget (1977).  Crucially, what an object 
looks like (i.e. if it is featural or relational) should not affect analogical 
outcome. 
 
Performance factor account.  The performance factor account is 
Goswami‟s concession to information-processing and individual 
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differences. She proposes that “meta knowledge” of the analogical task can 
account for some or all relational thinking.  It is based on the work of 
Goldman and her colleagues (Chen & Daehler, 1989; Goldman et al., 1982) 
who suggested that a simpler mechanism for understanding analogy existed.  
This may be by association, but may also include the level of instruction or 
experience with the specific task.    
 
Analogy is often a term which can only be applied post-hoc after the 
analogical „problem‟ has been solved (Goswami, 1992), implying that most 
reasoners either do not implicitly understand what is required of them or 
that participants have not specifically been asked to reason relationally. 
Performance factors are therefore factors which aid task understanding and 
the formation of appropriate schemas or rule-sets.  What Goswami terms the 
“facilitation gradient” of “performance factors” (Goswami, 1992, p. 74). For 
example, being able to interpret an ambiguous goal, interpret experimenter 
demand, comprehend instruction, hold a goal in mind, or reject alternative 
responses known to be incorrect.    
 
Brown and Kane (1989) suggest that in many cases analogies are really 
measuring “meta knowledge”.   By frequently observing the type of 
responses available they learn to answer relationally. Of course obtaining 
this meta knowledge is not in itself an easy task. In many cases analogical 
problems use confusing, contradictory or vague language (arguably brought 
about by the confusion surrounding the definitions of the term analogy) 
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citing words such “patterns8” (Richland et al. 2004, 2006), “hints9” (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980) or “correspondences.” (Waltz et al., 2000), which may be 
confusing to younger participants who need to decipher their instructions 
before they can adapt to the task.     
 
Similarities and differences between SMT and relational primacy. Despite 
their apparent differences, both SMT and relational primacy share a number 
of similar theoretical stances.   Both state that domain-specific knowledge is 
fundamental in AR tasks (without which we cannot fully comprehend what 
is required of us), and both suggest that featural matching during this 
process may (in some circumstances) be a fall back strategy, brought about 
by an absence of prerequisite information.  Indeed both theories directly 
mirror Piaget‟s concept of experiential learning being crucial to the 
developmental process; if you have no personal experience of something: 
you are unable to accomplish the task.  
 
The biggest different between the two theories surrounds processing.  For 
Gentner the focus is on the later active one-to-one mapping of the 
descriptive information in the base onto candidate targets; the relationships 
being held in mind and processed for meaning.  For Goswami, it is on early 
processing, specifically the ability to recognize and conceptualize the 
appropriate similarity-constraint in the base object.  Ratterman and Gentner 
                                                 
8
 “A certain pattern exists in both the top picture and the bottom picture, and the child‟s job 
is to find this pattern.” (Richland et al, 2004) 
9
 “Subjects in the experimental conditions were told that the first story might give them 
some hints for solving the test problem” (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) 
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(1998) coined the term „relational primacy‟ to describe the differences 
between these approaches.   
 
It can be argued that the construct of a schema/rule set and the descriptive 
complexity of a relational object do in fact represent different approaches to 
the same concept of strategy management.  A rule-set simply describing the 
overall appropriateness of an object while complexity describes the number 
of ways in which they are similar.  
  
The main differences between the two theories are that Goswami predicts 
that the similarity-constraint can be understood by all ages if the child is 
able to comprehend what is being asked of him/her.  Secondly, she predicts 
that relational-complexity does not load mapping.  In the case of the latter, 
relational primacy predicts that once a similarity-constraint is understood, it 
is a part of knowledge and the child can find the correct solution regardless 
of how complex it is.  However, recognizing the appropriate similarity-
constraint it not always easy and may require a more detailed schema (i.e. 
further processing
10
) if the target is ambiguous.   
 
                                                 
10
 Because Goswami‟s focus is on the presence of knowledge and sees mapping as 
influenced by the performance factors described above, it has received a degree of negative 
attention from cognitive psychologists who have criticised the Goswami theory for not 
predicting processing differences in problems where the similarity-constraint is already 
known (Richland et al, 2004; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998).   However it may be more 
beneficial for researchers to consider that both theories are more similar, viewing the same 
mapping process from different standpoints with a greater emphasis on different stages of 
the process.   
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How ambiguity might be managed is not discussed in Goswami‟s (1992) 
theory however, it is suggested that ambiguity is not demonstrated by the 
number of attributes relational objects may share (one being more 
appropriate than another in a task and therefore being the correct solution), 
but the overall goal.  
 
A further point of contention is that of Gentner‟s relational shift.  Goswami 
argued that such a change could be a function of knowledge, a child 
progressing from no-knowledge about a similarity-constraint to knowledge.  
However, Gentner (1998) dismisses such a claim.  For Gentner, whilst the 
relational-shift does involve a change in knowledge, featural-matching is 
more than an error suggested by Goswami.  Instead it is a prerequisite for 
relational thought and a product of a developing system, the sheer number 
of featural errors made by younger year groups suggesting a fundamental 
change in the way relational-reasoning is conducted.   As Gentner states, 
featural responses are “a crucial and necessary step in the progression from 
comparisons based on overall similarity to comparisons based on relational 
similarity” (Gentner, 1998, p. 456).   
 
“The relational shift hypothesis predicts a shift from interpretations based 
on object commonalities to interpretations based on relational 
commonalities as domain experience increases. The relational primacy view 
predicts that children should either process relational comparisons correctly 
from the beginning or, if errors are made before the child possesses 
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adequate domain knowledge, there should be a variety of errors, with no one 
type predominating.” (Gentner, 1998, p. 457).  
 
1.3 Working memory 
In this section we will focus on the contribution of working memory (WM) 
to reasoning and cognitive development.   WM refers to the processes in 
short term memory beyond that of passive storage which includes the 
cognitive ability to manipulate the information being stored.   It is believed 
to “underpin our capacity for complex thought.” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 1) and 
as such has been implicated in important areas such as child development, 
learning (for a review see Alloway, 2006) and language comprehension 
(Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003), diagnosing learning difficulties (Alloway, 
Gathercole, Willis & Adams, 2004; Swanson, 1994), reasoning and thinking 
(Logie & Gilhooly, 1998), conscious thought (Baars & Franklin, 2003), and 
even moral decision making (Moore, Clarke & Kane, 2008), childhood 
poverty and stress (Evans & Schamberg, 2009) … amongst many others.  
   
One of most widely accepted models of WM is the Baddeley & Hitch 
model.  Developed in 1974 the original tripartite model is a modality 
specific, resource limited, modular system containing three slave systems: 
the phonological loop (PL) the visuo-spatial sketch pad (VSSP) and the 
central executive (CE).   
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Figure 5.  The multiple resource model of WM (Baddeley, 2000). The top 
section represents the multiple resource model itself, which is based around 
fluid processing systems.  The bottom represents crystallized areas of LTM 
that are accessed by WM. 
 
 
Within the model the central executive fulfils the most important role 
(Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003), its main functions being to both process 
and store information, as well as regulate the information flow between the 
slave systems and long term memory.  The other systems, namely the PL 
and VSSP, are maintenance and rehearsal modules which deal with 
specialised domain specific information, namely verbal and visual/spatial.   
The WM model is limited by what is referred to as working memory 
capacity (WMC).   
 
Although much debate surrounds the definition (Engle, 2002) WMC refers 
to storage and attentional limitations within STM which vary according to 
the domain and content of the information stored.  Baddeley has recently 
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indicated that these constraints are attentional, however because the WM 
construct is modular (with evidence for visual and verbal systems) these 
resources may be further categorized into what will be termed global 
„executive‟ and domain-specific STS (Short Term Store) capacities. 
In 2000 a multiple resource model (Figure 5) of WM was introduced 
(Baddeley, 2000) when a fourth module, the Episodic Buffer (EB) was 
added to the WM system.   The EB is a limited capacity store, linking the 
CE to LTM, its main purpose being to integrate information into coherent 
episodes, binding different dimensions of information from the other 
systems, as well as any form of perceptual input into chunks (such as 
colour: shape: type etc). 
 
As with most cognitive models Baddeley‟s model of WM is intended as a 
framework for research, and as such is not meant to be a detailed 
representation of neurological networking.   As an experimental framework 
the model has undoubtedly been highly lucrative and has successfully been 
applied as an investigational tool in a wide range of roles.   Part of WM‟s 
success has been due to its simplicity; Baddeley himself stating that upon its 
creation, he expected the model to change, more components to be added
11
 
and existing modules to be fractionated
12
.    
 
                                                 
11
 The exact quotation is: “I assume that the working memory system will ultimately prove 
to comprise considerably more than two or three subcomponents” Baddeley (1995) p. 114. 
12
 Baddeley is quoted as saying “I assume that the central executive can in common with 
the other components of working memory, be fractionated into subcomponents.” Baddeley 
(2007) p. 119 
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To an extent this has already happened with other authors adding new 
insights to the existing structure; such as Logie‟s visual spatial model (Logie 
& Pearson, 1997) or Baddeley‟s own inclusion of the Norman and Shallice 
(1986) supervisory attention model.  
 
1.3.1 Dual task methodology.  Undoubtedly the reason for the 
success of the WM model has been its ability to make specific predictions 
based on its subcomponents within a limited-capacity system through the 
creation of tests designed to overload global or domain specific resources.  
This method of overloading has become known as the „dual task 
methodology‟. 
 
Within the dual task methodology participants perform a primary task 
concurrently with a secondary task, the idea being that if the primary task 
uses the same cognitive resources as the secondary task then the level of 
performance at either will significantly drop.  Secondary tasks usually 
involve concurrent processing in specific domains such as continually 
articulating a word (known as articulatory suppression) or remembering a 
series of letters (DeStefano & LeFevre, 2003).  As such the dual task 
methodology provides “the most compelling evidence on the specific 
processes involved in the task of interest because they can be used to isolate 
the roles of the different working memory components.” (DeStefano & 
LeFevre, 2003, p. 3) 
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Figure 6. The Phonological Loop (Baddeley, 1986). 
 
 
1.3.2 The phonological loop.  The PL is a slave system specialized 
in the storage of verbal material.   It is a two component process containing 
a short term phonological store and the sub vocal rehearsal system (Figure 
6).   As its name implies, the phonological store is responsible for the 
storage of phonological code (both acoustic and non-acoustic). This code 
decays over time (Baddeley, 1974) but may be refreshed by the rehearsal 
system.  Critically, auditory information (such as speech) has direct access 
to the phonological store, whilst non-verbal information (such as words), 
must be recoded through the rehearsal system before it is stored.   
 
Experimental methodology of the phonological loop.  Evidence for the 
architecture of the phonological loop comes from a number of experimental 
phenomena associated with phonological STM, such as the phonological 
similarity effect, articulatory suppression and the word length effect.   
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In the case of articulatory suppression the recall of printed words is affected 
by the suppression effect of repeatedly vocalizing words such as “the, the, 
the.”  This disrupts the rehearsal process resulting in reduced phonological 
coding and refreshing, meaning that the phonological code decays without 
replacement (Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003).   
 
Further evidence for the process of rehearsal was found in what became 
known as the word length effect (Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 1975) 
which states that longer words are harder to recall than shorter words 
(within both verbal and visual stimuli).   This alone implied a maximum 
capacity limit, but when the size of the words being recalled was examined 
the findings suggested that the observed word length effect was “due to the 
articulatory duration of the items, and not simply the number of syllables 
they contained” (Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003, p. 9).  This suggests that 
rehearsal is a real time process and that capacity within this process is not 
down to the number of spaces available during processing for phonological 
code but rather to the length of time information is held within the system. 
This temporal rather than volumetric based capacity has a drastic effect on 
recall:  since words with longer spans take longer to encode, the loop is less 
able to refresh the short term store, meaning that other items (of any span) 
decay more rapidly.   What is more, since longer words take more time to 
rehearse, more short words may be maintained compared to longer ones.   
    
Since the word length effect and articulatory suppression both appear to 
affect the rehearsal process (which as mentioned is limited by temporal-
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space) it was hypothesized that the advantage short span words have over 
longer span words would be abolished under conditions of suppression, i.e. 
when rehearsal is prevented or made more difficult. This was found to be 
the case in a further experiment (Baddeley, 1995); wherein both verbal and 
visual recalls were affected
13. “The results were clear.” writes Baddeley: 
“The standard word length effect was present under control conditions but 
was abolished under articulatory suppression” (Baddeley, 1995, p. 81).   
This therefore provided good evidence for both the sub vocal rehearsal 
process and the existence of the PL. 
 
Another effect that gave rise to the structure of the PL was the phonological 
similarity effect
14
, which, as with most of the evidence for the PL, was a 
well known phenomenon prior to the development of WM.  Simply put, this 
effect occurs when participants make acoustic errors on visually presented 
stimuli in a recall task, phonologically similar letters being recalled less 
accurately than dissimilar ones (Conrad, 1964; Conrad & Hull, 1964).   
Salame & Baddeley (1982) suggest that this effect results from the 
degradation of an item that is phonetically similar to another already being 
held in the STS.  In such cases, when the number of discriminating features 
between the two is small, the effect is particularly catastrophic as the loss of 
potentially definitive/unique features will render it identical to the other 
maintained item(s).    In these experiments, when the recall stimuli were 
                                                 
13
Although with visual presentation the effect was similar to verbal presentation, the direct 
access phonological code has to the STS means that with phonological presentation “It may 
be necessary to continue articulatory suppression during recall as well as during list 
presentation” (Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003; p. 11) 
14
 Conrad (1964) used the term „Acoustic Similarity‟. 
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presented visually the phonological similarity effect seemed to disappear 
under articulatory suppression, however it remains within auditory stimuli 
interference (Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003).  This discrimination is 
accounted for because the effect takes place within the STS, not the 
articulatory loop.  Articulatory suppression blocking the rehearsal process 
and interfering with the access visual information has to the STS, whilst 
verbal material, which has direct access, is not affected.   
 
1.3.3 The visuo-spatial sketch pad.  The VSSP is a slave system 
involved in the generation of images and in the retention of information 
with visual or spatial dimensions.   It is responsible for processing verbal 
material that has been encoded in the form of imagery, integrating visuo-
spatial information from multiple sources (such as visual, tactile, and 
kinaesthetic; as well as episodic and semantic LTM)
15
 (Baddeley, 1995; 
Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley, 2007).   Practical applications for 
such a system include mental calculation, mental mapping (i.e. route 
learning) and mnemonic strategies, skills that are critical in occupations 
such as architecture or engineering (Baddeley, 2007).   
 
Experimental methodology of the visuo-spatial sketch pad.  The idea that 
the visuo-spatial memory are distinct processes from the phonological 
system comes from a number of sources (See Baddeley, 2007; Baddeley, 
                                                 
15
 The WM model assumes that the VSSP is a storage system for integrating visual and 
spatial information.  This visuo-spatial code is acquired, not just from vision, but also 
touch, language and LTM, so the term “domain specific” when used for the VSSP is a little 
ubiquitous.   
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1995 for a review), the most influential of which has been 
neuropsychological evidence citing double-disassociations between patients 
with impaired visuo-spatial ability and intact verbal ability, and vice versa 
(DeRenzi & Nichelli, 1975; Hanley, Young & Pearson, 1991).     
 
The WM model proposes that such a visual-spatial system may be further 
divided into two separate but otherwise complimentary visual and spatial 
systems, and over the past few decades supporting evidence also has 
emerged to suggest that visual-memory systems might be separate from 
spatial-memory along these axis, such research stemming from further 
double-disassociations in FLHI patients (Darling, Sala, Logie & Cantagallo, 
2006) and interference tasks which reported an observed difference between 
location and appearance memory (Darling, Sergio & Logie; 2009) .    
Admittedly much confusion exists around how „visual‟ and „spatial‟ 
memory may be defined, however very broadly speaking „spatial‟ may be 
defined as the location of an object (where it is), whilst „visual‟ memory 
refers to the detail within an object (what it looks like). (Darling et al., 
2006).   
 
The joint visual and spatial WM hypothesis arose from a number of task 
based experiments (Baddeley, 1995) designed to tap one system but not the 
other (such as sound cuing in a darkened room, or the recall of colours and 
shapes), using modality specific interference via the dual task technique.  
Two of the most frequently cited visual and spatial tasks, which are often 
used as a psychometric measure of visual and spatial abilities respectively, 
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are the Wilson, Scott and Power (1987) matrix task (participants must 
remember the order of shapes) and the Corsi (1971) block tapping task 
(participants must physically tap out the correct sequence of answers on 
different blocks).  More recently, passive and active aspects of VSWM have 
been highlighted, which allow the subdivision of storage and attentional 
components (Hamilton, Coates, & Heffernan. 2003).  As a consequence of 
such evidence, two components of visuo-spatial working memory have been 
proposed: a visual cache thought to store the appearance of a stimulus and 
an “inner scribe”, believed to store crucial spatial information such as 
locations (Logie, 2003). 
 
Logie’s elaborative model.  In contrast to the PL and the CE, Baddeley‟s 
accounts of the VSSP are far less developed (Pearson 2001), the VSSP 
being described as a “younger sibling to the theoretically more mature 
phonological loop” (Logie & Pearson, 1997, p. 241).  As a result, unlike the 
PL, there is currently no officially accepted (sub)model within Baddeley‟s 
WM for the layout of what the components of the VSSP may look like.   
There are a number of reasons for this, the most critical being that visual 
spatial working memory is a notoriously hard concept to study:  there is no 
analog for the word length effect, most visual tasks seem to involve at least 
some elements of spatial memory, and all spatial tasks (developed thus far) 
are moderated by extraneous factors such as motor skills/muscular control.   
 
Although Baddeley (1995) does not describe the inner architecture of the 
VSSP Logie and colleagues (1995) provide us with a more descriptive 
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model of what the components sub-processes may look like.  Logie 
differentiates the VSSP‟s functions into three distinct processes (all of 
which may be roughly analogous to the visual spatial equivalent of the PL 
model created by Baddeley et al.).   
 
i) Visual cache, a short term store: a passive process not involved 
in rehearsal. 
ii) The inner scribe, an active rehearsal loop for both visual and 
spatial information: critically, the scribe is also responsible for 
the manipulations/transformations of the information within it). 
iii) And, the central executive: a control process for the other two 
modules. 
 
Although fundamentally in agreement with the overall perspective of the 
VSSP
16
 Baddeley and Logie differ in terms of emphasis.   The key 
difference between the two perspectives is that Baddeley holds the Sketch 
Pad to be a single system for the processing of visual and spatial 
information, whilst Logie suspects that the processes are separate (Mohr & 
Linden, 2005).  To Logie, Baddeley‟s VSSP is a “mental workspace” 
(Baddeley, 2007, p. 92), an area where visual-spatial manipulations are 
made on data already stored in LTM memory.  Conversely, Baddeley‟s 
stance on the VSSP is based around the short term storage of visual 
information relying on the direct processing of sensory code from 
                                                 
16
 Baddeley notes that the lack of evidence is still “sparse” regarding the VSSP and does 
not yet justify totally “abandoning Logie‟s concept” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 92) of the 
rehearsal process despite his concerns, detailed above. 
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perceptual input rather than a unitary inner scribe which holds, and then 
processes, all forms of information in LTM as well.    
 
In the quadripartite model the VSSP does not manipulate information; 
instead this role is fulfilled by the CE/E.  Although Baddeley‟s tripartite 
concept did account for transference of information from LTM, it did not 
qualify how this might take place until the quadripartite model was 
introduced.    
 
Logie‟s elaborative model has been called indirect because of its nature of 
handling data from LTM rather than directly from sensory input (Baddeley, 
2007).  As such it should be noted that Logie‟s model fits the original 
tripartite model better than the quadripartite, as the manipulation of 
information from LTM in the tripartite model is now performed up by the 
EB in the quadripartite rather than the CE.  This effectively means that 
Logie‟s use of the CE as a workspace is now redundant. 
 
1.3.4 The central executive.  Described as the most important 
component of working memory (Baddeley, 2007) the CE fulfils a number of 
critical supervisory roles: coordinating strategy selection and planning, and 
controlling the transmission and (in the tripartite model) retrieval of 
information from LTM to the other subsystems.    As previous described, 
WM is defined as being a „capacity‟ limited, system and one of its primary 
roles of the CE is to govern the flow of attentional through a number of 
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executive processes
17
 (see p. 84).  Like the VSSP the CE started life as one 
of the least studied aspects of working memory
18
, however by the mid 1990s 
the lack of evidence had become something of a concern (Baddeley, 1996).  
As with the VSSP there was no cognitive model, and little could be done to 
hide the ambiguity surrounding the critical (directorial) decisions the CE 
was being asked to make; a point noted by Merlin Donald when he 
infamously criticised the CE as being little more than an inscrutable 
homunculus
19
 (Donald, 1991). 
 
This initial critique of the model was acknowledged by Baddeley and his 
colleagues, who adopted the Norman and Shallice (1986) supervisory 
attention system (SAS) as a possible alternative to the CE.  This move 
effectively abandoned the idea that the CE was in any way involved in 
storage (i.e. was a mental workspace) and postulated instead that attention 
was the processing resource famously implied by limited capacity 
(Baddeley, 1995).   Although frequently misquoted as being a unitary 
construct (Baddeley, 2007, p. 118), the CE is now assumed to have at least 
four particularly important executive component processes that are believed 
to globally effect WM including the capacity to focus attention, divide 
attention, switch attention, and to provide a link to LTM (Baddeley, 1996).  
                                                 
17
 Processes should not themselves be seen as being limited capacity; rather these processes 
define what we understand as a limited resource system; constraining attentional control in 
a number of different ways. 
18
 In Baddeley‟s 1995 book concerning the tripartite model represented, work on the CE 
covered 11% (one chapter) of the overall written content. Comparatively an entire book 
(Gathercole & Baddeley, 2003) has been written on the articulatory loop. 
19
 The exact quote is: “The C.E. is a hypothetical entity that sits atop the mountain of 
working memory and attention like some gigantic Buddha, an inscrutable, immaterial, 
omnipresent homunculus, at whose busy desk the buck stops every time memory and 
attention theorists run out of alternatives”. (Donald, 1991, p. 327) 
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Figure 7.  The Mk II Supervisory System Model.  (Adapted from Shallice & 
Burgess, 1996) 
 
 
The supervisory attention system (SAS).  According to Norman and 
Shallice (1986) behavioural output (action) is either automatic (via a 
contention scheduling system) or controlled by executive processes (via a 
supervisory attention system: Figure 7).  Automatic actions are stored as 
schemas which are chosen by their relevancy and which are used until the 
system either runs out of attentional resources, or another schema overrules 
the first.   In the latter case, which schema is preferentially chosen is 
decided by a process of “contention scheduling”, which uses inhibitory and 
excitatory processes to decide upon the action relevant to the situation.  For 
automatic processes (such as driving a car) the relevant action is chosen if 
there are appropriate environmental stimuli present (such as being in a car). 
In the cases where automatic tasks cannot be carried out, or where new 
stimuli are involved, the SAS process becomes involved, increasing or 
decreasing excitatory variables until a single schema is selected. 
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Although switching the CE with the SAS effectively silenced the critics and 
circumvented the infamous „Homunculus‟ problem, new problems were 
created in the process.  One big side effect of adopting the SAS was that the 
system had no storage component: it worked in parallel to a STS.  Since the 
main criterion for WM is that it should be able to manipulate the material 
being stored “incorporating information indirectly, either from LTM or by 
allowing cross modal encoding” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 85), the new model had 
effectively removed cross modal semantic manipulation within information 
stored in LTM.  Therefore a new component was required, one that restored 
the tripartite CE‟s buffering facility.  This new component was the EB. 
 
Experimental methodology of the central executive.  The process of 
investigating the CE has been made easier by the recent advances in (and 
availability of) neuroimaging techniques- which, since the creation of the 
quadripartite model, have now convincingly isolated the frontal lobes as 
being involved in the executive processes (for review of this see Henson 
2001; Kane & Engle, 2002; Roberts, Robbins & Weiskrantz, 1998; Smith & 
Jonides, 1997; Stuss & Knight, 2002).    
 
Prior to this, the investigational methodology of the CE centred on 
neuropsychological techniques investigating inhibition and inappropriate 
behaviour in frontal lobe damaged patients (frontal lobe head injury or 
„FLHI‟ patients).     Since WM operates on the assumption that the selection 
and processing of information is a critical attribute of the CE, conceivable 
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central executive deficits would impair processing ability, which would in 
turn explain well known side effects of such FLHIs, such as poor planning 
and organisation skills (Hartman, Pickering & Wilson, 1992).   This 
assumption was supported by a series of behavioural experiments in normal 
participants, each of which looked at the four areas of WM indicated by 
Baddeley (1996) as being involved in executive control (for full a review of 
these see Baddeley 2007; Baddeley 1996).   As mentioned previously, these 
were  
 
i) The capacity to focus attention. 
ii) Divide attention. 
iii) Switch attention. 
iv) To provide a link to LTM. 
 
Three of these executive processes are attentionally based- the fourth, the 
link to LTM, came about when the SAS model was introduced to the WM 
framework and the CE was stripped of its storage capacity: therefore the EB 
makes up the fourth executive function of the model. 
 
Because executive functions share much common ground (specifically 
inhibition), identifying separable aspects of each is paramount, but 
understandably difficult.   Yet recent evidence has arisen that suggests that 
this task is far from impossible, with growing evidence appearing over the 
last ten years to suggest that three functions in particular (separate 
interpretations of Baddeley‟s big four) may be isolated (Miyake, Friedman, 
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Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager; 2000), shifting, inhibition and 
inhibition and updating.  
 
The following four sections will detail each of Baddeley‟s functions in 
order, briefly describing the methodology and reasoning behind isolating 
each function. 
 
(i) Attentional focus.  Focusing attention is one of the most crucial features 
of the central executive (Baddeley, 2007).  It is now readily accepted that 
attentional capacity is limited but that different factors such as task 
familiarity
20
 (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) or number of tasks being held in 
mind at any one time (Baddeley, 2007) can reduce attentional demands.  
Historically two of the most frequently encountered experimental 
methodologies used to investigate attentional focus have been random 
verbal generation and the generation of items from semantic categories 
(RVG). Semantic categorization (such as naming as many words or animals 
as possible that begin with certain letters, without repetition) is both 
attentionally demanding (Vallar, & Baddeley 1984) and known to be 
vulnerable to frontal lobe damage (Milner, 1964).  Random verbal 
generation (generating supposedly random numbers or letters out of 
sequential order, such as 1, 2 or A, B and in the case of letters, without 
commonly encountered acronyms) is known to share common 
                                                 
20
 The most likely reason for this is because (as modelled in the SAS) “habit-based 
automatic processes become more efficient” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 126).   
 
68 
processes/resources with decision making whilst showing improvement 
across the developmental course (Baddeley, 1966; Holding 1989).   
 
Interestingly, RNG has been shown to be comparatively less sensitive to the 
mediatory effect of rule comprehension although it has been suggested that 
this may be because RNG is representative of general high level functioning 
(Towse & Mclachlan, 1999) rather than a specific attentional function.    
 
Methodologies such as RNG or RVG may be highly-useful to WM 
psychologists as they exemplify the different facets of attentional constraint, 
tapping the same executive systems, specifically inhibition as other more 
complicated tasks.  Thus, when conducted simultaneously, such tasks as 
RNG or RVG are understood to affect the concurrent task (Vallar, & 
Baddeley, 1984).   
 
Separating „active‟ executive functioning from „passive‟ storage processing 
is one of the major tasks of the WM executive and it should be noted that a 
counter argument to the attentional claim is the position that the findings 
from studies using just verbal generation or categorization tasks do not 
automatically imply a distinct executive system comparable to the CE.    
This is the case of the Holding chess study, where Holding (1989) 
demonstrated that counting backwards in threes interfered with the retention 
of chess pieces within carefully structured chess problems, but rather than 
assuming this was interfering with an executive resource, Holding attributed 
his findings to the limited capacity phonological loop.   This assumption has 
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since been refuted.  In a number of experiments centred on similar chess 
problems, Baddeley (2007) investigated whether or not the CE could be 
implicated instead in any of these claims.  Using dual tasks designed to 
disrupt the three primary aspects of WM (PL, VSSP and CE namely 
articulatory suppression, spatial tapping and backwards counting 
accordingly).  Baddeley and his colleagues found that articulatory 
suppression had little or no effect on the retention of the chess positions; 
spatial tapping had a moderate disruption, whilst backwards counting had a 
severe effect on performance, implying that backwards counting was an 
executive demanding process rather than a purely phonological one.  
Critically in a follow on study (using chess problems restrained by a time 
limit) Baddeley also found that “performance was not impaired by a 
demanding concurrent load” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 125), suggesting that task 
difficulty was unrelated to attentional demand.   
 
(ii) Division of attention.  If one of the features of the CE is to allocate 
resources to “heavy” cognitive loads it is reasonable to assume that the 
ability to schedule 2 or more cognitive tasks is either a separate process 
from other executive functions, or a subtask of the overall ability to focus 
attention.  Baddeley (2007) assumes the latter, stating that it is “potentially 
dissociable” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 136) but also states that although work is 
“appears promising” it is by no means “firmly established” (Baddeley, 
2007, p. 138).    Unsurprisingly therefore, the executive ability to divide 
attention enjoys the least empirical support out of all four abilities currently 
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associated with the CE, with much of the work being either pragmatically or 
intuitively based.  
 
As mentioned previously the WM model assumes that some processes are 
more automatic than others, but it is highly evident that we are able to 
conduct more the one cognitive task simultaneously, and that some of these 
tasks interfere with one another (such as driving, reading, or playing the 
piano).  What experimental evidence there is comes mainly from 
Alzheimer‟s disease patients, whom it is argued have trouble performing 
more than one skill concurrently, but who have a level of performance on 
the individual (single as opposed to dual) tasks that remains steady 
throughout the majority of the disease (Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie 
& Spinnler, 1991), implying that Alzheimer‟s disease is disrupting an 
executive functioning facility that is able to divide attention.   Other more 
general studies support this association, such as Hartman, Pickering and 
Wilson (1992) who found that FLHI patients found it more difficult to 
divide their attention over two tasks
21
.   
 
(iii) Task switching.  Task switching is perhaps one of the better known 
control processes thought to be associated with the CE, with research citing 
its importance dating back to the early quarter of last century (see Baddeley, 
2007, for a review).    
 
                                                 
21
 Studies by both Baddeley (2007) and Hartman (1992) found that the act of conversation 
had a particularly big negative effect on dual tasks: this in turns suggests that social activity 
has a high executive loading. 
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As with other processes implied by Baddeley as being core to CE function, 
Task Switching has been shown to be linked to FLHI patients (Milner, 
1965).  Historically, psychometric measurements of task switching include 
tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
22
 (WCST; Wells printing and 
digital services, 2000) or the Trail Making Task
23
 (TMT; Reitan, 1958). 
Other commonly encountered tasks such as the Stroop are also thought to 
involve similar core processes.   
 
Although difficult to define with any precision (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) a 
„task‟ may be described as a subset of cognitively available representations, 
which may contain a number of different processes, learned material, and/or 
perceptual inputs.  Switching tasks involves arranging these processes, 
either consciously or subconsciously to achieve a goal (Monsell, 2005).   
 
In order to switch routinely between parallel tasks using the same input we 
must a) maintain two or more task-sets active and accessible whilst b) 
simultaneously being able to disregard (reconfigure) the appropriate set as 
required (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).  Additionally, on top of these, we must 
concurrently hold the initial instructions as to which set is needed at which 
point and be able to recall our current position in the problem (i.e. which 
methodology is required next); earlier studies having already shown that 
                                                 
22
 Participants are shown a number of cards and told to match a stimulus card with them.   
Participants are not told the rule governing how the cards, and at set periods of time, this 
rule changes.  The errors are taken as the score.  
23
 The TMT comes in two sections.  In the first, participants join sequential numbers on a 
sheet of paper using a pen/pencil (i.e. 1,2,3 etc.), in the second, they must alternate between 
letters and numbers (i.e. A1,B2,C3 etc). 
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task difficulty in task-switching is increased when the stimulus provides a 
clue as to which is next (i.e. is not identical) (Spector & Biederman, 1976). 
 
Most commonly we measure the cognitive costs of switching between tasks 
(switch cost) either by comparing a standard number of correct/incorrect 
responses in a task where switching is not required to a task using identical 
stimuli where switching is required (error cost), or by determining how long 
the participant takes to complete either (time cost) (Rogers & Monsell, 
1995).    
 
Using a verbal version of the TMT (involving articulated days of the weeks 
and months rather than letters and numbers) and articulatory suppression 
(involving repeating days of the week, then months articulated 
continuously) as dual tasks, Baddeley asked participants to add or subtract 
(depending on condition) digits from a column depending on a stated or 
unstated rule.  It was found that without signs stating the rule participants 
were highly impaired on the primary task (judged by higher reaction times), 
especially under conditions where the verbal TMT was being conducted 
concurrently.   From this Baddeley hypothesised that the verbal trail making 
test was using similar attentional resources, increasing what Baddeley called 
the “switch cost”.  Attentional demand may not be related to switching itself 
however, as “switching under certain circumstances, appears to enhance 
performance” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 133).   
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Intriguingly however, there is some controversy surrounding whether or not 
these measures represent a specific cognitive function of the CE or a matter 
of (cognitively simpler) retrieval of learned associations which may or may 
not be attentionally demanding and have attentional costs associated with 
them (Monsell, 2005; Baddeley, 2007).   Baddeley himself somewhat 
sidesteps the issue, stating that task switching “is not a general function, but 
a process whose costs or benefits are likely to vary depending on the precise 
situation and the strategy adopted by the subject to deal with it” (Baddeley, 
2007, p. 133), despite this, the implication that task switching is an 
important cognitive ability is still prominent in the field of psychometrics; 
its connection with memory taken somewhat for granted. 
 
Miyake’s three primary functions.  As has hopefully been indicated above, 
executive functions are highlighted by psychometric tasks targeting specific 
mental abilities; but a lot of the time such abilities are highly abstract, using 
terminology such as “planning” or “strategy” to describe success at 
particular problems. 
 
It makes good theoretical sense that such general functionalities are of 
course made up of component processes, some of which may be pinpointed 
to specific functions.  In 2000 Miyake and his colleagues used structural 
equation modelling (SEM) alongside a number of frequently used tasks 
purported to assess executive functioning.  Modelling of the data revealed 
three clearly separable low-level functions which are assumed to underlie 
most executive tasks. 
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i) Shifting.   The ability to switch back and forth between operations: the 
failure of which has been associated with perseveration and attention-
maintenance errors in FLHI patients.   Tasks used to measure shifting ability 
appear to be based on temporal metrics, designed to assess how quickly 
earlier modes of thinking can be disengaged in favour of new measures, 
such as the Local Global Task (Navon, 1977) which purports to measures 
what was termed the “switch-cost” (Miyake et al., 2000) of changing 
between rules which might be applied to otherwise identical problems.  
 
ii) Inhibition.  As described above inhibition is perhaps considered to be the 
most important aspect of executive functioning, and is consistent with 
Baddeley‟s 2000 model.  However, according to Miyake, inhibition in this 
sense may be defined as being solely the inhibition of prepotent responses.   
Common measurements of inhibition are the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) or 
Stop-Go tasks (e.g. Logan, 1994), which require a dominant or learnt 
response.    
 
iii) Inhibition and updating.  The ability to hold information in mind and 
dismiss non-relevant „old‟ information for relevant „new‟ information: thus 
updating it.  Because of its dynamic nature updating is highly associable 
with the concept of storage and processing in the WM model requiring 
information to be currently held in mind whilst also selected for meaning.  
Since the original WM model no longer represents a CE based capacity, 
such balancing would have to take place in Baddeley‟s fourth executive-
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function-cum-module the episodic buffer, which deals with binding 
meaning to maintained information.  
 
1.3.5 The episodic buffer.  The adoption of a priming mechanism 
such as the SAS had negated the possible role of the central executive in 
setting up, maintaining and retrieving temporary representations in long-
term memory (Baddeley, 1996).  As a result the CE was no longer seen as 
being capable of being a back-up-store for STM, effectively meaning that a 
good portion of the mental workspace aspect of WM had been taken out of 
the model.  This change necessitated that a new aspect of WM be 
introduced, one that was capable of storing information that had been 
retrieved from LTM and that could also be chunked into meaningful 
episodes (an area which had not been fully explored in the tripartite model).  
This new component process was the EB, and formed the core component 
of the new quadripartite model.   Whether it is a unique system or a core 
process of the CE is open to interpretation, however recent studies have 
suggested that an executive process is more suitable, as the actions of the 
EB largely depend on the dynamic capabilities of modality specific modules 
such as the VSSP or AL (Baddeley, Hitch & Allen, 2009). 
 
The EB is named because it integrates cross modal information into 
coherent episodes (Baddeley, 2007); it also is a limited capacity store
24
 
(Cowan, 2005), capacity being defined by „chunks‟: “a package of 
                                                 
24
 The term „resource‟ within the EB is slightly misleading as the EB‟s capacity is 
determined by the limitations of the PL, VSSP and CE; however in this case capacity refers 
to the number of chunks maintained. 
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information bound by strong associative links within chunks and relatively 
weak links between chunks” (Baddeley, 2007, p. 148).  The main role of the 
EB is therefore to create these internal links, binding information into 
chunks; the manipulation of these chunks for meaning being performed by 
static and dynamic binding processes.  Static bindings are learned 
associations (such as „fire trucks‟ are „red‟), whilst dynamic bindings are 
novel combinations of items (Baddeley uses the example of a „red banana‟ 
in „blue porridge‟) that can be combined in a number of different ways.    
 
Experimental methodology of the episodic buffer (binding).  Up until the 
time of writing, experiments by Baddeley and his colleagues have mainly 
centred on the most critical aspect of the EB: that of binding.  In order to 
investigate this phenomenon, two popular modality specific methodologies 
have arisen (to reflect the multi-dimensionality of the EB), that of colour-
shape testing (VSSP) and that of syntax/prose testing (PL). 
 
Syntax/prose testing.  Because of the scope of the English language, verbal 
testing is more varied in nature than the colour-shape paradigm.  It is 
defined by the use of phonological information (either verbal or written) and 
the investigation of the semantic information bound to it.  It originates from 
the well known effect of phonological capacity (see earlier section on the 
phonological loop), i.e. that participants are likely to be able to recall six or 
seven words on their own but when these are put into meaningful sentences 
they can remember 16+ (Baddeley, 2000). This suggestion is supported by 
neuropsychological evidence, such as the case of patient P.V. who had a 
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severely limited digit span of just 1 but a sentence span of 5 (Vallar & 
Baddeley, 1984), a phenomenon traditionally explained by Miller‟s  process 
of „chunking‟ whereby different types of information are combined to make 
it more memorable.    
 
Of course one of the main aspects of chunking is that the more meaningful 
information (bound semantic information) a target phonological item has 
attached to it, the more likely it is to be recalled, a suggestion which might 
be interpreted to suggest that a binding-cost is associated with the 
association of previously unconnected objects.    Indeed, as Jefferies and her 
colleagues showed (Jefferies, Lambon & Baddeley, 2004) as progressive 
learning increased so did attention-demands.  But, like other WM theorists, 
Jefferies did not automatically prescribe this to the active binding process.  
Instead it has been suggested that this effect is down to the construction of 
individual strategies (what Jefferies and her colleagues call multi-word 
chunking), meaning that the task is more open to executive interference the 
more external demands (outside of the task) are placed on it.  Additionally, 
in the same vein, Jefferies also showed that the difference in “binding cost” 
of multiple as opposed to single words is minimal as the timed-recall of 
unrelated words was the same when compared to meaningful sentences.  
Instead what seemed to alter outcome the most was the span of the task 
itself (i.e. task requirement), a heavier load equating to less items recalled 
and longer processing times.   Instead of implicating the EB as being 
attentionally demanding, this therefore places all demands associated with 
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phonological encoding firmly at the door of the PL and its individual 
capacity (Jefferies, Lambon & Baddeley, 2004). 
 
This conclusion was reinforced recently by Baddeley‟s laboratory 
(Baddeley et al, 2009) who also indicated that although the phonological 
binding-capability of the EB may indeed be effortful (i.e. capacity based) 
this is only so if the associative semantic-bindings require further attentional 
resources beyond the span of the PL.  Here Baddeley specifically suggests 
that newly developed task-specific arbitrary combinations (i.e. not backed 
up by learned facts from LTM require more attentional resources than 
relatively automatic semantically based chunks (i.e. sentences that have 
meaning beyond the task), but it remains to be seen whether this effect may 
be comprehensively demonstrated  in the Binding process, or whether, as 
Baddeley himself suggests, the binding-demand comes from the number of 
chunks capable of being simultaneously maintained.  
 
The EB‟s role in chunking/binding is further highlighted by previous 
phonologically based evidence that individual differences in WM affect 
reading comprehension and development (see Gathercole & Baddeley, 
1993, for a summary), as well as research from authors such as Poulton 
(1958) who showed that increased reading speed leads to decreased 
comprehension of the text, suggesting within the confines of the EB that the 
reading rate was either interfering with the amount of information able to be 
held/updated, or the chunking of semantic meaning to the words (Baddeley, 
2007).  Baddeley and his colleagues studied these effects in a series of 
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experiments based on the influences of speed on recall and accuracy within 
reasoning tasks (Baddeley & Hitch 1974) and sentence comprehension 
(Baddeley, 2007). Despite intuitive claims to the contrary, executive 
influence was found to be small, with minimal attentional demands being 
necessary for binding, executive interference being found to increase 
verification latency but not the number of errors
25
 (Baddeley, 2007).   
Attentional influence, it seems, is reserved for heavy cognitive loads, with a 
minimum amount needed for the process of binding, which appears to be 
fairly automatic.   
 
Colour/shape testing. Similar findings have been found in the colour-shape 
paradigm. Within visual-centric investigations into the EB participants are 
normally shown either patches of colour, coloured shapes, or shapes 
themselves, and after a short delay are given a question-probe and asked 
whether or not it had just been presented.   
 
A series of these experiments (Allen, Baddeley & Hitch, 2006; Baddeley, 
2007) showed that participants were as equally good at recalling coloured 
shapes as they were recalling individual shapes or colours, and that 
disruption by secondary tasks (either random-number-generation or a 
concurrent digit span task) had equal effects on colour-shape combinations 
as opposed to individual features,  implying that (under normal 
circumstances) the EB either has enough attentional resources to manage the 
                                                 
25
 Baddeley initially suggesting that this may be because the PL capacity is more then 
enough to handle the phonological information used in the individual tasks methodologies, 
implying that a considerable load is needed to see an effect.   
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normal binding process, or that binding does not discriminate between the 
number of dimensions being processed.  It is worth noting that even this 
latter suggestion does not necessarily mean that visual binding is entirely 
void of attentional demands, just that passive binding is more likely to be a 
peripheral, pre attentive process.  Following on from this suggestion the role 
of visual attention in the binding processes has instead been suggested by 
Allen and his colleagues (Allen et al., 2006) as being sequentially based: in 
other words it is centred upon maintaining bonds in the face of conflicting 
stimuli (relating the sequential activation of propositions to the ability to 
inhibit the activation of non-relevant associations whilst 
allowing/facilitating the synchronous firing of those that are relevant 
(Morrison 2010)).  It has been suggested by Allen et al. that this ability to 
visually maintain information affects multiple bindings, implying fragile 
rather than resource demanding connections.     
 
1.3.6 Distinguishing WM and intelligence tasks.   Intelligence and 
WM are both core constructs that are central to our understanding of human 
cognition.  Broadly speaking, an intelligence quotient (IQ) is measured by 
variety of tasks which abstract general “high level” functions and processes 
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990, p. 426) in areas such as mathematical, verbal 
and/or written skills (Spearman, 1923, 1927) from which the normal 
developmental course has been standardized.  WM is measured by tasks 
which rely upon span (capacity) testing. 
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Despite this, the dividing line between IQ and WMC (which places 
processing above storage) has not been so clear.   While WM measures have 
been established as measures of general ability, it has also been argued that 
the two terms are frequently interchangeable, if not indivisible (Colom, 
Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa & Kyllonen, 2004; Colom, Jung & Haier; 
2007), with underlying factors such as speed of processing (see p. 83) 
associated with both (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). 
 
It has been argued (experimentally) that components of WM may be 
uniquely discriminated against IQ (Ackerman, Beier & Boyle, 2005; Colom 
et al., 2007; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm & Süß, 2005) or even that that 
WM is actually a better predictor of academic ability then IQ (Alloway & 
Alloway, 2008
26
).   
 
One argument appears to be that intelligence is more fluid and generally 
applicable than WM tasks, the number of operations possible being 
restricted by the task modality i.e. the verbal and/or visual input (Heinz-
Martin, Oberauer, Werner, Wittmann, & Schulze, 2002).  For our present 
purposes this position has been accepted; it being understood that the 
concept of memory as being separable from other systems is paramount 
when investigating influences on human reasoning.  The measurement of 
WMC only being meaningful if its mediatory effects can be separated from 
                                                 
26
 Although this point is purely determined by ones definition of IQ. 
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systems associated with generic IQ processes.  For instance, As Oberauer 
(2005) states:  
 
“It would be a surprise and an embarrassment if one found that 
measures of WMC and measures of g were perfectly correlated. It 
would imply that measures of WMC do not come closer to measuring 
a theoretically well-defined parameter of the cognitive system than 
g
27
 does.” (Oberauer et al., 2005, p. 64).  
 
This thesis will therefore consider WM as being separate from many non-
capacity based tasks.  This means that every effort will be made to separate 
effects of capacity in verbal, visual and global domains of WM, as defined 
by Baddeley‟s quadripartite model (2007).   It is however acknowledged 
that at the information-processing level no absolute discrimination is 
possible, or particularly desirable.   For instance, whilst processes 
underlying reasoning might be accounted for by the WM model, they may 
also be explained for by additional individual differences which are generic 
in nature and in some circumstances might be applicable to other systems, 
such as processing speed (see p. 89). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 In this sense „G‟ is implied to be a nondescript amalgamation of systems, processes and 
abilities. 
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1.3.7 Working memory and reasoning.    As had already been 
stated WMC is already well understood to be connected to the processes 
underlying non-analogically based reasoning tasks (Braine & O‟Brien, 
1998; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Logie & Gilhooly, 1998; Rips, 1994), 
with individual differences in memory possibly accounting for erroneous 
solutions.  This individual-difference perspective does not necessarily stem 
just from attentional or storage constraints. Another factor already highly 
associated with influencing reasoning ability is that of processing speed (see 
below).   
 
Processing speed, reasoning and WM.    Speed of processing (SOP) is an 
arbitrary term used to define the rate at which our cognitive functions 
operate.  SOP is thought to constrain cognition by limiting the effectiveness 
of higher order faculties associated with both WM and IQ; arbitrating 
processes such as execution speed, the synchronisation of secondary tasks 
and the scheduling of operations.  SOP is representative of the overall 
efficiency of neural networks and mental systems (Kail & Salthouse, 1994, 
Salthouse, 1996).    
 
In terms of WM, increased fluency is understood to free resources for 
processing; SOP facilitating executive faculties involved in the parallel and 
sequential division and selection of attention (Fry & Hale, 1996, 2000) as 
well as determining the number of processes capable of being executed 
while information is held in a STS (Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982; 
Kyllonen, & Christal, 1990).   
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When reasoning a SOP constraint is believed to occur when the temporal 
requirements of parallel and sequential processing are exceeded by the 
demands of the task or problem, in which case task performance is expected 
to drop (Fry & Hale, 1996).  Yet despite this predicted effect, it appears 
unlikely that SOP alone can completely determine reasoning outcome in 
isolation.   Extensive modelling on the subject suggests that processing 
speed is a product of processes within WM and fluid intelligence, rather 
than a direct contributor to comprehension or deduction (Engle, Cantor & 
Carullo, 1992; Nettelbeck & Burns, 2010).  This hypothesis is supported by 
a growing number of theorists (Colom et al., 2006; Colom et al, 2007) as 
well as those who point out that WMC measures contain specific processes 
which processing speed cannot account for such as inhibition of irrelevant 
schemata (Heinz-Martin et al, 2002).   
 
Regarding plausible roles for SOP in AR, two mechanisms of cognitive 
speed proposed by Salthouse (1991) are directly applicable to inferential 
reasoning and the complexity-constraint theory (Halford, 1992; 1993; 
1998).  The time constraint limitation, where task complexity increases the 
time needed to form associations and the simultaneous mechanism where 
slower processing effects the abstraction of meaningful information by 
limiting what can be processed in parallel or retrieved from LTM.  In either 
case Halford (1998) has suggested SOP as a possible age-related indicator 
of WMC‟s mediatory role in AR, while connectionist models of AR such as 
LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003, see French 2002 for a review of 
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this form of programme) intrinsically demand that speed of processing may 
be thought of as processing efficiency, brought about by strong or weak 
neural connections between arguments.    These factors will be discussed in 
detail in the experimental chapters. 
 
Mental workspace theory.   Broadly speaking, most theories of WM and 
reasoning fall into the mental-model category.   Developed from the original 
early work by Craik and Pierce (for a review see Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
2000; 2004) this approach to reasoning postulates that problem solving is 
facilitated through the internal representation of (and experimentation with) 
the external world using “the meanings of assertions, together with general 
knowledge, in order to construct mental models of the possibilities 
compatible with the premises” (Johnson-Laird, 2001, p. 1).   
 
From a WM perspective mental-models may be perceived as a cognitive 
workspace (Alloway, 2006; Baddeley 2007) where abstract rules relevant 
for immediate processing are stored in LTM and selected for relevance by 
the CE (Alloway, 2006; Baddeley 2007) to be combined with the results of 
recent processing (Gilhooly, 1998).   Such a workspace is analogous to the 
different facets of WMC, with individual differences in passive storage and 
active (executive) attentional constraints placing limits on how information 
is processed.   
 
Theorists have hypothesized that holding representations in store in such a 
manner creates processing traffic-jams when the cognitive load is „heavy‟ 
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(i.e. when more than one representation is held or when processing aspects 
requires a deeper manipulation of the problem), WMC limitations resulting 
in what Johnson-Laird calls a “bottleneck in the inferential machinery” 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 115).  Bottlenecks overburden the reasoning 
mechanisms, possibly leading to erroneous thinking (Heinz-Martin et al, 
2002; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990).  Such circumstances often occurring if 
the processing demands exceed the resources available; or circumstances are 
not ideal (i.e. the reasoner is required to continuously visualize this problem 
without opportunity of refreshing it). 
 
The episodic buffer as a workspace. Although theorists initially postulated 
that the CE might be entirely responsible for the maintenance and selection 
of information this is no longer the case.  The adoption of the multiple 
resource model in 2000 meant that whilst the CE is still thought to be 
actively in control of selective information through attentional constraints, 
the EB and its unique multi domain store is now more likely to be 
responsible for the role of a workspace in its capacity as a mediator to LTM 
(responsible for accessing memories) and binder of cross-modal information 
(Baddeley, 2007).    
 
Within the quadripartite model the slave systems act in tandem with the EB 
as short term stores for literal surface based code, holding either visual or 
phonological information as required by the EB, whilst the EB chunks this 
code into meaningful segments before passing it into LTM.  This process is 
highly relevant to reasoning considering that Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
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(1993, p. 181) proposed in the 1960s that reasoning is not a form of 
“syntactic process but a matter of understanding meanings” whilst as 
mentioned in the previous section on the EB, Baddeley sees syntactic 
parsing as being automatic in nature, whilst “The maintenance/binding of 
several different propositions is effortful” (Baddeley et al., 2009, p. 640). 
 
Experimental methodology of working memory based reasoning tasks.  
There is strong evidence for a link between WM and performance in a 
variety of reasoning tasks, (Baddeley, 1968; Barrouillet, 1996; Bull & 
Scerif, 2001; Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; DeStefano & LeFevre; Klauer, 
Stegmaier & Meiser, 1997; Gilhooly, 1998; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 
Kyllonen & Christal, 1990).   Within this research the dual task 
methodology has been used to show that burdening WMC gives rise to 
performance errors in reasoning tasks (Baddeley, 1968; Gilhooly, Logie, 
Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993; Klauer et al., 1997; Toms, Morris & Ward, 
1993).  Crucially, this effect does not appear to be a result of overloading a 
purely storage based system.  Modality specific studies using forms of 
grammatical reasoning have typically shown only limited disruption by 
concurrent articulatory suppression (Baddeley, 1995; Gilhooly et al., 1993; 
Klauer et al., 1997; Toms et al., 1993), whilst (dual) visuo-spatial tasks have 
been shown to interfere similarly with visuo-spatial reasoning (Klauer et al., 
1997).  In most cases it appears clear that individual performance in 
reasoning tasks suffers the most when the dual tasks overload the attentional 
(executive) limits of the central executive (Baddeley 2007; Gilhooly et al., 
1993; Klauer et al., 1997; Toms et al., 1993). 
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Note that it does not necessarily follow that those individuals with high 
WMC are slower processors than their counterparts.  In analysis of 
reasoning, Sternberg (1977) suggested that slower processors were actually 
more successful, instead implicating high WMC with the ability to hold 
more relations active for longer without the need for refreshing them, which 
may itself lead to more errors. 
 
Performance factors.  When considering the possible constraint effects in 
reasoning there is a danger of assuming that only processes directly 
involved with the solution are mediated by WMC.   As already stated, in 
any problem solving task WMC may be implicated in processes beyond 
those primarily associated with the task, such as rule comprehension, meta-
learning, interpreting experimenter demand, goal maintenance, inhibiting 
non-relevant stimuli etc. As such, although individual ability measures may 
appear to be associated with success/failure, there is a constant danger that a 
proportion of the results may be due to the effect of secondary performance 
factors.   The best way to account for these during experimentation is to 
include measures which are less focused on capacity limits than their WM 
counterparts, i.e. IQ measures.  
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1.3.8 Analogical reasoning and working memory.  To this date the 
majority of research focusing on WM‟s role in AR has been dominated by 
what is known as the complexity hypothesis (Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998, 
Halford, Maybery, O'Hare & Grant, 1994) developed from Gentner‟s work 
on structural mapping (Gentner, 1983, 1988; Gentner et al., 1993; 
Ratterman & Gentner, 1999).     
 
Complexity-constraint theory.  The complexity-constraint perspective has 
been described as a “construct invoked to explain the systematic decline of 
performance with increasing task complexity” (Oberauer; 2005, p. 368).   
 
„Complexity‟ in this sense being defined by Gentner‟s (1983) taxonomy of 
relations (see p. 38) whose concept of similarity gave rise to the perspective 
that the more relationships (predicates and arguments) a base object shares 
with a candidate target, the greater the complexity and the greater quantity 
of processing power required represent the problem and calculate an 
appropriate response.   Zelazo and Frye (1998) describing complexity as the 
more hierarchical rules that must be considered to accomplish a task  
 
The „constraint‟ complexity places on cognition has been interpreted 
differently, but in most cases may be summarised as the number of 
relationships  that must be processed in (Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford 
et al., 2002; Halford, 1992; 1993; 1998; Richland et al., 2006).    The central 
idea is that there is a limit to the complexity of possible mappings due to 
WM limitations. WMC may therefore dynamically constrain analogical 
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thinking by what may be represented and processed.  Halford (1998) argues 
that as WMC develops across maturation, so does a child‟s ability to 
represent relational arguments, with 50% of children being able to 
manipulate ternary relationships by age five, rising to 100% by years 10-11.  
It is argued that children who lack the processing capacity to manipulate an 
analogical problem are less likely to provide an adequate response due to an 
overloaded cognitive system (Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford et al., 
1994; Halford, Andrews, Dalton, Boag, & Zielinski, 2002), resulting in a 
possible increase in the selection of lower order (simpler) relations (Waltz et 
al, 2000) which are more likely to be understood. 
 
Over the last two decades a complexity-constraint hypothesis has been 
successfully applied to computational models such as the STAR
28
 (Halford 
et al., 1994; Wilson et al., 2001) and the LISA
29
 (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003) programmes which rely on humanistic limitations to what may 
be maintained in conscious thought.   However, within the information-
processing field of psychology the approach has been dominated by the 
work of Morrison and his colleagues who have used two forms of analogical 
problem, the scene-based analogy and the classical analogy to illustrate the 
effects of complexity. 
                                                 
28
 Both the STAR and STAR-2 (Structural Tensor Analogical Reasoning) models assume 
that each argument has multiple dimensions.  Previously known statements regarding these 
dimensions are held in a tensor array equivalent to LTM, the STAR models focusing on 
only a limited number of these dimensions at a time, an act which the authors equate to 
WM limitations.   
29
 The LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies) model uses a system of 
synchronous firing within neural networks to bind observable features to concepts in order 
to identity relationships.  The successful computation of any analogy relies upon keeping 
the relevant relationships separate and out of synchrony.  In this context WMC is 
understood to be the limited capacity system that keeps all bindings active and independent. 
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In 2000 Waltz and colleagues examined the complexity constraint to the 
scene based analogy (cross mapping) paradigm. Like the Markman and 
Gentner (1993) study, Waltz and his colleagues observed that more 
relational answers were given in „multiple‟ compared to single „one shot‟ 
trials (see p.25), suggesting that people naturally attend to relational forms 
of response if cued to more than one base object.   However, when a dual-
task (phonological suppression repeating the word „the‟ and executive 
interference from random-number-generation) was introduced alongside the 
analogical scene, this significantly reduced the tendency to identify 
relational similarities. 
 
In accordance with complexity-constraint theory this implied that WMC 
played a role in the active mapping of relationships, the reduction of 
available WMC making it more difficult to compute relational mappings 
and increasing the proportion of less-complex attribute (featural) mappings 
which appeared to be either a default position in AR or a fall-back strategy, 
“in situations in which the mapping is ambiguous” (Waltz et al., 2000, p. 
1206); featural mappings possibly being a form of response within a child‟s 
processing ability.     
 
Although Waltz et al.‟s (2000) experiment failed to discriminate between 
executive and phonological loading, Morrison and his colleagues (Morrison, 
Holyoak & Truong, 2001) suggested that the scene based analogy 
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methodology, might not have been sensitive enough to pick-up individual 
differences within working memory.   
 
In a series of experiments using Sternberg‟s (1977) visual „People Piece‟ 
analogies (a variation of the classical analogy format wherein the a:b::c:d 
relationship is represented by characters with one of 4 binary arguments 
(MAN/WOMAN, BLACK/WHITE, TALL/SHORT, FAT/THIN)  as well 
as verbal classical analogy variants (as described by Sternberg & Nigro, 
1980), Morrison et al. (2001) used dual tasks (articulatory suppression, 
spatial tapping, and random number generation) to tax the phonological and 
executive components of WM.  
 
In both analogy formats the dual tasks significantly reduced accuracy 
(although in verbal classical analogies spatial-tapping had less of an impact 
compared to phonological and executive interference).  Yet, the proportion 
of correct responses was significantly lower in the verbal compared to visual 
paradigm, leading to the conclusion that task modality existed within AR, 
and that verbal analogies were more vulnerable to phonological 
interference. 
 
One of the additional observations Morrison highlighted was that accuracy 
in the random-number-generation condition was the lowest for each 
condition in each analogy format, this form of executive interference also 
eliciting the longest average response times.  This lead to Morrison‟s 
suggestion that, as in other non-analogically reasoning based tasks, that 
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executive WMC mediated AR; a prediction in-line with Halford‟s (1992, 
1993, 1998) predictions that processing capacity was limiting analogical 
performance.  
 
In a follow up study Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel and Knowlton 
(2004) partly replicated the 2001 experiment. They introduced a new 
variation of the people-piece analogies which could be manipulated in order 
to increase the complexity of the problem, complexity being defined the 
number of irrelevant traits (between 1 and 4) favouring the incorrect 
response which were required to be attended to at once, e.g. in the simplest 
condition a participant had to make sure that the C:D terms possessed all 4 
of the same arguments, specifically height, weight, gender and colour (in 
other words the answer was far more obvious).   In the most complex 
condition only one argument would be the same 
 
A second change was the introduction of older participants, it being 
hypothesized (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2004; Zelazo & Müller, 2002) 
that a developmental curve exists in the growth of available attentional 
resources (WMC and general cognitive functioning) that develops across 
childhood, but which declines in older age. 
 
 As predicted relational responding was reduced in complex conditions for 
older participants.  Younger adults (mean age 20) performed better, and at a 
faster rate, than older adults (mean age 75) in complex tasks, with the older 
adults being prone to distraction by the presence of irrelevant and 
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misleading information.  The conclusion Viskontas came to was that a 
decline in analogical performance in older participants was due to attention 
and inhibitory deficits brought about through old age, implicating WMC in 
the need to maintain and manipulate the complex information.  
 
In 2007, Cho, Holyoak and Cannon used a further variation of the PPA 
paradigm used by Viskontas et al. (2004) that introduced a gap between 
presentation and response to allow information to be properly encoded into 
memory and to add a further burden on the storage components of WM.   
They found that participants were slower at responding when they were, i) 
resolving conflicts caused by multiple possibilities and attribute based 
distraction, and ii) integrating multiple relations: effects which increased 
when all conditions were combined (conflict was presented in complex 
conditions with a delay).   This suggests a shared executive resource 
mediating complexity which the authors suggested was WMC. 
 
Concurrent to Morrison et al.‟s work on the people piece format of 
analogies, the concept that WMC arbitrates AR in scene based problems has 
been supported by Richland (Richland et al, 2004; 2006, Richland, Chan, 
Morrison & Au., 2010) using the Richland Picture Analogies (RPA).  The 
purpose of these studies being to both challenge Goswami‟s (1992) proposal 
that domain knowledge alone is the sole mechanism for relational 
comprehension, and to offer a new hypothesis for a role WMC may play in 
constraining analogical performance. 
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The RPA used a 2x2 repeated design (see Figure 8) consisting of two 
conditions of complexity and two conditions of distraction.  Crucially, 
Richland used Halford‟s (1998) concept of binary and ternary relations to 
determine complexity (complex ternary relations consisting of an object 
within a 3 object relationship, such as “chasing and being  chased”, binary 
simple relations consisting of a 2 object relationship such as “chasing” or 
“being chased”, see page 38).   They selected year groups above and below 
Ratterman and Gentner‟s (1998) and Halford‟s (1998) 5-year-old 
developmental floor (which Halford, 1998 cites as the age in which 50% of 
children are able to represent ternary relationships) in order to illustrate how 
changes in WMC influence relational responding under conditions of 
complexity.   
 
For distraction, „transformed‟ objects were chosen that were attributionally 
similar to the base query object (i.e. the looked the same but might be doing 
something new, like walking instead of sitting).  The idea being that the 
growth of inhibitory skill (Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 2002) could 
represent at least some of the maturationally developing WMC constraint 
hypothesized by Halford (1992, 1993, 1998). 
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Figure 8.  The Richland Picture Analogies (Richland et al, 2004, 2006).   
Each Question has a 2x2 design with conditions of distraction and 
complexity.  The RPA consists of 20 questions repeated in 4 conditions to 
make 80 in total. Participants are shown a page containing the target-scene 
on the top and a base-scene on the bottom.  They are required to do one shot 
mapping by equating the target-object (shown with an arrow in the target 
scene) to an object in the base scene.   Relational objects interact with one 
another in the same number of ways as the target object (such as the boy 
above). „Featural error‟ objects resemble the target scene in appearance but 
do not interact within the scene (such as the cat above).  Other forms of 
response are possible, including „relational errors‟ (right similarity, wrong 
object: such as the girl in the pictures above); or „other-errors‟ (objects not 
associated with the problem, such as the house or sandpit in the picture 
above). 
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When designing the RPA two important controls were introduced by 
Richland.  Firstly, in order to prevent unintended loading of WM by extra 
objects not involved in the binary-ternary relations, the object per scene 
ratio in the RPA was set to five (complex conditions replacing a non-
relevant background object such as a bush).  Secondly, to account for 
domain knowledge all similarity-constraints used were designed to be 
recognizable by even the youngest age ranges.   Analogies such as „chasing‟ 
being understood by everyone at age 5. 
 
In her experiments, Richland and colleagues (2004, 2006, 2010) 
consistently demonstrated reduced analogical performance in conditions of 
increased complexity and distraction, promoting (due to the controls set in 
place) her overall conclusion that domain knowledge alone could not be the 
sole mechanism for relational comprehension.   
 
In her 2004 and 2006 studies, Richland et al. identified significant two way 
interactions for the number of relational responses elicited between age and 
distracter condition, distraction and complexity, as well as a significant 
three way interaction between age, distraction and complexity. The three 
way interaction showed that the effects of complexity and distraction 
differed within individual year groups.  Children in Richland‟s youngest age 
group (age 3-4) showed a main effect of both distraction and complexity 
and a two way interaction between complexity and distraction.   Children in 
the middle year group (ages 6-7) showed main effects of complexity and 
distraction but no significant interaction between them.  Children in the 
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oldest year group (13-14 year olds) revealed main effects of complexity but 
not distraction, and no significant interactions between them.  Whilst these 
results confirmed Richland‟s original hypothesis that younger participants 
performed less well at identifying relational responses than their older 
counterparts in the distraction conditions, they also suggested that the 
psychological construct of WMC (which was suggested by Richland as 
mediating the ability to illicit relational responses under conditions of 
complexity/distraction conditions and facilitate inhibitory skill) was a 
constraining factor in the youngest age range. 
 
This supported Halford‟s developmental assumptions that maturation 
increased a child‟s ability to process complex relations, but also supported 
(through the complexity-distraction interaction) the Waltz et al. (2000) 
hypothesis that when the demand on WMC was high, reasoners were more 
likely to choose a featural response, if available.  Richland proposes that 
individual differences in WMC underpin her findings and argues, through 
subsequent changes in the key-wording of the instructions
30
 (Richland et al., 
2006), that it was not task-understanding that was developing but the ability 
to process complex relations. That is, complex tasks represent a higher 
burden to the available resources.   
 
In a further study using foreign participants, Richland underlined her 
position when Chinese pupils were found to perform at a higher rate under 
                                                 
30
 Richland replaced complex words such as “Patterns” with “The same as”.   See appendix 
A for the wording of the RPA. 
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conditions of complexity when compared to US pupils of the same age, a 
factor Richland suggests may be due to increased visual-semantic 
processing ability of Chinese children used to binding meanings to visually 
presented complex symbols (Richland et al., 2010).   
 
Inhibition and AR.   Like „analogy‟ „inhibition‟ is a troublesome term that 
means many different things to different people.  Without wishing to be 
drawn too deeply on the subject what is being discussed here is not neural 
inhibition (that is to say the inhibition of action potentials in the brain), but 
what has been frequently termed „cognitive‟, „behavioural‟ or „response‟ 
inhibition.  That is to say: the ability to act by choice rather than impulse, 
resist non-relevant behaviour, and to „quickly and flexibly adapt behaviour‟ 
(Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006).   
 
Such abilities represent our concept of what Davison et al. (2006) terms 
„cognitive control‟ and are key components of the executive functions of 
working memory which frequently rely on the ability to switch attention 
resources between tasks or maintain a certain mode of thinking against 
interfering stimuli (Baddeley, 2007;  Miyake et al., 2000).  
 
Whilst for a number of years connectionist models such as LISA (Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997, 2004) have proposed a form of neuro-cognitive inhibition 
as selectively pruning non-relevant semantic units, recently a number of 
theorists have started to consider inhibitory-control processes, as executive 
functions of WM (see Miyake et al., 2000,  p. 73) may potentially be able to 
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explain individual differences in cognitive performance observed in AR 
(Krawczyk, Morrison, Viskontas, Holyoak, Chow, Miller & Knowlton, 
2008; Morrison et al., 2006, 2010; Richland et al., 2004; 2006; 2010; 
Thibaut, French & Vezneva, 2010), 
 
Such an account makes good theoretical sense.  Like WM, inhibitory skill is 
known (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004) to have 
“extremely slow, protracted developmental progression” (Diamond et al, 
2002) while low WMC individuals have also been shown to be less 
effective at blocking intrusive thought than high-WMC individuals (Brewin 
& Beaton 2002).   As Richland et al. (2004, 2006) indirectly asserts, it is 
likely that inhibitory control may represent part of Halford‟s (1992, 1993, 
1998) concept of WMC. 
 
The most prominent explanation for inhibitory control in AR is that 
competition may exist between relational and featural attributes (Morrison 
et al., 2010; Richland et al., 2004, 2006; Thibaut, et al. 2010).  Just why this 
may be the case is currently being debated, although distraction errors are 
hypothesized to occur when irrelevant content is not removed from WM and 
when the information held in mind is contradictory to the present situation 
(De Neys & Van Gelde, 2008). For example, as might be found in scene-
based analogies where an individual is presented with a problem where a 
relationship previously thought to be true (i.e. “the same” means an object 
looks similar) is no longer relevant given the demands of the task.  Yet it 
remains to be seen whether featural objects present an intrinsic attraction 
101 
regardless of what the base query object looks like (which is opposite to 
what is predicted by Gentner‟s principle of Systematicity, see below), 
and/or whether inhibition is demanded because the query object held in 
mind is similar to one form of response. 
 
Of course conflict between competing objects is not the only explanation for 
inhibitory skill mediating performance. Proactive inhibition in AR tasks 
may also play a role (Lustig, May & Hasher, 2001; Rowe, Hasher, & 
Turcotte, 2010; 2008), affecting paradigms with similar multiple trials and 
(in the case of the RPA) similar scenes and/or objects which are repeated 
across condition.  The difficulty occurring either because of “…difficulty 
discriminating current items from those presented in earlier trials or 
difficulty maintaining suppression of prior trial information in the face of 
highly similar items.” (Rowe et al., 2010; p. 804) or because external stimuli 
foreign to the test need to be inhibited. For example, background noise or 
sudden/unusual distractions causing wandering chain of thought (Chiappe, 
Siegel & Hasher, 2002; Zacks & Hasher, 1994) 
 
However, as Oberauer (2005) points out, selecting a wrong relational object 
may also occur from a simple error in representing which content is deemed 
to be relevant to the task at hand (the ability to disseminate task 
requirements being one of Goswami‟s (1992) performance factors.   
 
According to a strict interpretation of the relational shift and systematicity 
(Gentner, 1988; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998), we 
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should also expect featural objects to be less appealing than relational; at 
least in circumstances where we understand the required similarity-
constraint and have the ability to process it, as according to Gentner we 
allegedly have an innate preference to prefer this form of relationship.  
However, it may also be true that, as Richland suggests, it is the 
development of inhibitory skill that represents this shift.  At the time of 
writing this issue currently remains unresolved. 
 
Relational primacy and WM.  Relational primacy theory originated from 
structuralist claims that young children cannot reason analogically, and not 
from the assertion that relational processing does not take place beyond the 
recognition of similarity-constraints.  As a result Goswami does not go into 
detail regarding her predictions for the theory, but believes historical 
evidence from the information processing perspective such as Sternberg‟s 
(1977) componential model support her claims. 
 
One might expect any theory which is centred upon the recognition of the 
similarity-constraint to be dominated by a child‟s ability to interpret the 
demands of task (in which case you would expect fluid intelligence and 
executive decision making processes to play a role as one of Goswami‟s 
(1992) „facilitation gradients‟ in the construction of schema for the task.  
However, it is important to note that, despite the term „relational primacy‟ 
the appropriate analogy must also be recognized in the base as well as the 
target argument.  If the appropriate response is not clear (what Goswami 
briefly describes as „ambiguous‟ circumstances) then a role similar to that of 
103 
Gentner‟s mapping must take place in order to determine relevance, 
involving a further active processing component.  Crucial to relational 
primacy is not the concept that mapping does not take place, just that it is 
not always necessary.    
 
As mentioned earlier, the chief distinction between relational primacy and 
the complexity-constraint effect is Goswami‟s belief that once the 
similarity-constraint is held in LTM, its size is irrelevant, and that relational-
complexity should not represent an extra cognitive load on the analogical 
process, either in situations of ambiguity or relational recognition.    This 
may be interpreted as meaning that relational mapping can load WM, but 
that processing a ternary relationship (as described by Halford, 1992, 1993, 
1998) should not be more difficult to process than a binary one.   
Such an approach is grounded by recent research into binding which 
predicts that relevance testing is automatic and relatively unweighted 
(Baddeley, 2007) and that no greater level of attentional capacity is required 
to bind propositions than encode them separately. That is unless other 
conceptualizations are being bound at the same time (i.e. more than one 
similarity-constraint) or the capacities of the PL or VSSP are exceeded 
during recognition (Allen et al., 2006). 
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1.4 Research aims and rationale 
As illustrated in the preceding section, the central argument for WM‟s 
involvement in AR is that capacity limitations
31
 within the WM system 
mediate AR by placing constraints on the number of possible arguments that 
may be processed in parallel (Halford, 1993) and/or the number of 
hierarchical rules that must be maintained in order to solve the problem 
(Zelazo et al, 2004).  This is termed the complexity-constraint theory. 
 
The primary opposition to such an approach is considered to be Goswami‟s 
(1993) relational primacy theory, which postulates that the cognitive 
recognition, representation and manipulation of relationships does not place 
a recognizable burden on cognitive processes.  Instead, in relational primacy 
theory „performance factors‟ are thought to explain analogical performance, 
such as interpreting task demand. 
 
Although (given the volume of research on WM and Reasoning) it is logical 
to assume that increased WMC aides the resolution of conflicts arising from 
performance factors (e.g. inhibition), the key difference between the two 
theories is that in relational primacy WMC is not increasingly involved in 
the representation of more complex relations.  The loading on WMC is 
                                                 
31
 Although the term WM may be interpreted differently, „capacity‟ in this respect refers to 
two resource-based mechanisms within the quadripartite WM model (Baddeley, 1996, 
2000, 2007): the temporary maintenance of domain-specific information within the VSSP 
and PL (STSs) and the control of domain-general attentional resources which are defined 
by a number of core executive functions of the CE (p.57).  
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considered constant and minimal regardless of the number of rule/arguments 
the relationship may contain.  
 
Aim.   It is the aim of this thesis to better qualify the potential role(s) of 
WMC in the successful resolution of scene based analogical problems.  It 
will achieve this by assessing the validity of relational primacy theory 
(Goswami, 1993) and the most commonly encountered interpretation of 
complexity-constraint theory proposed by Halford (Halford, 1992, 1993, 
1998).   The central proposal of the thesis being that WMC mediates AR in 
scene based analogies by allowing the problem-solver to deal with 
increasingly complex analogies.  
 
 The aim will be achieved by testing the effects of not only complexity but 
also distraction on AR - plus making direct comparisons to other/more 
generic cognitive processes traditionally associated with fluid intelligence. 
 
It is understood that a complexity-constraint approach predicts that WMC 
will mediate the degree of complexity that may be processed accurately in 
an analogy; whilst relational primacy theory predicts a greater involvement 
of more general faculties such as fluid intelligence and/or WMC irrespective 
of the degree of complexity (faculties which Goswami terms the 
“facilitation gradient”) 
 
Direction of research.   In order to achieve the above aim, a series of 
experiments will be reported comparing individual differences in various 
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aspects of cognition (i.e. those related to IQ/WM) to AR.  Analogical ability 
is defined here as the ability to elicit a desirable form of relational response 
from a selection of competing alternatives. 
 
For this to be achieved an analogical ability measure was required; the core 
requirement for this task being that it would allow for the manipulation and 
measurement of complexity in accordance with the thesis‟s stated aim of 
testing the relationship between WMC and simple/complex forms of 
analogical problem.  Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) Picture Analogy task 
(RPA) was judged to be the most suitable, the other most likely candidates 
being Sternberg‟s (1977) People Piece analogies.   
 
 Not only would the RPA allow the ability to investigate factors of 
complexity, but also distraction (p. 99) allowing the investigation of 
a third component of AR: that of inhibition. 
 Complexity in the RPA was defined by the presence of extra 
relations rather than their absence (as is the case of the PPA).  
 The RPA uses a real-world visual setting, meaning that it is 
conceptually closer to a problem analogy than a classical analogy 
(The PPA being far closer to a classical A:B:C:D format). 
 The rules are easier to explain to younger children and it was also 
considered much more dynamic and fun to play (thus requiring 
constant unrewarded attention).  
 RPA is easier to transfer to a computer based paradigm, which 
would be necessary later on in the thesis.    
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Since (at the time of testing) the RPA was a relatively new paradigm in the 
U.S.A, it was necessary that the RPA be tested for its suitability with a UK 
sample to establish if a similar pattern of performance data to that reported 
by Richland was observed (Richland et al., 2004, 2006)
32
. 
 
Suitability was judged primarily on the ability to find main effects of age, 
complexity and distraction in the relational score across the age ranges 
chosen.  It was hoped that interactions between complexity and distraction 
could also be reported in order to support Richland‟s assumption that a 
single underlying system (WMC) may be responsible for mediating these 
variables in AR.  Furthermore, although Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
reported that the strength of the interaction between complexity and 
distraction lessened in older age ranges (thus resulting in an age x 
complexity x distraction interaction),  because in the present study the 
participants‟ age range was narrower, a three way interaction between year 
group, complexity, and distraction was not necessarily expected.     
 
In line with this aim, Experiment 1 was a partial replication which critically 
appraised the findings from the Richland et al. series of experiments 
published at the time on a UK sample. Supporting evidence for the 
reliability of the RPA in a non-US sample has since been gained (Richland 
et al, 2010); however, at the time of the present study it was considered 
                                                 
32
 Previously the RPA has shown cultural differences, specifically in the Chinese 
population where it was thought that a more (visual) written language base allowed Chinese 
children to perform better at the task (Richland et al, 2010) 
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important that main effects of complexity and distraction were replicated in 
a UK sample, as well as interactions between year group, complexity, and 
distraction. 
 
Experiment 2 assessed the contribution of individual differences in the three 
WM domains (visual, verbal and global/attentional WMC) to analogical 
success (relational responses) and failure (featural responses); comparing 
the effect to that of other more generic (non-capacity centred) systems such 
as IQ.  Crucial to the experiment was whether individual differences in 
cognitive ability could explain variance in the types of answer given when 
complexity and/or distraction was manipulated by the RPA.    
 
Experiment 3 investigated the mediatory role of WM further, by attempting 
to establish if individual differences in STSs or WMC could be best related 
to task performance, and if either could explain the effects of complexity 
and distraction described by Richland et al. (2004, 2006, 2010).  
 
Chapter 3 introduced a new approach, assessing the loading effects of 
relational objects (Experiment 4) and factors of complexity and distraction 
(Experiment 5).   This was to test the complexity-constraint approach (i.e. 
relational-complexity burdens the WMC system) and to question whether 
any loading-data from the previous experiments could be interpreted in 
other ways.  Both experiments utilized a (new) computerized touch-screen 
version of the RPA. 
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Experiment 4 was a reaction time study which examined whether 
differences exist between the time taken to select featural and relational 
responses.   The results are discussed in terms of inhibitory responses, 
preferential selection of objects, and/or the (random) selection of incorrect 
responses.   It also addressed the important question of whether featural 
responses can be considered prepotent. 
 
Experiment 5 adopted a dual-task methodology which aimed to burden 
WMC beyond the load already imposed by the (computerized) RPA task.  It 
has been claimed (Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998) that current WM measures 
may not be sensitive enough to discriminate between individual differences 
in AR tasks beyond the age of four- or five-years. Children beyond this age 
presumably having sufficient WM resources to process ternary relations as 
found in the RPA.  Because of this argument it was proposed that a dual-
task methodology might allow insight into whether the components of WM 
(visual and verbal STSs, and attentional WMC) are the same as those used 
to solve the RPA (performance theoretically dropping if a secondary task 
using the same processes/capacities as the main task is performed 
concurrently).  A dual-task would also enhance the loading aspects of the 
RPA, meaning that effects of complexity and distraction are more visible 
(reducing the available WMC to a level where levels of complexity which 
are usually handled with ease, become difficult or impossible to process).  
 
Finally, Experiment 6 examined whether individual executive processes (as 
defined by Baddeley, 2007, see page 65 onwards) could offer additional 
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insight into the potential role of WMC in AR.  It being assessed whether 
these processes could potentially explain some of the findings observed in 
Experiments 1 to 5, and if so, how such an explanation might fit into 
relational primacy and capacity constraint models of analogical thought.  
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Chapter two 
2.0 Introduction 
In 2004 a new scene based paradigm designed by Richland and her 
colleagues (Richland et al., 2004; see figures 8 and 9) was developed in 
America which purported to show a decline in analogical performance 
through the increase of complexity within an analogical scene.  Using this 
new experimental methodology Richland et al. (2004, 2006) reported 
significant interactions in the number of relational responses elicited 
between factors of age and distraction (distraction being the presence of a 
featural object similar in appearance to the base item), complexity and 
distraction, but not age and complexity. However, the three way interaction 
between age, distraction and complexity was significant.  The youngest 
children (ages 3-4) in her study showed the strongest effects of distraction 
and relational complexity, with the oldest (ages 13-14) the weakest. 
Richland attributed interactions between complexity, age and distraction to 
maturational factors constraining analogical performance; suggesting that 
individual differences in WMC and/or perceptual inhibition were possible 
candidates for this developmental element.    
 
Richland concluded that, since all relations used in the RPA were both 
controlled (five per scene) and relatively simple (i.e. understood by the 
participants), processing errors brought upon by the complexity of the scene 
must be behind all incorrect (non-relational) choices: ergo domain specific 
knowledge alone, as proposed by Goswami (1993) could not be behind 
analogical success.    Richland also observed that: (a) participants were 
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likely to choose featural objects when the „perceptual distracter‟ (featural 
object) was present, and that (b) when available 3-4 year old children were 
more likely to choose featural than relational objects, a trend which did not 
continue beyond these age ranges, providing support for the relational shift 
theory (Gentner, 1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). 
 
2.1 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 investigates Richland‟s findings (Richland et al., 2004, 2006) 
by conducting a partial replication study with different year groups in the 
UK, appraising whether the RPA is a reliable paradigm to further 
investigate the relationship between WMC and AR - i.e. does it produce the 
same effects of complexity and distraction Richland et al. 2004, 2006 
observed in their American sample?  
 
Despite the aim to replicate some of the effects observed by Richland et al. 
(2004, 2006) it is important to note that the following experiment was not 
intended to be an exact replication.  The current study uses four year groups 
(representing the development of children within the British Primary School 
educational system) with participants aged between 8-11 s (class years 3-6, 
mean number of participants in each group = 19.5, total participants 78).  
The original experiment used three year groups (from a North-American 
population) ranging between 3 and 14 years of age (mean number of 
participants in each group = 22.6, total number of participants 68).   This 
change was instigated because the age gap between years 3 and 14 years 
was considered to be too great to capture the process of change and because 
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more participants within a narrower age range allow a closer view of 
changes in AR during the critical stage of development (i.e. relational-shift) 
described by Ratterman and Gentner (1998) and Halford (1993, 1998), and 
increases in WMC. 
 
Although the number of participants in each group is roughly comparable, 
(an extra year group being included in the present study taking the total 
participants to 78 against 68 in the 2004 Richland et al.‟s study) it is 
recognized that by reducing the age range of participants the interactions of 
age with the factors distraction and complexity reported by Richland may be 
less pronounced.   
 
Using a sample size of 68 participants, Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
33
  
found larger effect sizes for the significant main effects of age and 
distraction (age, 2p = .71; distraction, 
2
p = .29) and smaller effect sizes in 
the significant main effect of complexity and in the significant interactions 
(complexity, 2p = .02; age x distraction, 
2
p = .09; age x complexity x 
distraction, 2p = .09) in relational scores when looking across all year groups 
(note that the age x complexity interaction was not significant, 2p = .02).   
Although some of these same significant main effects and interactions were 
also present when the year groups were analysed individually (Ages 3-4, 
complexity, 2p = .18; distraction, 
2
p = .40; complexity x distraction, = 0.17. 
Ages 6-7, complexity, 2p = .34, distraction, 
2
p = .30.  Ages 13-14, 
                                                 
33
 Note that the effect sizes presented here are not reported in the original 2004 paper but 
they are available in the 2006 paper where the same set of data was re-analysed.   
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complexity, 2p = .42), some were not statistically significant and showed an 
overall smaller effect size (Ages 6-7: complexity x distraction, 2p = .12.  
Ages 13-14:  distraction, 2p = .08, complexity x distraction, 
2
p = .07).   
 
It can be noted that some of the effect sizes that Richland (2004, 2006) 
obtained for non-significant main effects and interactions were relatively 
large (e.g. main effect of distraction in ages 13-14, 2p = .08; complexity x 
distraction interaction in age 6-7, 2p = .12) and comparable to the effect 
sizes that were obtained in the same set of analysis for significant effects 
(e.g., age x distraction, 2p = .09; age x complexity x distraction, 
2
p = .09). 
This suggests that Richland‟s study was possibly under-powered due to a 
small sample. 
 
Because there is no standard effect size criterion for interpreting partial eta 
squared (Levine & Hullett, 2002), and given the wide range of effect sizes 
found in Richland‟s et al. (2004, 2006), in the current study an a priori 
analysis of required power (G*Power software; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) was based on Cohens f medium effect size of f= 0.25
34
 (Cohen, 
1977) and a power of 0.90 (Cohen, 1977). This analysis determined a 
minimum number of participants equal to 32 for the within-factor 
interaction (i.e. complexity x distraction) and equal to 44 for all other 
within-between factor interactions. The number of participants in the current 
experiment was 78, that is, above the minimum number required. With a 
                                                 
34
 This is equivalent to ²=0.06. 
115 
sample of 78 participants and a power of 0.90 (see above), the smallest 
effect size that the current study was powered to detect is f=0.15.  
 
In Richland 2004 and 2006, age groups were chosen in accordance with 
Gentner‟s relational shift (1983) but also Halford‟s (1992, 1993, 1998) 
views on complexity-constraint which suggests that children below the age 
of 5 have difficulty processing ternary relationships (such as those used in 
the RPA) due to insufficient WMC.  Interestingly, Gentner‟s original theory 
predicts a more gradual change to relational responding over the 
developmental course, which it was hoped would be visible through the 
current year groups chosen in the experiment.  
 
This study used a 2x2 repeated measures design using the factors of 
complexity (one or two relations) and distraction (present or not-present) 
defined by Richland et al. in the original 2004 paper (which utilized the 
relational, featural and relational error scores as the dependent variables) 
and the non-experimental (between subjects) factor of year group (4 levels).  
The hypothesis was that the three main effects identified by Richland et al. 
(2004, 2006): i.e. age, complexity and distraction, would be observable in a 
similar UK based study in the relational score, whilst an effect of age and 
distraction would be identified in the featural score.  The experiment hoped 
to observe some of the findings as reported previously in the relational score 
by Richland et al. (2004, 2006), namely significant main effects of age, 
distraction, and complexity. However, because of the differences in the age 
range between the current study and Richland‟s study (see p.112), it was not 
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expected to find significant interactions between year group and the factors 
distraction and complexity (reported by Richland, 2004, 2006), but rather a 
two way interaction between distraction and complexity (i.e. with no 
differences among year groups). It was believed that such results might be 
indicative of WM resources being loaded by relational complexity.  
 
2.1.1 Participants.  Seventy-eight participants aged between 8 and 
11 (UK class years 3, 4, 5, and 6) were recruited from three primary schools 
in the North East England.  Participants were arranged into the following 
groups: 20 (participants) from year 3 (mean age = 102 months); 20 from 
year 4 (mean age = 112.6 months); 20 from year 5 (mean age = 123.95 
months), and 18 from year 6 (mean age = 133.83 months).   
 
All participants were screened prior to testing in order to establish that they 
were able to comprehend the English language sufficiently well enough for 
them to be able to understand instructions and complete the task and were 
free from severe mental health difficulties.   
 
Additional requirements for the study were that all children involved were 
able to see the problems presented to them, were able to indicate the desired 
response, and were able to point and/or hold and use a pencil when required.  
All participants underwent strict ethical consent procedures (Appendix A). 
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Figure 9.  A single RPA problem.  This image is problem 4-2b, that is to say 
the 3rd variation (2b) of the 4th question.  Put simpler this is condition 
R2ND, i.e. it has two relations in it as the base object (the chest of draws) is 
“dropping something whilst also being dropped”.  If it was a one relational 
problem (R1ND [question 4-1a] or R1D [question 4-1b) then there would be 
no hammer, the relation just being “dropping”.  It is a no-distracter (ND) 
because there is not a chest-of draws in the bottom picture (see Figure 8 for 
an example of the 4 different types of problem).   Objects in other 
conditions are replaced but not removed, extra relational-error objects 
taking the place of a non-interacting „other-error‟ object (i.e. the plant), the 
number of objects always being 5 in each scene (in the target scene this is 
the woman, tray, bowl, plant, stool). 
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2.1.2 Materials and Design.  A paper version of the Richland 
Picture Analogies (or RPA: see Figure 9) was presented on a one-to-one 
basis with the experimenter in a quiet environment.   
 
Figure 9 shows an example of the RPA.  Each page (i.e. a single problem) 
contains a base (top) and target (bottom) picture.  During the task the 
experimenter points to the object with the arrow and asks the child to find 
the object in the bottom picture that is the same (see appendix B for 
standardized instructions). 
 
The RPA follows a 2x2 design varying across dimensions of complexity 
(distracter versus no-distracter) and complexity (complex or simple 
conditions) to create four RPA conditions with 20 problems in each (80 
randomly presented items in total):  simple no distracter (R1ND), simple 
with distracter (R1D), complex no distracter (R2ND) and complex with 
distracter (R2D).   
 
Responses are categorized into relational (the object that is doing the same 
thing in the same sequential order as the base object, i.e. the tray in Figure 
9), featural (objects that look the same as the base object), relational-error 
(objects that are almost doing the same as the base object but in the wrong 
order, i.e. the bowl in Figure 9) or unrelated objects (i.e. the plant in Figure 
9). 
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Crucial to the design of the RPA the task uses both a controlled number of 
objects (five per scene) and analogies understood by the youngest 
participants such as [chased] or [in the middle of] and consists of objects 
appealing to younger participants (monkeys, dolls etc.).    
 
Despite its origins, Experiment 1 was not a full replication of the Richland 
et al. (2004, 2006) studies, although it was understood that at the time of 
writing the RPA was still a relatively new paradigm and additional support 
for Richland‟s hypotheses were required.   First and foremost, different age 
ranges were being investigated, it being understood that a broader picture of 
how analogical reasoning develops beyond the critical age of 5 years 
proposed by Halford (Halford, 1992; 1993; 1998; Halford et al, 1994, 2004) 
would contribute significantly to the field in that it would either suggest 
alternative explanations for AR that were not WMC dependent, or show 
how AR develops with the incremental increases in general cognition 
(including but not exclusive of WMC) experienced between Richland‟s 
extreme age-ranges of up to 16 years
35
.  Secondly, Experiment 1 would 
conduct additional analyses not seen in the Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
studies, such as meta-learning, which would look to see if RPA performance 
(relational responses) increased over the course of the task.  It being 
possible that some groups of children, possibly older age ranges, were 
learning the required form of response as the task sequentially progressed;  
                                                 
35
 Halford himself suggests that Analogical thought develops between the ages of 3 and 12, 
but 100% relational responding is not likely until this age range is passed, implying a 
gradual development of AR ability beyond the time (age 5) in which he indicates that 50% 
of children are able to fully represent the ternary relationships used in the RPA.  
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an important point given that each RPA question consists of 4 visually 
similar scenes presented throughout the battery, the relational answer being 
the same in each.   
 
2.1.3 Procedure.  Standardized instructions (see appendix B) were 
used following those used by Richland et al. (2004, 2006).  Participants 
were given 80 problems (20 questions with 4 conditions each), in a repeated 
measures design (including all conditions) which had been placed in quasi-
random order using a web-based research programme (Urbaniak & Plous, 
1997) which had been adjusted so that no problem was presented adjacent to 
an identical question within a separate condition.  In such cases conflicting 
problems were swapped or the order re-randomised if this was not possible. 
 
2.1.4 Results.  The data from Experiment 1 was divided into three parts: 
relational, featural, and relational-error responses.  
 
First a correlational analysis was conducted to test for learning effects 
(meta-learning analysis) within the task, correlating performance with 
progression in the RPA.  This was important as different forms of response 
in the RPA follow patterns which can be learnt (i.e. the relational form of 
response is always in the middle, whilst the featural form is always in 
isolation); also to a lesser degree the RPA paradigm uses a repeated 
measures design with each question being repeated four times- giving the 
participant extra experience/the option of repeating the same response 
without considering others. 
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Once the meta-learning analysis was complete a more detailed analysis was 
performed for three forms of response (relational, featural, relational-error 
[Rel-error], but not other-errors).  Other error responses were very rare.  In 
accordance with the RPA‟s design, the relational analysis consisted of a 
three factor mixed ANOVA with two experimental repeated measures 
factors, complexity and distraction - with the non-experimental between-
participants factor of year group, whilst for the featural analysis only 
complexity would be used due to the lack of distraction data in no-
distraction conditions.  
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Table 3.   Mean responses (by year group). 
  Mean 
Relational 
SD Relational% Mean 
Featural 
SD Featural% Featural%* Mean 
Rel-
Error 
SD Rel-
Error% 
Mean 
Other 
Errors 
SD Other 
Errors 
% 
All 64.64 8.93 80.80% 5.33 4.04 6.67% 13.33% 7.01 5.11 8.77% 3.01 2.89 3.70% 
Year 3 61.9 8.86 77.38% 6.25 3.64 7.81 15.63% 7.45 5.68 9.31% 4.4 2.89 5.50% 
Year 4 61.85 10.24 77.31% 5.3 3.85 6.63% 13.25% 9.3 5.78 11.63% 3.55 3.44 4.44% 
Year 5 65.5 8.33 81.88% 5.9 5.07 7.38% 14.75% 6.25 3.92 7.81% 2.35 2.60 2.94% 
Year 6 69.83 5.61 87.29% 3.72 3.14 4.65% 9.31% 4.83 3.94 6.04% 1.61 1.54 2.01% 
  
†
 Note: Within each experiment, four categories are used: relational (rel), featural (feat), relational-error (rel-error) and other errors (other)  
* Featural responses are only present in approximately 50% of the questions; this column therefore represents the true percentage of featural answers in questions 
where they were present. 
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Table 4.  Mean responses (by RPA condition and year group) 
R1ND Rel   Feat   Rel-Error   Other   
  Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD % 
All 17.24 2.13 86% N/A N/A N/A 1.15 0.98 5.75% 1.62 1.68 8.10% 
Year 3 16.35 2.06 82% N/A N/A N/A 1.1 0.91 5.50% 2.55 1.70 12.75% 
Year 4 16.75 2.38 84% N/A N/A N/A 1.6 0.94 8.00% 1.65 1.90 8.25% 
Year 5 17.6 1.93 88% N/A N/A N/A 1.15 0.88 5.75% 1.25 1.52 6.25% 
Year 6 18.33 1.61 92% N/A N/A N/A 0.72 1.07 3.60% 0.94 0.94 4.70% 
R1D                         
All 15.4 2.55 77% 3.18 2.32 16% 1.13 1.00 6% 0.29 0.56 1% 
Year 3 15.1 2.02 76% 3.6 2.06 18% 0.85 0.81 4% 0.45 0.69 2% 
Year 4 14.8 2.63 74% 3 2.03 15% 1.8 1.11 9% 0.4 0.68 2% 
Year 5 15.05 3.07 75% 3.65 3.05 18% 1.15 0.81 6% 0.15 0.37 1% 
Year 6 16.78 1.96 84% 2.39 1.88 12% 0.67 0.91 3% 0.17 0.38 1% 
R2ND                         
All 16.81 2.56 84% N/A N/A N/A 2.23 2.08 11% 0.96 1.20 5% 
Year 3 16.1 2.85 81% N/A N/A N/A 2.6 2.48 13% 1.3 1.26 7% 
Year 4 16.1 2.95 81% N/A N/A N/A 2.65 2.41 13% 1.25 1.48 6% 
Year 5 17.1 2.05 86% N/A N/A N/A 2.1 1.68 11% 0.8 1.06 4% 
Year 6 18.06 1.83 90% N/A N/A N/A 1.5 1.47 8% 0.44 0.71 2% 
R2D                         
All 14.45 2.90 72% 2.03 1.78 10% 2.38 2.15 12% 0.14 0.35 1% 
Year 3 13.6 3.19 68% 2.55 1.61 13% 2.75 2.51 14% 0.1 0.31 1% 
Year 4 13.4 3.05 67% 2.25 1.86 11% 3.1 2.38 16% 0.25 0.44 1% 
Year 5 15 2.60 75% 2.05 2.06 10% 1.8 1.91 9% 0.15 0.37 1% 
Year 6 15.94 1.98 80% 1.17 1.30 6% 1.83 1.30 9% 0.06 0.24 0% 
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Meta-learning analysis.   A bivariate correlation comparing the proportion 
of responses within each response-category was run within age and RPA 
conditions against the sequential question number (1 being question 1, 80 
being question 80 etc.), the intention being to show the patterns of responses 
as the participant progressed through the RPA task.  In general, no effects of 
learning were observed within the task for any response category.  However, 
an analysis within year groups did observe a significant negative correlation 
between the sequential questions order and the total number of relational 
responses in Year 5 (r = -.242, p< 0.05), and the total number of relational 
answers in Year 3 was also found to be approaching significance (r = .193, 
p=0.056). 
 
 
 
Table 5. Mean relational scores (by RPA condition)      
  R1ND R1D R2ND R2D R1 R2 ND D 
Mean 17.23 15.40 16.81 14.45 32.63 32.01 43.04 29.85 
SD 2.13 2.55 2.56 2.90 4.280 5.271 4.317 4.957 
Table 6.  Mean relational scores (by year group)  
 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
Mean 15.29 15.26 16.19 17.28 
SD 2.23 2.50 2.04 1.40 
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Figure 10. Complexity/distraction interaction in the relational score. 
 
Relational analysis.     The factorial ANOVA for the number of relational 
responses given (R
s
) revealed a significant main effect of complexity (see 
Table 5, columns R1 and R2)  (F[1,74] = 11.26; p<0.05, 
2
p = .13), distraction 
(see Table 5 columns D and ND) (F[1,74] = 175.004; p<0.001,
2
p =.70), and 
year group (see Table 6) (F[3,74] = 3.84; p<0.05,
2
p =.14). Pairwise contrasts  
revealed that the significant differences in year groups were found between 
year 3 and 6 (p<0.05), and year 4 and 6 (p<0.05). The interaction between 
complexity and distraction (see Figure 10) was also significant (F[1,74] = 
4.77; p<0.05,2p =.06), while there were no significant interactions between 
complexity and year group(F[3,74] = 0.69; p>0.05, 
2
p =.03), distraction and 
year group (F[3,74] = 0.74; p>0.05,
2
p =.03), or complexity, distraction and 
year group F[3,74] = 2.25; p>0.05,
2
p = .08).    
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Table 7. Mean featural scores (by RPA condition) 
 
  R1ND R1D R2ND R2D 
Mean N/A 3.18 N/A 2.03 
SD N/A 2.32 N/A 1.78 
 
 
Paired sample t-tests between RPA conditions across all year groups found 
significant differences between conditions R1D and R1ND (t(77) = -8.44, 
p<0.001, ² = .48 ), R2D and R2ND (t(77) = -13.06, p<0.05, ² =.69) as 
well as R1D and R2D (t(77) = 3.67, p<0.001, ² =.15),  R1D and R2ND  
(t(77) = -5.17, p<0.001, ² =0.26).  This illustrated the interaction between 
complexity x distraction in the relational score (see Figure 10) by 
demonstrating that participants gave more relational responses in no-
distracter compared to distracter conditions whilst also eliciting fewer 
relational responses in complex distraction conditions.   
 
Featural analysis.  The same procedure for the number of featural 
responses (F
s
, see Table 7) minus the distraction condition, found a 
significant main effect of complexity (F[1,74] = 49.11; p<0.001, 
2
p =.40) but 
no main effect of year group (F[3,74] = 1.65; p>0.05, 
2
p =.06).  
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Table 8. Mean relational-error scores (by RPA condition). 
 
 
  
  R1ND R1D R2ND R2D R1 R2 ND D 
         
Mean (all years) 1.15 1.13 2.23 2.38 2.28 4.73 3.38 3.51 
SD 0.98 1.0 2.08 2.15 1.728 4.063 2.70 2.66 
Year 3 mean 1.10 .85 2.60 2.75 1.95 5.50 3.70 3.60 
SD 0.912 .813 2.479 2.511 1.504 4.685 3.16 2.89 
Year 4 mean 1.60 1.80 2.65 3.10 3.40 5.90 4.25 4.90 
SD 0.940 1.105 2.412 2.382 1.729 4.734 2.86 3.08 
Year 5 mean 1.15 1.15 2.10 1.80 2.30 3.95 3.25 2.95 
SD 0.875 0.813 1.683 1.908 1.342 3.379 2.15 2.11 
Year 6 mean 0.72 0.67 1.50 1.83 1.39 3.44 2.22 2.50 
SD 1.074 0.907 1.465 1.425 1.787 2.770 2.26 1.82 
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Relational-error analysis.  For relational-errors given (the relational-error 
score, see Table 8) significant main effects of complexity (F[1,74] = 33.05; 
p<0.001,2p =.31) and year group (F[3,74] = 2.72; p<0.05,
2
p =.10) were 
observed revealing that after an initial rise at around class Year 4 (when 
more relational errors were made) - the number of relational errors 
decreased with age, presumably (given the relational data) as more children 
were able to correctly choose which form of relational response was correct. 
(see table 9) However, pairwise contrasts revealed that the differences in 
year groups were statistically significant only between Year 4 and 6 
(p<0.05). 
 
 No main effects were found for distraction (F[1,74] = 0.46; p>0.05,
2
p =.006) 
and no interactions were found between complexity and year group (F[3,74] = 
0.95; p>0.05,2p =.04), complexity and distraction (F[1,74] = 1.16; p>0.05,
2
p 
=.02), or complexity, distraction and class year (F[3,74] = 0.94; p>0.05,
2
p 
=.04).   
 
Table 9.  Mean relational error scores (by year group)  
 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 YEAR 6 
Mean 1.82 2.28 1.55 1.18 
SD 1.45 1.40 0.98 0.97 
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Relational vs. featural responses.  In the Richland et al.‟s (2006) study, 
relational-errors and featural responses were compared in R2D conditions 
(i.e. a condition where both complexity and distraction were present) using a 
one-way ANOVA, this was done to see which form of response represented 
the greatest attentional appeal/distraction.  A variation of this methodology 
was performed here in order to see which form of response was preferable 
for each year group, and how this preference developed.  
 
Here an ANOVA was performed on condition R2D with the two 
experimental measures of the relational and featural scores and the non-
experimental between groups factor of age.    It was predicted that a main 
group effect of type of response would be found due to the large difference 
in size between relational and featural responses. 
 
As expected there was a significant main effect of response type (F[1,74] = 
538.39, p<0.001, 2p = .88) meaning that relational responses were preferred 
over featural responses, but no interaction between response type and class 
year group (F[3,74] = 1.72, p>0.05, 
2
p =.07) meaning that although there was 
a difference, some class years did not prefer certain types of response.   
 
2.1.5 Discussion.  Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) study makes two 
basic assumptions regarding her data.  The first regarding complexity is that 
performance was better in non-distraction/complexity conditions, and that 
due to control of the number of objects (five per scene) and (simple to 
understand) relations used, domain specific knowledge alone could not 
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account for the complexity findings. Secondly regarding Maturational 
Factors and the Relational shift, Richland postulating that relational shift 
hypothesis was supported in that, beyond ages 4-5 (the key years 
highlighted by Ratterman & Gentner; 1998), a trend was observed wherein 
the proportion of relational responses chosen over featural was greater in the 
older class years.  As a result of both of these claims Richland hypothesized 
that the interaction between age/complexity and distraction was mediated by 
maturational factors, which were hypothesized as being WMC and 
inhibitory skill.  Both of these claims will be reviewed in light of the present 
data. 
 
(1) Complexity and Distraction 
Relational score.  Children on the present experiment gave more relational 
responses in the no distracter (R1ND and R2ND) than distracter conditions 
(R1D and R2D) and gave more relational responses in simple (r1) compared 
to complex (r2) conditions.    As predicted by the relational shift (Gentner, 
1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998), the youngest participants (Year 3 and 4) 
also elicited the lowest proportion of relational responses and the oldest 
(Year 6) the highest. 
 
The main effects of year group, distraction, and complexity found in 
Richland‟s study (2004, 2006) were all replicated here, with the effect size 
for year group and complexity being smaller in the current study (year 
group: 2p =.13 in the current study vs.
2
p =  .71 in Richland‟s study; 
complexity: 2p = .13 in the current study vs. ,
2
p = .22 in Richland‟s study), 
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and the effect size for distraction being larger in the current study (2p =  .70 
vs. 2p =  .29 in Richland‟s study). The two way interaction between age and 
distraction and the three way interaction between age group, distraction, and 
complexity found in Richland et al.‟s study (2004, 2006) were not replicated 
here. This was assumed to be due to the age range chosen in the study, 
which offered a restricted age range for any age-related change to be 
identified. However, it should be also noted that the effect sizes obtained by 
Richland et al. in the interactions involving the factor year group were small 
and partially comparable with those found in the current study (year group x 
complexity: 2p = .03 in the current study vs. 
2
p =.02 in Richland‟s study; 
year group x distraction x complexity: 2p = .08 in the current study vs. 
2
p = 
.09 in Richland‟s study; but note that the effect size in the year group x 
distraction interaction was smaller in the current study: 2p = .03 in the 
current study vs. 2p = .09 in Richland‟s study)    
   
In strict accordance with Gentner‟s (1989) view of similarity space (where 
featural „distracter‟ objects are described as relational objects with less 
bound descriptive information) the interactions observed within the data can 
therefore be broadly understood to be in accordance with Richland et al.‟s 
(2004, 2006) interpretation of SMT
36
, an effect of complexity apparently 
having been demonstrated.   
 
                                                 
36
 e.g. if the participants already held the similarity-constraint in LTM, then lowered levels 
of performance in complex and distracter conditions reflect increased task difficulty. 
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Intriguingly conditions of distraction, above those of complexity, were 
considered the most difficult
37, providing additional support for Richland‟s 
idea that inhibitory mechanisms may underlie AR, even though the original 
study did not find the same effect. 
 
Yet despite these conclusions, other interpretations of the data do exist 
beyond the complexity-constraint perspective.   For instance, the rising 
proportion of relational over other forms of response across year groups 
may not arise from the relational shift or the increased ability to process 
relations per se, but from participants being primed in standardized training 
to answer relationally, the effect of age not being from a growing 
dominance of relational information, but developing cognitive abilities used 
in to interpret/follow that training. 
 
Other issues regarding relational responding surround how complexity may 
be measured.   In the RPA relational objects are the only form of objects 
that interact, the idea of complexity being to increase the descriptive 
dimensions of the target object (i.e. turning the similarity-constraint from 
„chased‟ in the R1ND condition into „chasing and being chased‟ in R2ND).  
However, target objects do not always have to be described by their 
function, their existing the possibility that they are being identified by a 
single comparatively low-level relation which focuses on their position, i.e. 
                                                 
37
 In terms of a sequential order for highest proportion of relational responses the order was 
R1ND, followed by R2ND, R1D and R2D.   70.3% of the variance in the relational score 
was accounted for by the main effect of distraction, with 13.2% accounted for by the main 
effect of complexity. 
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„in the middle.‟  Secondly, although the number of objects in each scene is 
technically always five, not all objects are relevant, so it is entirely possible 
that r2 scenes are increasing the number of relevant response.    
 
In order to show the validity of these latter prospects we must look at the 
patterns of other forms of response within the RPA.  
 
Featural score.  For featural responding a main effect of complexity and 
distraction was identified as well as an interaction between complexity and 
distraction, but no effect of year group, the effect of class year group on the 
F
s
 being too small to detect given the present experiments sample size.  This 
could indicate that the F
s 
is uninfluenced by maturation, however given the 
low variance in the score a more likely conclusion was that the RPA lacked 
power for this form of analysis, especially when the sample was separated 
into small groups.  
 
This observation appeared to be unique to the present study as in 2004, 
2006, Richland (with fewer participants but a lower age-floor) had 
previously identified a main effect of age within this form of response, as 
well as an interaction between age and complexity.  Despite this claim, age 
effects were not entirely absent as a significant negative correlation between 
age and F
s
 that had been identified in the R2D but not R1D conditions, a 
finding which at first glance, made good theoretical sense if condition R2D 
required more developmentally accrued processing power because of its 
complexity. 
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Yet one aspect of the analysis came as a surprise: that of the effect of 
complexity (on F
s
).  In a finding that directly conflicts with Richland et al 
(2004, 2006) a higher proportion of featural responses were consistently 
reported in condition r1 than r2 across the majority of year groups.   This is 
directly contradictory to Waltz et al.‟s (2000) interpretation of the 
complexity-constraint hypothesis (Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998), which states 
that: 
 
“…any manipulation that reduces available working-memory 
capacity will make it more difficult for reasoners to compute 
relational mappings, and hence will increase the proportion of less 
complex attribute mappings in situations in which the mapping is 
ambiguous.” (Waltz, 2000, p. 1206)  
 
One possible reason for this was general task difficulty, R1D somehow 
being more difficult than R2D, a factor which seems unlikely given 
Richland‟s original hypothesis.  Since relational responding was slightly 
but not significantly higher in condition R1D than R2D, this was dismissed, 
instead it being assumed that condition R1D somehow placed unique 
demands on the reasoner, which made featural responses more attractive 
than other forms of error (non-relational response).  This could be because 
of the forced-choice dynamic in such problems which clearly highlighted 
two forms of response which are potentially correct according to two 
opposing logical paths, a theory which has some providence given Richland 
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et al.‟s (2004, 2006) proposed (but unexplained) effect of inhibition within 
the RPA. Inhibitory skill possibly kicking in situations where a) less 
processing time is required, b) where a type of response is more prominently 
detectable or c) where one form of response is proponent.   In such 
circumstances it is common sense to assume that if one of the visible forms 
of response is similar to the object being compared and held in mind, rapid 
selection of that response would require some form of base inhibition. 
 
Interpreting the data more generally however, the number of featural 
responses elicited in any condition/class year group was considered small 
(the ratio of featural to relational answers across the whole of the RPA 
approaching 1-4, the mean percentage of featural responses per participant 
being just 6% or 5 out of a possible 80), indicating that the sample chosen 
was not particularly prone to this form of response.  At this stage it was not 
known whether this was potentially due to the age range chosen (as 
predicted by Richland et al., 2004, 2006) and/or (as suspected given the 
standardized instructions) the paradigm naturally primed participants to 
avoid featural forms of response.  In either case it was apparent that the 
cognitive development of individual differences across childhood could be 
explained by individual differences in ability, through increased ability to 
process relationships and/or to comprehend/follow instruction, or indeed 
both.   Yet whilst this clearly underlined a future direction for research, the 
interpretation of the present featural effect was less clear cut.      
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Here the low level of responses brought F
s
 within range of other forms of 
response (the mean for relational-error and other-error responses being 7 
and 3 respectively).  Elucidating further on this, no significant difference 
was found between the proportion of featural and relational-error responses 
within condition R2D (half of all conditions involving featural responses), 
highlighting the possibility mentioned earlier that non-relational (incorrect) 
responses are chosen in complex conditions not because a processing error 
has arisen due to object complexity, but because of scene complexity,  
Condition R2D having more (potentially) relevant forms of responses - 
increasing the task ambiguity.  
 
Relational-error score.  Within the relational-error score a main effect of 
age was found as well as complexity, although again no interactions 
(between age, complexity or distraction) were observed.  Once more a lack 
of power was indicated for this form of error analysis; however unlike the F
s 
the variance within the score appeared large enough to consider that older 
participants may make less relational errors (a hypothesis supported by the 
correlation analysis).  At first the main effect of complexity also looks 
meaningful but for this analysis it was hypothesised a priori that despite the 
control of five objects per scene the higher proportion of relational-error 
responses available in r2 compared to r1 problems would mean that the 
number of relational-error responses would almost certainly be greater in 
complex conditions.  This effect being presumed to be likely to occur 
because there were more relational-error responses than any other form of 
response and because relational-error objects were more task-appropriate 
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than (i.e. they shared some of the similarity-constraint observed in the base 
item).  
 
In complex r2 problems, although marginally more relational-error 
responses were elicited in distraction conditions compared to no distraction 
conditions, the difference was not significant indicating that the presence of 
a distracter generally did not increase the likelihood of a relational-error 
response in either complex or simple RPA conditions.  This in turn suggests 
that the children understood what was being asked of them in the task (i.e. 
to select relational responses) but in complex conditions were having 
difficulty deciding which relational response represented a best fit.   
 
Maturational factors (the relational shift).  In her study, Richland proposes 
that the age based interactions with factors of complexity and distraction 
were due to maturational factors which “may interact to constrain children‟s 
capacity to perform successfully on picture analogies that require more WM 
or perceptual inhibition” (Richland et al., 2004; p. 153).    As such, the 
2004, 2006 study was thought to provide evidence for the relational shift 
wherein, according to some researchers (Morrison et al., 2006, 2010), at 
around 4-5 years old children begin to incrementally prefer relational 
responses over featural.       
 
Although no such age based interactions were observed, the current study 
supported this developmental claim in that a significant main-effect of age 
was identified in relational responding.  Additionally, although the featural 
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data crucially failed to replicate the same maturational assumptions it was 
still somewhat consistent with Richland‟s hypothesis, especially given that 
no significant interactions were observed in the relational score for Richland 
et al.‟s (2004, 2006) 6-7 year old year group. 
 
This failure to precisely replicate Richland et al.‟s findings was almost 
certainly because floor/ceiling effects were present in the original trial, 
wherein a disparity clearly existed between the lowest year group (3-4 years 
old) and the highest (13-14 years old), the youngest participants eliciting a 
far higher proportion of featural responses than was observable in this 
experiment in the 8-9 year old group. Such a lack of featural-age data in the 
present sample was of course not entirely unexpected, whilst Richland‟s 
middle year group (6-7 years old) was always likely to under-perform 
compared to the youngest age presented here (8 years old).  There has been 
additional evidence to suggest that beyond 4-6 years children reason by 
relational-relations rather than attribute-based relations (Morrison et al., 
2006, 2010), however (due to the age ranges chosen here) in this case 
insufficient evidence has been provided to support this.   It therefore seems 
likely that young children lack the cognitive processes or capabilities 
necessary to adequately complete the RPA, presumably because they have 
less executive resources with which to actively manipulate and map 
complex analogical problems. 
 
Maturational factors (relational primacy perspective).  As we have seen in 
chapter 1, an abrupt naturalistic change in thinking styles is not necessarily 
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supported by knowledge-based theorists who predict that children can 
answer relationally even at early ages (Goswami, 1992; Goswami & Brown, 
1989).  Or indeed by some relational-shift theorists who postulate a more 
gradual change, the relation shift occurring “at different ages in different 
domains, depending on domain knowledge” (Gentner & Ratterman, 1991, p. 
456).  This leaves the possibility that the relational shift at these ages is not 
occurring because of the inability to process relations, but because they are 
failing to understand the task. 
 
Following this perspective age based changes in WM resources or cognitive 
abilities (capacity based or otherwise) may still be applied to the RPA, albeit 
indirectly through such spheres as meta-learning, interpreting task 
ambiguity (i.e. selecting relevant responses from less relevant options) or 
the ability to comprehend the instructions used, interpret experimental 
demand and/or maintain goals in the face of highly demanding parallel 
processes/distractions.   
 
Intriguingly Richland et al. (2006) refute the idea that children were unable 
to understand the RPA, speculating that instead the effect is mainly due to 
the capacity based limitations of WM in the active processing of 
complexity.  However this claim was focused almost purely on the words 
used (language in analogical tasks being notoriously vague) and is directly 
contrary to Goswami‟s speculation (Brown 1989; Goswami, 1992; 1994) 
that given the right instructions and similarity-constraint, most children can 
complete an analogical problems by answering relationally.   
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Meta-learning.  In general, no effects of learning were observed within the 
task for any response categories, meaning that the RPA was considered to 
be mostly free of meta-learning, however Year 5 did demonstrate an effect 
wherein more relational responses were elicited near the end of the task than 
the beginning, meaning that some learning was taking place in older 
participants.  This was not entirely unsurprising, as learning is almost 
certain to take place in one form or another within most, if not all, 
sequential reasoning tasks such as the RPA (lending limited credence to the 
idea that the maturational factors Richland described, may not entirely be 
due to the loading of WMC effective active processing).  However, the low-
strength of this one correlation was not considered strong enough to 
represent a major effect, and so the concept of WM effecting meta-learning 
within these class years in the RPA was rejected. 
 
Efficacy of the RPA.  The RPA offers the almost unique potential to 
explore the effects of complexity and distraction on WM.   Generally the 
data presented here supported Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) claims that 
such factors mediate AR, the relational analysis in particular indicating age-
based interactions which were in-line with SMT.  Yet even non-complexity 
based interpretations of the findings promote the concept that further 
psychological insights into WM and AR may be achieved through the 
paradigm.    
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As ever, concerns regarding the RPA were raised, particularly in regard to 
the prospect of using the task to measure age based effects on featural 
responding.  For this reason it is suggested that although further assessment 
be conducted in this area (in order to investigate the lack of featural data 
observed here) future analyses may benefit more from a relationally focused 
assessment.   
 
2.1.6 Conclusion.  In conclusion, although these findings differ from 
the Richland et al. (2004, 2006) study in a number of important ways, this 
experiment generally supports the hypothesis that factors such as 
complexity and distraction increase task difficulty in the RPA.   Like the 
earlier Richland experiment the data also seems conclusive in that it 
provided strong support against Goswami‟s (1993) relational primacy 
perspective, participant‟s particularly high success rates suggesting that they 
were able to successfully identify the required similarity-constraint whilst 
still making errors in the task, suggesting that processing difficulties were 
occurring during later mapping, rather than initial recognition.       
 
However sufficient questions have been raised in regards to possible 
alternative interpretations of this data to warrant further investigation.   One 
area in particular which requires additional attention is the maturational 
factors discussed by Richland et al. (2004, 2006) in the original paper.   
Given our knowledge of the existing relationship between STM and 
reasoning it seems self-evident to propose that WM is in some way 
mediating analogical thought.  Yet if we wish to infer that this mediatory-
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role is due to a constraint-effect of relational-complexity (Halford 1992, 
1993, 1998) in accordance with Gentner‟s taxonomy (Gentner, 1983, 1988, 
1989) - then it should be a requirement for the research to establish a 
connection between WMC and the proportion of relational responses 
elicited.   The alternative is to adopt a more general perspective wherein 
children with higher WMC have an inherent advantage over others as they 
may be better able to maintain a problem during processing regardless of 
view of structural complexity (Gilhooly, 1998; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990) a 
theory which is entirely in accordance with the claims of Goswami (1993).   
 
This experiment therefore paves the way for a series of experiments 
designed to test both the hypothesis that WMC plays an important role, and 
Richland‟s (2004, 2006) argument that RPA complexity data could 
potentially provide evidence for the involvement of WM and its processes in 
AR.  It is clear that whilst the findings observed here support the idea of a 
„relational shift‟ in that the data may be seen as an extension of Richland‟s 
observations in the 2004, 2006 study, sufficient doubt exists in the current 
experiment (due to the relatively high proportion of relational over featural 
responses) to suggest that the role of working memory/intelligence may not 
be as clear-cut as previously suggested.  The next experimental step should 
therefore be to investigate the validity of each perspective by directly 
comparing WMC and non-capacity based measures of ability to the 
performance in the RPA, to attempt to further clarify the role of each in AR. 
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2.2 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to assess the involvement of WMC in AR whilst 
controlling for generally ability (hereby referred to as IQ
38
). 
 
As stated in the literature review, the most widespread account of AR-WM 
is the complexity-constraint theory.  This states that any cognitive 
manipulation that reduces WMC makes it more difficult to successfully map 
analogical problems.  Increased object complexity makes additional 
demands on these WM resources, possibly leading to an increased selection 
rate of less-complex attribute based objects during the mapping processes 
(Waltz et al., 2000).  Individuals with higher WMC may also have 
additional resources with which to devote to analogical tasks, meaning that 
their reasoning functionality may be less affected by complex relationships 
than their low WMC counterparts (Gentner, 1983, Richland et al., 2004, 
2006).    
 
It is understood that WMC increases throughout childhood (Alloway et al, 
2004; 2005).  Halford (1992, 1993, 1998) and Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
claimed that WMC may act as an age-centric constraint on the number of 
relations that can be processed in parallel.  This assertion was partly 
supported in Experiment 1: it being established that older participants 
responded relationally at a higher rate than their younger counterparts, 
                                                 
38
 The word IQ is used here cautiously. As described in the previous chapters, „IQ‟ or 
„intelligence‟ may be seen in some instances as being synonymous with WM, however in 
this instance it is used to refer solely to processes which do not rely on capacity as their 
chief component.  It includes tasks which have WM components or which primarily rely on 
speed of processing, the latter being known to be associated with WMC. 
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specifically under conditions of distraction or high complexity.  Yet despite 
this observation, a complexity-constraint effect has not been practically 
demonstrated using WM measures.  
 
It was discussed at the end of Experiment 1 that other factors besides WMC 
might potentially explain the results observed both in the previous 
experiment and the Richland et al. (2004, 2006) study, and that WM did not 
necessarily have to rely on a complexity-constraint model to mediate AR
39
.   
More critically it was also reported that increased complexity resulted in 
less featural responses, not more; possibly implying that individual 
conditions in the RPA place different demands on cognition other than those 
anticipated by a complexity based approach 
 
These observations provided two clear directions of research for Experiment 
2.   Firstly, it was seen as necessary to associate WMC with performance in 
the RPA in order to test the validity of any WM/AR account.  Secondly, 
precisely how WMC might influence this form of thinking should also be 
clarified; particularly investigating Richland‟s (2004, 2006) proposal that 
the maturational factors reported in the experiment could be explained by 
capacity constraints in the WM system.    
  
A new experiment was therefore designed to directly compare the 
involvement of WM and IQ in the RPA in an attempt to gain theoretical 
                                                 
39
 A WM effect might also represent the application of mental ability to interpret 
experimenter demand, or the overall functioning efficiency/speed of cognitive systems, 
neural networks and selective executive processes. 
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insight into AR.   To this end a battery of eight tasks, consisting of four 
measures of IQ and four measures of WM, were presented alongside the 
RPA. 
 
The IQ tasks were chosen in order to be representative of core aspects of 
commonly encountered and widely available intelligence tests for children: 
focusing on both visual and verbal tasks- it being a requirement that each IQ 
task was widely accepted in the research community.   The tasks being 
selected on the grounds that they would appeal to young children as a 
puzzle, game or familiar form of school administered vocabulary test- whilst 
also being well within the ability of children younger than those being tested 
here (in case of future research pursuing these year groups).  It was reasoned 
that these tasks should be not be overly representative of a single factor, 
therefore two tasks required a verbal response; a single word reading task 
(Wechsler, 2005) and a vocabulary task (Wechsler, 1991), and two required 
a visual or „hands on‟ response; a block design task and a coding task 
(Wechsler, 1991).  All the tasks required the ability to think quickly and 
accurately (see materials and design for a review of these measures below).    
 
The WM measures were chosen in order to represent the different 
modalities of Baddeley‟s traditional model of WM.  Taken from the 
Automated Working Memory Assessment programme or „AWMA‟ 
(Alloway, 2007), two tasks were visually based (the Odd One Out task and 
the Mr.X task) and two were verbally based (the listening recall task and the 
backwards digit task).  The battery of WM tasks selected were considered 
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not too difficult for young children to understand and they could easily be 
explained by the experimenter during an instruction phase (see materials and 
design below). 
 
The strength of the relationships between the resulting eight variables and 
the R
s
 (the central measure of AR in the RPA) was then to be examined 
through linear regression modelling and correlational analyses. 
 
In a further attempt to answer more directly how covariates may interact 
with factors such as complexity and/or distraction, a series of ANCOVAs 
were performed to investigate whether high/low IQ and/or WM could 
account for individual differences in relational responding within the 
different conditions.   These, and all subsequent ANCOVAs, were carried 
out in accordance with the recommendations by Delaney and Maxwell 
(1981), means centring the covariate in order to protect it from altering the 
main effect of the repeated measure (see referenced paper).  
 
The R
s 
was chosen as a measure of AR in strict accordance with the 
traditional perspective within this field (chapter 1) which states that only 
relational responses typically dichotomize analogical thought.  However 
Waltz et al.‟s (2000) recent claims that attribute based responses may be a 
side effect of reduced WMC warrants further investigation.  For this reason 
the featural score (F
s
) was also included in the main analysis.   
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Since no age based interactions were observed in the first study, this 
experiment would extend beyond the lower age range tested in Experiment 
1 to include Year 2 children. This decision was made primarily because of 
analogy‟s cornerstone relationship with cognitive development (Gentner, 
1988, Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998; Piaget et al., 1977) but also because the 
previous years tested may have been above that suggested for the relational-
shift (Morrison et al., 2006). By lowering the age range to 6/7 the change 
from featural to relational responses should hopefully be more obvious in 
the data and more comparable to Richland‟s original study, without going so 
low as to risk a greater level of task misunderstanding. 
 
2.2.1 Participants.  Seventy-four children aged between 5 and 11 
years (UK class Years 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) were recruited from three schools in 
the North East of England.  Participants were arranged into three year 
groups: 20 aged 6-7 years-old (mean age = 78.75 months), 31 aged 8-9 
(mean age = 101.19 months) and 23 aged 10-11 (mean age = 124.87 
months) and were recruited in accordance with the same ethical 
recruitment/consent criteria previously mentioned for the earlier study. 
 
2.2.2 Materials and Design.  Eight subtasks in addition to the paper 
version of the RPA used in Experiment 1 were administered to each 
participant on a one-to-one basis:  four measures of IQ, representing 
processing speed, visual ability, verbal ability and vocabulary; and four 
measures of WM.    
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Cognitive ability tasks. 
Basic reading test (verbal measure of ability).  The basic reading test is a 
subtask taken from the standardized WIAT battery (Wechsler, 2005), the 
task consisting of 55 sequentially administered written words which the 
child is required to correctly read aloud.  
 
Words systematically increase in difficulty as the child progresses 
(difficulty being defined by both word length and frequency within the 
English language), a maximum of ten seconds being allowed for the correct 
pronunciation of each item.  The task is concluded when a child reaches the 
end of the task or when five consecutive errors are made. Task reliability for 
the Basic reading test has been reported as being .87 (Wechsler, 1992). 
 
Vocabulary (measure of verbal fluency).  Taken from the WISC-IIIR 
(Wechsler, 1991) the vocabulary subtask is a list of 30 words for which the 
children are asked to provide definitions.  Words are presented verbally one 
at a time and are of gradually increasing complexity, the task being 
discontinued if the child reached the final item or if four consecutive failures 
(scores of 0) are made.  In accordance with the WISC manual, each item is 
scored 0, 1, or 2 depending on the level of understanding, with a score of 2 
representing full understanding of that particular word.  
 
Although also a measure of verbal ability, the vocabulary test is also thought 
to be an excellent measure of general intelligence (Prifitera et al., 2005; 
Flanagan & Kaufman, 2004, Sattler & Dumont, 2004) and as such is 
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perhaps the most broadly applicable subtest to a variety of cognitive 
abilities.  This association with other intelligence tasks is thought to due to 
the increased efficiency of neural networks demonstrated in verbal fluency 
measures (Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 1996).  Verbal fluency is a 
temporally-centric skill known to place demands on the CE through the 
rapid recall and selection of relevant information (the speed of processing 
effect being observable in its frequent correlation with other IQ tasks) and is 
also known to be associated with WM (Chuah & Maybery, 1999), the 
selection processes of which are crucial to the WM system. 
 
Reliability scores for the subtask have been favourable with a mean 
reliability coefficient of .87 having been reported (Goldstein & Hersen, 
2000). 
 
Coding (measure of processing speed).  The coding subtask from the WISC-
IIIR (Wechsler, 1991) uses a code-key of numbers, each representing a 
simple geometric shape, and a list of 119 numbers.  Going from left-to-right 
children were asked to draw in the correct shapes for as many numbers as 
they could within two minutes; time bonuses being given for faster 
performances.  Children aged seven and under, were also asked to complete 
an additional easier page of 65 items, children over this age being 
automatically accredited the points for the full completion of this easier task 
as a method for controlling for age. 
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The coding task is understood to be a measure of motor and processing 
speed, general processing ability, STM and attention (Weiss et al., 2006) 
and has been cited as having a moderate-high reliability coefficient of .79 
(Goldstein & Hersen, 2000).  It was chosen for this task because it 
adequately represented a mix of functions from core cognitive areas (IQ and 
WMC): processing speed being seen as synonymous with processing power 
through its enhancement of individual systems (Kail & Salthouse, 1994).  
 
Block design (visual ability measure).  The final subtask from the WISC-
IIIR (Wechsler, 1991) is the Block-Design task, which is thought to be a 
good measure of visual/spatial ability (Flanagan & Harrison, 2005;  
Kaufman, 1994;) in particular executive functioning (Lezak, Howieson, & 
Loring, 2004) and visual assessment and planning skills (Brown, 
Brockmole, Gow &  Deary, 2012).  
 
The block design task consists of 12 individually administered patterns of 
increasing complexity (number of blocks, complexity of design) which the 
child is asked to reproduce uses coloured plastic blocks.  Each pattern has a 
time limit within which the child must complete the task, points being 
scored the faster the child can complete the task.  If the child does not 
complete the task then zero points are scored, two failures being allowed 
before the task is discontinued.  Reliability for the block-design task is 
good, with an average reliability coefficient of .87 (Goldstein & Hersen, 
2000). 
 
151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  The Mr.X task.  As each sequence appears participants are asked 
to determine whether the ball in the hand of the Mr.X on the right is in the 
same hand as the Mr.X on the left; before recalling (un-cued) the location of 
all the balls from the sequence that were on the right. 
 
 
Working memory tasks: 
Backwards-digit task (verbal).  The Backwards-Digit task is a verbal WM 
subtask from the computer based Automated Working Memory Assessment 
(AWMA; Alloway, 2007).  For this task a child was given a list of digits 
and asked to recall them in backwards order.  For the first trial, the span 
would consist of 2 digits, with an additional digit being added each time a 
child got four or more spans (out of a possible six) correct.  If less than four 
out of six were answered, the task was concluded.  For the Backwards-Digit 
task a low-moderate reliability coefficient of .64 has been reported 
(Alloway, 2008).  
 
Listening-recall task (verbal).  The Listening-Recall task is a computer 
based measure of verbal WM taken from the AWMA battery (Alloway, 
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2007). Children were given a sentence to remember and then asked to say 
whether it was true or false before recalling the last word of the sentence, 
the number of sentences increasing by one each time a child answered four 
out of six questions correctly.  For this subtask the average reliability 
coefficient has been reported as being .81 (Alloway, 2008). 
 
Mr.X task (visual).  A subtask from the AWMA (Alloway, 2007), the Mr.X 
task uses two cartoon figures on the left and right hand side of the screen, 
both of whom are holding a ball in one hand.  Whilst the Mr.X on the left 
(identified continuously as having a yellow hat as opposed to blue on the 
right) remains at the same orientation across all Mr.X trials, the figure on 
the right is rotated through one of six pre-determined points, with the ball 
assigned to either the right or left hand (Figure 11).   
 
For each problem the child is required to say whether the ball in the hand of 
the Mr.X on the right is in the same hand as the ball in the hand of the left 
Mr.X.  The picture is then removed and the child is then asked to recall the 
(right Mr.X) ball location from the six possible locations.  Once four 
sequences were complete, an additional Mr.X was added, meaning that 
more ball locations had to be remembered.  The average reliability 
coefficient of the Mr.X task is stated as being .77 (Alloway, Gathercole, 
Kirkwood, & Elliott 2008). 
 
Odd-one-out task (visual). A subtask from the AWMA (Alloway, 2007), the 
Odd-One-Out task requires the child to view three shapes before identifying 
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which one the odd one is.  The child then recalls the location of each odd-
one-out shape presented in the trial, in order.  For the first trial the child is 
given one batch of three shapes, in accordance with the rest of the AWMA 
program, once the child had successfully completed four of six trials, an 
extra batch was added.  The reliability coefficient of the odd-one-out task is 
stated as being .82 (Alloway, 2008).    
 
From the above eight experimental measures, composite scores were 
calculated to represent IQ, WM and VWM and VSWM in the modelling of 
the results.  Also included was age (maturational factors previously having 
been flagged as a core determinant of analogical ability). 
 
2.2.3 Procedure.  This study was divided up into two phases lasting 
(on average) 30 minutes per participant.  In Phase 1, the first half of the 
RPA (consisting of R1ND and R2D) was administered, followed by the IQ 
subtasks.  In Phase 2 (administered with a gap of at least 24 hours in 
between sessions) the AMWA subtests were given first, followed by the 
second half of the RPA (consisting of the R1D and R2ND conditions).  All 
tasks were administered on a one-to-one basis in a quiet location. As the 
RPA follows a repeated measures design, with 4 variations (conditions) for 
each question, both sections of the RPA were presented in a standardized 
quasi-randomised order using a web-based research programme (Urbaniak 
& Plous; 1997).  Here, any questions of the same condition appearing 
sequentially were re-randomised so that they were always at least two 
questions apart.  
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Table 10.  Varimax rotated factor 
loadings for WM and IQ measures. 
 
 Component 
 I II 
 IQ WMC 
Block-Design 0.824* -0.108 
Vocabulary 0.789* -0.379 
Reading 0.769* -0.278 
Coding 0.678* -0.515 
Listening-Recall 0.578* 0.476* 
Mr.X 0.557* 0.338* 
Odd-One-Out 0.525* 0.568* 
Backwards-Digit 0.332* 0.567* 
* = Component loading above the .30 
level 
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Table 11.  Correlation matrix for individual difference measures 
 
  
Listening 
Recall 
Backwards 
 Digit 
Odd One 
Out  Mr..X Block Design Vocab Coding Reading 
Age -.153 -.157 -.085 .022 .588** .607** .847** .696** 
Listening   .410** .394** .358** .303** .237* .024 .182 
Backwards    .347** .255* .154 .023 .045 .051 
Odd One      .430** .249* .108 .064 .104 
Mr.X     .356** .214 .13 .145 
Block      .633** .652** .666** 
Vocab       .631** .634** 
Coding        .769** 
* = p<0.05 
**= p<0.001    
  
 
2.2.4 Results.    
Factor analysis.    Before any analysis was conducted, a factor analysis, 
followed by post-hoc correlational testing was performed on the individual 
difference measures used in order to observe any multicolinearity effects 
that may be evident.  
 
The Principal Axis Factor (PAF) used a Varimax (orthogonal) rotation of all 
8 individual difference measures was conducted (Table 10 shows the 
varimax rotated loadings of each measure).  An examination of the Kaiser-
Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy suggested that the sample was 
factorable (KMO =.765).   Prior to analysis, an arbitrary criterion figure for 
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deciding how strong a loading must be in order for it to be included in 
component models was set at 0.3. 
 
The PAF showed a predicted degree of separation, with two variables 
(assumed to be WM and IQ) being shown to account for the 8 measures (λ 
>1).   Because factor I was shown to contain a mixture of WMC and IQ 
components, it was named “IQ”.   Because factor II continued purely WM 
components, it was named “WMC”.  Table 11 shows the post-hoc 
correlational matrix.     
 
In summary, each WM measure was found to be correlated with one another 
at the <.001 level of significance (with the exception of Mr.X/Backwards 
digit, which was significant at the p<0.05 level).  Each IQ measure was also 
correlated with one another at the same level (<.001).     
 
However, the listening-recall task was correlated with both the block-design 
(r=.303, p<0.001) and Vocab tasks (r=.237, p<0.05); whilst the odd-one-out 
was correlated with the block-design task (r=.249, p<0.05).  The Mr.X was 
also correlated with the Block design (r=.356, p<0.001). 
 
Mean scores.  Table 12 shows the mean scores for R
s
/F
s
 respectively, by 
RPA condition and by year group.  Table 13 shows the mean scores for IQ 
and WM measures by year group, whilst Table 14 shows the mean scores 
categorized into experimental factors. 
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Table 12.   Mean relational and featural responses (by RPA condition and year group) 
 
    
All RPA  
Conditions     R1ND     R1D     R2ND     R2D     
   Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD % Mean SD % 
 
Relational All Ages 58.39 11.08 72.99% 16.46 2.86 82.30% 14.08 3.87 70.40% 14.51 2.89 73% 13.35 3.69 66.75% 
  Year group 1 48.62 9.76 60.78% 14.81 2.58 74.05% 11.24 3.73 56.20% 11.81 2.68 59% 10.76 3.35 53.80% 
  Year group 2 59.11 8.54 73.89% 16.19 2.75 80.95% 14.48 3.58 72.40% 14.89 2.06 74% 13.56 2.88 67.80% 
  Year group 3 64.39 9.39 80.49% 17.81 2.52 89.05% 15.65 3.18 78.25% 16 2.39 80% 14.94 3.67 74.70% 
                   
Featural All Ages 6.61 5.43 16.53%* N/A N/A N/A 3.76 3.22 18.80% N/A N/A N/A 2.84 2.76 14.20% 
  Year group 1 9.33 6.29 23.38%* N/A N/A N/A 5.19 3.52 25.95% N/A N/A N/A 4.14 2.96 20.70% 
  Year group 2 6.15 3.99 15.38%* N/A N/A N/A 3.78 3.2 18.90% N/A N/A N/A 2.37 1.62 11.85% 
  Year group 3 5.16 5.39 12.9%* N/A N/A N/A 2.77 2.72 13.85% N/A N/A N/A 2.35 3.17 11.75% 
              
* = Adjusted for the 40 trials in which featural objects occur 
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Table 13.   Mean individual difference scores 
  
Year group 
Listening  
Recall   Digit Recall   
Odd One  
Out   Mr X   
(Verbal 
 simple)  
(Verbal  
WMC)  
(Visual 
 simple)  
(Visual  
complex)   
  
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
All 96.77 15.86 102.08 16.77 102.23 15.63 98.97 17.22 
1 87.43 14.48 101.43 15.971 103.38 17.99 98.38 16.7 
2 100.19 15.52 109.52 15.57 104.11 15.38 97.56 17.83 
3 93.35 16.82 96.03 16.23 99.81 14.3 100.61 17.45 
 Vocab   Reading  Coding  
Block  
Design 
 
 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
All 20.16 7.19 27.52 13.93 83.53 22.6 27.04 12.15 
1 13.67 5.05 11.52 10.85 55.52 19.89 14.14 7.92 
2 20.07 5.15 31.48 11.01 85.48 12.77 30.67 8.43 
3 24.65 6.65 34.90 8.47 100.81 7.85 32.61 10.94 
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Multiple regression analysis.   The factor analysis had revealed two 
variables that could be contributing to the R
s, “IQ” consisting of all IQ and 
WM measures, and “WM”, which contained just the WM measures.   It was 
therefore necessary to investigate the predictive strengths of these 
components.  As a result a Multiple Linear regression analysis was 
performed with the aim of constructing a global model of the data which 
offered the strongest explanation of the data from the variables which 
contributed to the greatest proportion of variance. 
 
IQ model 1. The first variable tested was IQ.  The factor analysis had 
already indicated that this variable contained the components from both 
WM and IQ, so two models were compared, one which contained just IQ 
components (model 1) and one which dealt with both (model 2). 
 
For model 1 (p<0.001) the association between the R
s
 and IQ measures was 
moderately strong (Multiple R = .53), Vocabulary, Block-Design, Coding 
and Reading tasks accounting for 50% of the variance.  The regression 
Table 14.   Mean individual difference scores (categorized) 
 
 
 
 VSWM  VWM  WM  IQ  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
All Age  99.42 13.7 100.6 13.89 100.01 11.84 158.25 49.13 
groups 
1 
99.43 13.05 100.88 14.62 100.15 11.35 94.86 36.84 
2 
104.85 12.77 100.83 13.99 102.84 11.9 167.7 27.99 
3 
94.69 13.55 100.21 13.76 97.45 11.92 192.97 23.53 
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coefficient for block design was .20 (95% CI = -.012 to .414); for 
vocabulary it was .30 (95% CI = -.050 to .644); for coding it was .14 (95% 
CI = .005 to .335) and for reading it was .12 (95% CI = -.093 to .335). 
 
IQ model 2.  For model 2 (p<0.001), using WM and IQ components, the 
association between the R
s
 and IQ measures was increased (Multiple R = 
.60), now accounting for 55% of the variance.  The regression coefficient 
for the listening recall measure was -.06 (95% CI = -.187 to .078), for the 
backwards-digit it was .003 (95% CI = -.111 to .117), for the odd-one-out it 
was -.04 (95% CI = -.164 to .090), for Mr.X it was .19 (95% CI = .078 to 
.309), for the block-design it was .11 (95% CI = -.106 to .334), for the 
vocabulary it was .29 (95% CI = -.052 to .624), for coding it was .13 (95% 
CI = -.003 to .264) and for reading it was .16 (95% CI = -.049 to .365)  
 
WM model 1.   (p<0.001)  Although IQ model 2 gave us a good indication 
that WM measures played a (in some cases) lesser role, the second WM 
variable was now tested as means to compare the results.  Here the 
association between WM and R
s
 was weak (Multiple R = .162).  All WM 
measures accounting for 12% of the variation (adjusted r
2
).    
 
The regression coefficient for the Listening recall task was .006 (95% CI = -
.167 to .180), for the Backwards-digit it was -.013 (95% CI = -.171 to .144), 
for the Odd-one-out it was -.028 (95% CI = -.205 to .149) for Mr.X it was 
.27 (95% CI = .114 to .425). 
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IQ model 3.    (p<0.001) The above components were then reduced to see if 
a better fit for the data could be attained for both models, this meant 
removing all components not contributing to the model, specifically the 
listening-recall, odd-one-out and backwards digit measures, leaving the 
Mr.X measure as the only measure of WM. 
 
For this model the association between IQ and R
s
 was again moderate 
(Multiple R = .59), but accounted for 56% of the variation (adjusted r
2
).   
The regression coefficient for the Mr.X measure was .17 (95% CI = .064 to 
.27). 
 
IQ model 4.  (p<0.001) The model which best accounted for relational 
responding was therefore IQ models 2 and 3.  Since the partial correlation 
analysis has already shown that age may interact with the measures used, 
and since both of the central theories of AR (Gentner, 1983; Goswami, 
1992) has already indicated maturational factors may be involved. The IQ 
model 2 (thought to be the more comprehensive of the two) was re-run to 
include age.  
 
For this model the association between IQ and R
s
 was again moderate strong 
(Multiple R = .60), accounting for 56% of the variation (adjusted r
2
).    The 
regression coefficients for the components were also improved, for the Mr.X 
measure it was .18 (95% CI = .073 to .284) for block design it was .08 (95%  
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Table 15. Mean relational responses (by RPA 
condition) 
 
 R1ND R1D R2ND R2D 
Mean 16.46 14.08 14.51 13.35 
SD 2.855 3.862 2.891 3.69 
 
 
CI = -.131 to .294) for vocabulary it was .24 (95% CI = -.097 to .568), for 
coding it was .09 (95% CI = -.072 to .256) for reading it was .14 (95% CI = 
-060 to .344) and for age it was .95(95% CI = -.731 to .2.629) 
 
ANCOVA analysis.  One of the aims of this chapter was to explore the roles 
of various cognitive systems in the response-selection processes under 
conditions of complexity and distraction; it being anticipated that any 
interactions observed involving WM and complexity/distractions could be 
interpreted as being a mediatory capacity effect (High WMC individuals 
being better than their lower counterparts at responding relationally in these 
conditions). 
 
For this reason ANCOVAs with two experimental repeated measures 
factors– complexity and distraction, and the non-experimental (between 
subjects) factor of year group were conducted with the covariate measure of 
„Mr.X task- which, out of all WM tasks, had been found to account for the 
largest proportion of variance within R
s
 in the regression analysis.  In order 
to compare this to non-capacity centric abilities, „IQ‟ was also introduced as 
a separate covariate. Table 15 shows the mean scores in each RPA condition 
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for R
s
.  In order to account for the possible change in the main effect caused 
by the covariate, mean centring of the covariate took place according to the 
recommendations made by Delaney and Maxwell (1988). 
 
IQ. The first of these ANCOVAS was conducted with the experimental 
factor of IQ.  Due to the number of individual IQ tasks contributing 
similarly towards the R
s
 - IQ is included here as a summary only, IQ 
representing all non-capacity based task used in Experiment 2.   
 
The ANCOVA using IQ as a covariate of the proportion of relational 
responses given revealed main effects of  IQ (F[1,77 ] = 84.87; p<0.001, 
2
p 
=.52); complexity (F[1,77] = 43.30; p<0.001, 
2
p =.36) and distraction (F[1,77] = 
68.33; p<0.001, 2p =.47); and interactions between distraction x IQ (F[1,77] = 
5.94; p<0.05, 2p =.07) and complexity x distraction (F[1,77] = 4.08; p<0.05, 
2p =.50).  But no interactions were found between complexity x IQ (F[1,77] = 
0.41; p>0.05, 2p =.005) or complexity x distraction x IQ (F[1,77] = 1.22; 
p>0.05, 2p =.01) 
 
Mr.X task.  The ANCOVA using the Mr.X task as a covariate observed 
main effects of Mr.X (F[1,77] = 14.63; p<0.001, 
2
p =.16), distraction (F[1,77] = 
67.23; p<0.001, 2p =.47), complexity (F[1,77] = 44.02; p<0.001, 
2
p =.37) and 
an interaction between complexity x distraction (F[1,77] = 4.12; p<0.05, 
2
p 
=.05), as well as an interaction between distraction x Mr.X (F[1,77] = 3.90; 
p=0.052,  
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Figure 12.  Interaction between IQ and distraction.  The median split for 
High/Low performers in IQ was introduced at 158.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Interaction between Mr.X and distraction.  The median split for 
High/Low performers in Mr.X was introduced at 98.  
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Table 16.  Correlations between featural responding and individual difference measures (by RPA condition) 
 
  
  
  
Listening 
Recall 
Backwards 
Digit 
Odd One  
Out Mr.X 
Block 
Design Vocab Coding Reading IQ VWM VSWM WMC Age 
 
All 
 
-140 -0.19 -0.17 -.375** -.457** -.486** -.387** -.356** -0.463** -0.093 -0.223* -0.184 -0.333** 
R1D  -0.085 0.026 -0.025 -.431** -.456** -.466** -.348** -.372** -0.446** -0.033 -0.281* -0.184 -0.329** 
R2D  -0.169 -0.066 -0.65 -.235* -.367** -.413** -.360** -.267* -0.392** -0.138 -0.109 -0.144 -0.28* 
* = significant at the <.05 level 
        
** = significant at the <.001 level 
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2p =.05) that was approaching significance.  No interactions were found 
between complexity x Mr.X (F[1,77] = 1.69; p>0.05, 
2
p =.02);  
complexity x distraction x Mr.X (F[1,77] = 1.79; p>0.05, 
2
p =.02). 
 
Analysis of the featural score.    Because this thesis is concerned with 
successful analogical performance, we are less concerned with non-
analogical forms of response.  Never-the-less, Waltz et al. (2000) have 
shown that featural responses may be useful to the analogical researcher as 
low WMC may be reflected in a greater proportion of attribute based 
responses.  As a result the following limited assessments were carried out. 
 
T-test.  A paired samples t-test revealed that significantly more featural 
results were obtained in condition R1D then R2D (t(78)= 3.258, p<0.05, ² 
=.12), mean R2D F
s 
= 2.84, SD = 2.757, mean R1D F
s 
= 3.76, SD = 3.219. 
 
Correlational analysis.  As was conducted with R
s
, correlational analyses 
were run assessing the statistical relationships between the individual 
difference measures and F
s
 (see Table 16). 
 
Multiple regression analysis.   
IQ Model 1. p<0.001. The association between the F
s
 and all the WM and 
IQ measures was below moderate strength (multiple R = .38).  Together IQ 
and WM accounting for 31% of the variation in F
s
 (adjusted r
2
).  The 
regression coefficient was .001 the listening-recall (95% CI = -.080 to .081), 
.008 for the backwards digit (95% CI = -.062 to .077), .08 for the odd-one-
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out (95% CI = .005 to .159), -.11 Mr.X (95% CI = -.181 to -.041), -080 for 
the block design (95% CI = -.2145 to .053), -.224 for the vocabulary (95% 
CI = -.430 to -.018), -.021 for the coding (95% CI = -.1.00 to .059) and .016 
for the reading (95% CI = -.110 to .142).   
 
WM model 1. p<0.05. The association between the F
s
 and all the WM 
measures was weak (multiple R = .19).  WM accounting for just 14% of the 
variation in F
s
 (adjusted r
2
).  The regression coefficient was -.03 for the 
listening-recall (95% CI = -.115 to .053), .02 for the backwards digit (95% 
CI = -.059 to .094), .08 for the odd-one-out (95% CI = .006 to .165) and .14 
for the Mr.X task (95% CI = -.219 to -.069). 
 
IQ model 2.  p<0.001.  Each item not contributing to the F
s 
was sequentially 
removed from the analysis; this reduced model resulted in only two 
significant components being found to be associated with featural 
responding, age and the vocabulary measure.   The relationship being the 
strongest yet for the featural score, but still weak (multiple R = .24), 
accounting for 22% of the variance in the F
s
 (adjusted r
2
).  The regression 
coefficient for the vocabulary score was -.33 (95% CI = -.520 to -.139) and 
for age it was -.23 (95% CI = -.936 to .474).  The conclusion being that 
neither IQ nor WM could adequately account for featural responding.  
 
2.2.5 Discussion.   The results in this study have indicated that 
WMC and IQ are both important components for success in scene-based 
analogical reasoning problems.  Whilst perhaps common-sense given the 
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well-established connections between WMC and other forms of reasoning, 
these findings offer additional degrees of insight into the involvement of 
WM in AR. 
 
Overall, IQ tasks were consistently seen to be better associated with, as well 
as contributing more to the R
s
 than WM tasks, yet WM was also reported to 
be closely connected with the concept of IQ.  For the most part the 
involvement of WM was restricted to the Mr.X task which was observed to 
be a powerful-contributor to analogical success and the best contributor 
when age was controlled for; providing the possibility that WM might not 
be the maturational factor implied by Richland et al. (2004, 2006, 2010).  
Critically, no interaction was observed between any WM task and 
conditions of complexity/distraction.   
 
This latter point was an important omission.  Whilst the fact that an 
interaction between Mr.X and distraction was approaching significance was 
encouraging, if support were to be provided for the complexity-constraint 
theory (Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998; Halford et 
al., 2002; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) then it was a necessity that WMC be 
concretely related to increased complexity.   This was not established; 
however concerns had been raised in the analysis that the experiment lacked 
sufficient power to successfully analyse three-way interactions, so these 
observations were viewed with caution. 
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Maturation. One interpretation of lack of maturational effects similar to 
those described by Richland et al (2004; 2006; 2010) are the floor/ceiling 
effects discussed in Experiment 1, e.g. the year groups used.  Individual 
differences in WMC between year groups were not sufficient for significant 
effects to be observed.  This perspective is supported by Halford (1992, 
1993, 1998) and Morrison et al (2010) who suggest that by age 5 children 
have enough WMC to handle the complexity of ternary relationships (i.e. 
those used in the RPA, such as “being chased x being in the middle x 
chasing”) leading to a less observable effect in younger children when the 
complexity level is raised.   Yet this explanation swings both ways, and 
given the findings presented here (that IQ may mediate AR) it could be 
argued that the only reason such differences were detected in the original 
2004, 2006 study was because of the poor performance of the youngest year 
group- which tells us little other than the fact that young children aged 3-4 
are poor at the RPA when compared to 14 year olds, and which could 
equally be attributed to factors involving IQ as well as WMC. 
 
A further issue regarding the involvement of WM in Experiment 2 was that 
WMC is a domain general resource. If higher WMC is related to better 
analogical performance, then an equal cross-domain effect should have been 
observed in either VWM tasks (sentence-recall or backwards-digit task)?  It 
could be argued that Mr.X, like the RPA, is a visual paradigm and therefore 
involve visual processing. However, in this case a relationship between the 
odd-one-out task (the other VSWM measure) and AR should also have been 
reported.   
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The solution to this dilemma is that the Mr.X task may be more sensitive to 
the demands placed on WMC then the other WM measures, but this raises 
the issue that Mr.X may be also be tapping specific processes necessary for 
completing the RPA; processes which could conceivably be more in-line 
with IQ than WM (see “IQ”, below).  Further research, determining what 
this Mr.X effect might relate to, is indicated. 
 
IQ.  Although Experiment 2 has been noted as lacking power, it should be 
observed that no such limitations seemed present in the IQ measure; IQ 
being established as interacting with both distraction and, to a lesser degree 
complexity.   This presents the important notion that functions of IQ may be 
able to describe the data purported to relate to the complexity-constraint 
hypothesis both in Experiment 1 and the original Richland et al. (2004, 
2006) study: possibly through the identification and selection of „correct‟ 
responses without any demands being placed on WMC by object 
complexity  (Goswami, 1992).    
 
As mentioned above, it is possible that what the IQ tasks are measuring may 
be functions which might be shared by highly-demanding tasks such as the 
Mr.X.  This may be storage and/or processing capacity, in which case a 
further experiment (Experiment 3) detailing the relationship both may have 
to the RPA is a prerequisite for further assessment.   Cognitive abilities 
already well known to be mediate various aspects of thinking may also be 
involved, such as processing speed, increased executive functionality and 
cognitive efficiency (Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Lezak et al, 2004; Salthouse, 
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1996)
40
.   Such processes potentially arbitrate IQ as well as WM, explaining 
the data from the regression modelling and factor analysis (which suggested 
that aspects of the IQ measures may contain components associated with 
WMC).  It is hoped that Experiment 3 will be able to resolve this issue. 
 
Featural discussion.  The purpose of the featural analysis was to see if 
Waltz et al.‟s (2000) predictions regarding WMC and featural responses 
were true.  Overall the analysis appeared to show a similar pattern of 
findings to the relational analysis in that higher IQ children performed better 
at the RPA, in this case by choosing less featural responses.   Again the 
mediatory effect of WM was limited entirely to the Mr.X, but was 
surprising in that the direction of the effect was the reverse of what was 
predicted.   The effect being similar to what was observed in Experiment 1 
in that the F
s 
was greater in complex conditions
 
 than simple- this being 
counter-intuitive to theories which suggest that increased complexity 
requires greater amounts of processing power resulting in a larger 
proportion of featural responses in these conditions (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997; Waltz et al., 2000). 
 
Therefore, it had to be considered whether featural responses either might 
not be as distracting within the RPA as previously suspected, and/or that 
condition R1D was placing additional demands on WM that were different 
                                                 
40
 Such faculties have already been suggested as being intrinsic to AR through connectivist 
models of AR like LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).   Faster and more effective 
processing being hypothesized to result in a greater level of inferential abstraction where 
more descriptive axes may be processed in unison (Salthouse, 1991). 
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to, or in excess of, those experienced in R2D; making R1D more prone to 
this type of mistake.  
 
Evidence for the former is starting to emerge through eye tracking 
experiments.  Whilst younger children are already known to spend more 
time on distracters then pertinent items in analogical problems (Thibaut, 
French, Missault, Gérard & Glady, in press) - in the RPA paradigm it has 
been reported that participants actively search the pictorial target scene for 
meaningful similarities having first spent time ascertaining the relation in 
the base (Gordon & Moser, 2007).   Previous studies have already shown 
that fixation is highly correlated with meaningfulness of regions within a 
scene (Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999), meaning that complex 
relations in the RPA may in fact attract attention more than distracters.    
 
Another way in which these findings might be explained is through what 
may been termed here as „signposting.‟ This theorizes that relational forms 
of response (relational or relational error) are more likely to occur in 
conditions R
2 
than R
1
 not because increased complexity makes the problem 
harder, but because extra relational objects offer meta-level indicators that 
this form of response is preferable, making it easier.   This may be explained 
thus: In condition R
2 
the likelihood that relational forms of response will be 
selected is larger than others, as 3/5 of the objects in condition R
2
 are 
relational in nature compared to 2/5 in R
2
.    Although in the RPA the 5 
objects per scene ratio does not change, the presence of two relational 
objects, which usually are visually predominant either in terms of size or 
173 
positioning in the centre of the scene, may highlight that this form of 
response is the one required, or at the very least act as a memory cue to the 
RPA training session
41
.   
 
Just like the hypothesis presented previously, eye tracking studies also 
support the signpost effect.  It is already known that larger objects are more 
likely to fix attention, and are easier to locate at high speeds (Djamasbi, 
Siegel, & Tullis, 2011), however recent research has also shown that scenes 
with low object to space ratios are generally less preferred whilst clusters of 
objects attract fixation, particularly if the objects in question are interesting 
or unusual (Henderson, & Ferreira, 2004), as in the case of the RPA.   
 
A third explanation is that by offering a more direct (essentially forced) 
choice between featural and relational objects, more demands are placed on 
a discriminatory or inhibitory system in R
1 
conditions then R
2
.    This may 
cause a problem for the reasoner if they are holding the base object in mind 
(the base object identical to or similar to the distracter object) as it could 
require inhibitory skill to dismiss that form of response, resulting in more 
featural objects being chosen in R
1 
than R
2 
conditions. 
 
 
All of the above may be considered fair interpretations of the data yet one 
major concern which arose during the testing of the F
s 
was that of power- it 
                                                 
41
 Think of the signpost theory as turning the RPA into multiple choice questions rather 
then a measure of AR.  In such cases having three forms of response of a certain type 
makes you consider that an element contained by each of the three may be the required 
answer.  
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being consistently shown that a large number of participants were required 
to illicit meaningful data.  These circumstances were almost certainly due to 
the low proportion of responses, which in most RPA conditions was less 
than three.  Given the higher F
s 
in Experiment 1, it was suspected that 
continued use of an experimental population size similar to the one used 
here might result in a measure with too high a degree of inter-experiment 
variability (i.e. intrusive random or artifactual factors have a greater effect 
on small scores).  
 
 A second issue regarding variance within the F
s  
was more serious.  
Experiment 1 had already indicated that there was not enough variance 
between year groups in the F
s  
for a maturational factor to be identified.  
Given that such a change had been predicted by the much more extreme 
(broader) age ranges of Richland et al. (2004, 2006), and difficulties had 
already risen in detecting interactions in the larger R
s
.  The small effect size 
of the F
s 
 made it much more difficult to elicit meaningful data, thus 
questioning the efficacy of using featural data with such a narrow age range. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion.    Although WMC, and not a STS, has been 
indicated as possibly constraining AR, evidence has been provided in 
Experiment 2 to suggest that IQ may account better for relational 
responding than WM, especially in conditions of distraction, although 
neither IQ or Mr.X are likely to entirely explain this condition and Mr.X 
alone is unlikely to entirely explain complexity.  Additional questions 
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remain as to whether the current methodology may be sufficient to establish 
a similar relationship with WMC. 
 
As discussed previously, Halford‟s constraint hypothesis (Halford, 1992; 
1993; 1998; Halford et al, 1994, 2004) predicts that by the age of 5 years 
children may have sufficient WMC to process the RPA‟s „complex‟ ternary 
relations.  Yet such an explanation does not clarify the complexity effects 
demonstrated in relational responding within the year groups in Experiment 
1.   
Given that that it remains to be seen whether bound information such as 
“chased and chasing” represents an increased cognitive load over “chasing”, 
as predicted by Halford (1992, 1993, 1998), it instead may be considered 
that processing differences beyond relational representation may resolve the 
dilemma illustrated by the presence of extra candidate objects.  As reported 
in chapter 1, this process is traditionally described in the field of AR as 
mapping (Gentner, 1983), where the relevance of each argument is 
compared for application with the task goals.   
 
One such approach which takes this into account is relational primacy 
(Goswami, 1992).  As stated in chapter 1, Goswami‟s theory does not rely 
upon the assumption that increased relational-complexity also represents 
increased WMC load
42
.   Instead, in situations where the similarity-
                                                 
42
 Beyond what is required in the processing and maintenance requirements of relational 
objects regardless of complexity. 
176 
constraint is known, it is the ambiguity (relevance) of candidate arguments 
which dictates performance. 
 
Accordingly, increased complexity in the RPA increases problem ambiguity 
by providing additional objects for consideration.  If the correct similarity 
cannot be identified or a decision is made without considering the 
appropriate compliment of competing responses, then errors could 
potentially be made that replicate complexity data, leading to reduced 
relational performance in complex conditions  
 
In such ambiguous circumstances, performance factors- what Goswami calls 
the facilitation-gradient (Goswami, 1992) - mediate task performance, 
specifically the ability to form and abstract schemas appropriate for the 
resolution of the problem.   Although how these schemas are formed is not 
described in detail, such processes are of course roughly analogous to fluid 
intelligence and the executive decision making faculties of the CE (which 
will be investigated further in Experiment 3).   
 
A second relevant theory is that of Richland (Richland et al., 2004, 2006, 
2010) and Morrison (Morrison et al. 2010), this too prescribes executive 
processing as underlying situations where the similarity-constraint is known 
but its application is not immediately obvious, and where a decision must be 
made from competing stimuli. The main difference between such theories 
being that mapping in relational primacy is optional and that for Richland et 
al. (2004, 2006) relational-complexity may also increase the need for 
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additional processing resources even if the problem is adequately 
represented in WM. 
 
It is important to note that neither theory refutes the claim that WMC is 
involved in AR.  The executive control aspects of the CE have long been 
thought as being synonymous with/representative of WMC (Baddeley, 
2007), so it is reasonable to assume that the hypothesized constraint-effect 
of WMC in Experiment 2 may also represent the basic processing demands 
of a one-to-one comparison process or a mental workspace approach where 
more WMC allows more efficient manipulation of the problem (which can 
be illustrated with or without arguments of complexity).   
 
It should therefore be considered a direction for future research in chapter 3 
that the WMC effect demonstrated in chapter 3 should be better explained, 
and that the CE‟s ability to select appropriate information from that held in 
mind could potentially explain the reported mediatory effect of WMC in 
relational performance in the RPA.  In Experiment 2 the Mr.X task was 
reported to be a predictor of AR, but was considered to be composed of 
attentional (WMC) and storage components (STS).  Experiment 3 will 
develop our picture of the role of WM in AR from this assumption, looking 
at simple/complex span and verbal/nonverbal WM tasks (Experiment 6) in 
order to deconstruct the contribution of reportedly „execute-heavy‟ tasks 
such as Mr.X. 
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2.3 Experiment 3 
The previous experiment presented the possibility that some processes in 
WM may be mediating analogical performance in the RPA.  However, it 
remained ambiguous as to what the effect might represent.   Experiment 3 
was therefore designed to assess the involvement of STS and WMC in AR, 
to deconstruct the relationship observed between WM and AR in 
Experiment 2. 
 
The term „memory‟ is often used to refer to stored information that is 
required for concurrent recall, such as retaining a telephone number in 
conscious thought.  Information such as this does not necessarily depend 
upon processing ability, but may include such aspects if we are required to 
protect the memorized information from competing (non-relevant) 
„intrusive‟ data, or perform a mental operation on the information being 
stored and/or retrieved (such as dividing a number). 
 
The WM model (Baddeley, 2000) is modular, containing both processing 
and storage components. The term „STS‟, or storage capacity is primarily 
used to define information stored for later processing (Halford, 1998).   
„WMC‟ or processing capacity is used to describe computational and 
maintenance aspects of STM; i.e. “information that is currently entering into 
some kind of reasoning, decision-making, or other computational process.” 
(Halford, 1998, p. 142).  According to Alloway and her colleagues 
(Alloway, 2009; Alloway et al., 2008) WMC may be further conceptualized 
as a domain general resource which is applied to both visuo-spatial and 
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verbal domains, whilst STS‟s are domain specific, and applied to their 
prospective domains only.  
 
As AR is believed to involve active reasoning processes requiring the 
manipulation of information for meaning, WM measures are assumed to 
predict analogical success better than those measuring STS.  A factor 
exemplified by the fact that the RPA has both target and base scenes 
presented simultaneously, reducing visual STS loading by allowing the 
participant the ability to refer back to the base at any time rather than 
remember the query object. 
 
WMC and reasoning are well known to be intercorrelated (Baddeley, 2007; 
Barrouillet, 1996; Bungel, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2004; Cho et al, 
2007; Cho, Moody, Fernandino, Mumford, Poldrack, Cannon, Knowlton & 
Holyoak, 2010;  Halford et al, 1994; Krawczyk, Hanten, Wilde, Li, 
Schnelle, Merkley, Vasquez, Cook, McClelland, Chapman & Levin, 2010a; 
; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Krawczyk, McClelland, Donovan, Tillman 
& Maguire, 2010b; Logie & Gilhooly, 1998). Children with greater WMC 
are predicted to perform better at the RPA because they can allocate more 
processing resources to a problem and avoid processing errors caused by 
incorrect assessments.    In terms of AR, the most popular explanation for 
the involvement of WMC is the complexity-constraint hypothesis which 
relies on interactions between relational objects.   However, it may also be 
true that scene-complexity (i.e. the overall number of relevant responses 
regardless of interactions, and the ability to recognize the correct response 
180 
from these), may make demands on the reasoning system.  A third 
possibility raised in Experiment 2 is that one-to-one mapping naturally 
requires a baseline of computing power regardless of object complexity (i.e. 
the ability to compare two sets of information no matter how many 
descriptive axes they may possess). Increased WMC presumably still being 
beneficial to processing by allowing strategies to be better maintained 
against non-relevant interference, as well as assessing whether these are a 
good fit given the situation (Logie & Gilhooly, 1990). 
 
Despite the presumption that WMC is behind successful analogical thought, 
knowing whether visual/verbal capacity plays a major or minor role in 
solving the RPA is critical to our understanding of AR.  Even with the 
concurrent presentation of target and base scenes, a STS could be involved 
through the maintenance of the similarity-constraint or potential object 
candidates whilst attention is devoted to the target.  When faced with 
ambiguous problems/conditions which may take longer to solve, or during 
prolonged testing, a greater STS span may also be advantageous (Gordon & 
Moser, 2007), keeping the demands of the task in mind as well as the 
analogy being used. A further factor to consider is that the RPA is a 
repeated measures paradigm using 4 conditions- similar scenes where the 
answer is always the same.  Remembering previous responses and 
subsequently adapting behaviour to suit the current situation may therefore 
also be profitable good strategy. 
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For these reasons WM processes potentially benefit from greater 
visual/verbal STS spans by providing resources for mental visualization of 
the problem (i.e. a mental workspace), and the retention of verbal 
instructions.   The current aim is not necessarily intended to draw a line 
completely between STS/WMC; however understanding the contributions 
of each is important in developing our concept of AR.  
 
In Experiment 2, even though a methodological distinction was made 
between VSWM and VWM it can be argued that the WM tasks used were 
measures of WMC rather than STS (Alloway et al., 2008).    It was decided 
that in order to best explore what the reported WM (i.e. Mr.X) effect 
represented, an attempt  should be made to deconstruct (as far as is possible) 
the reported WM-AR relationship into STS and WMC aspects, assessing the 
contribution of both, and whether either could explain the complexity-
effect
43
 reported thus far in Experiments 1 and 2.    In a continuation of the 
search for an interaction between WMC and complexity, the contribution of 
both measures to the R
s
 would then be assessed within conditions of 
complexity and distraction.   
 
In order to reduce floor/ceiling effects, participants were recruited from a 
single UK year group (Year 5) between Richland‟s original upper and lower 
age limits.  Although children aged between 10 and 11-years were more 
likely to have sufficient WMC to represent and manipulate the similarities 
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 Increased R
s
 performance in simple, no distractor conditions, first reported in Richland et 
al. (2004). 
182 
used in the RPA (Holyoak, 1992, 1993, 1998; Morrison et al., 2010; 
Richland et al., 2004, 2010)
44
 , it was considered that the hypothesis that 
increased WMC associated with older year groups could still aid AR in 
other ways.  Possibly through the ability to apply increased levels of 
computational power to the problem, WMC representing increased 
processing efficiency or the ability to attend between multiple strategies and 
therefore select more relevant solutions to the problem (Heinz Martin et al, 
2002; Logie & Gilhooly, 1990). 
 
2.3.1 Participants.   Thirty children aged between 10 and 11 years 
(Year 5; mean age= 121.83 months) were recruited from three „new‟ 
primary schools in accordance with the ethical criteria previously used in 
the earlier studies.    
 
2.3.2 Materials and Design.  In addition to a paper version of the 
RPA, two measures of IQ were used from the previous experiment, namely 
the block-design-task and the vocabulary-task (Wechsler, 1991).  As a 
further measure of domain general knowledge and verbal fluency, the 
relational-task, was also included, as it was more relevant to the ability to 
recall associations.  
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 It has been argued that age based interactions are unlikely to be observed in previously 
tested ranges given that Children less than 6 years old may have already experienced a 
relational shift and/or possess the necessary WMC resources to process the ternary relations 
found in the RPA (Halford, 1993; Morrison, Doumas & Richland, 2006; 2011).   
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For the WM subscales four measures of WM were used: two measures of 
WMC and two measures of short-term memory capacity, (STS) each of 
which were visual and verbal tasks respectively.  For the WMC tasks the 
Listening Recall task (Alloway 2007) and Mr.X task (Alloway, 2007) were 
again used for in order to try and replicate the earlier findings (see 
Experiment 2).   For the measures of visual/verbal STS, two new tasks were 
introduced, both of which were intended to represent minimal executive 
loading: Digit recall (verbal; Alloway, 2007) and the Just Noticeable 
Difference Task (visual; Thompson, Hamilton, Gray, Quinn, Mackin, 
Young & Ferrier, 2007).   
 
Just noticeable difference task (JND).   The visual JND task is a 
computerized variation of the Thompson et al. (2006) task.  Because it is 
assumed that all tasks designed as WM capacity measures are in some way 
„contaminated‟ by executive processes (Phillips & Hamilton, 2001), the 
JND task was conceived to minimize this executive effect (even if it could 
not be removed entirely).   This would be done by constructing a simple 
visual recall task with no reasoning demands, relying instead on a yes/no 
question relating to whether an object was the same size or not.  
 
The JND consists of five trials, each containing 30 questions.  For each 
question, a yellow base square appears for 1300ms to the top left of the mid-
point (a jitter being included to make sure that sizes could not be judged by 
comparing the distance between squares).  The base then vanishes and after 
a delay of 4000ms a target square appears, which remains until participants 
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respond.  Participants answer using a colour coded button box, pressing the 
left button marked with the green word “same” if they think the target 
square is the same size as the base, and pressing the right button marked in 
red “different” if they think the target square is different.  
 
The size of squares, as well as the order they appear in, are initially 
randomly generated, but then standardized for each participant.  The 
difference between target and base squares are incrementally reduced by 
10% for each level, so that in trial four (the second most difficult) the 
percentage difference is just 10%; whilst trial one (the first and easiest) 
differs by 40%.  For trial 5, the difference is moved down to just 6%, five 
per cent or lower being considered too difficult for this age range.  
 
After a practice trial with an automated teaching programme (which would 
correct the participant if they answered correctly or incorrectly) the children 
were instructed to answer as quickly as possible.   In order to make sure 
participants were answering properly, and to make sure that the results were 
not due to visual difficulties in focusing attention, half the questions 
(appearing alternatively) were controls within which the base and target 
appeared simultaneously.  A cut-off was also introduced so that if the 
participant was answering at chance level (50%) the task would stop after 15 
questions, the score being zero for that trial.  The overall score was 
determined by the number of responses from all conditions. Due to time 
restrictions no reliability data was available, although similar paradigms had 
previously been successfully applied (Thompson et al., 2006).   
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Digit recall.   A measurement of verbal STS; the digit recall task is a 
subtask from the AWMA (Alloway, 2007).   Numbers are read out and the 
participant asked to repeat them.  Six questions make up each trial, with the 
participant advancing only if they answer four or more questions correctly.   
For each extra trial, an additional digit is added for the participant to 
remember.  Reliability for the digit recall task in the AWMA is .84 
(Alloway, 2007). 
 
Similarities task.  One of the most widely used measures of relational 
reasoning; the similarities subtask is taken from the WISC-IIIR (Wechsler, 
1991) as a direct measurement of domain general knowledge and 
understanding of relations.  Here 19 word pairs are given and the participant 
is asked to describe what makes them the same.  Answers are divided into 
high level (2 points), low level (1 point) and inappropriate (0 points) 
responses which are marked according to strict criteria in the WISC 
manual
45
.  
 
 Reliability for the similarities task has been shown to be .81 across all year 
groups (Goldstein & Hersen, 2000). 
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 Although some leeway is given for experimenter interpretation, this is a classic example 
of the form of relational reasoning task where the participant must respond with an answer 
the experimenter has previously decided is “correct” and where the experimenter has 
decided that some forms of answer are cognitively “better” then others.  It was chosen 
because it represented a commonly encountered form of relational paradigm. 
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2.3.3 Procedure.  This experiment was divided up into 2 sessions 
lasting 35 minutes (on average) each.  The first session consisted of RPA 
conditions R1ND and R2D, followed by the: Block Design, Vocabulary and 
Similarities subtasks (in that order).  After a minimum of 24 hours the 
second session was conducted, consisting of RPA conditions R1D and 
R2ND, followed by the Mr.X, Listening Recall, and JND subtask.   
 
All tasks were conducted on a one-to-one basis in a quiet location within the 
school, the order of presentation of the RPA problems being 
counterbalanced using the same procedure and web based programme as 
experiments one and two (Urbaniak & Plous, 1997): i.e. in a quasi-random 
order.   Here problems from both conditions in a session were randomly 
determined, the order being manipulated when a problem was presented 
adjacent to an identical question within a separate condition (i.e. question 1, 
RND and question 1 R2D).  
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Table 17.  Mean relational scores (by RPA condition). 
_____________________________________________________________ 
    Mean score SD % 
Relational Score Total 64.3 5.22 80.375 
 R1ND 18.4 1.25 92 
 R1D 15.13 2.6 75.65 
 R2ND 14.93 1.61 74.65 
 R2D 15.87 2.36 79.35 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18.   Mean individual difference scores. 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
Task Mean score SD    
Similarities 17.6 4.62    
Block Design 37.27 12.36    
Vocab 26.47 8.2    
Digit Span 94.2 3.37    
Listening 91.1 22.28    
Mr.X 94.97 23.25    
JND (Span) 4 0.98    
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2.3.4 Results.  Table 17 shows the mean relational scores from 
Experiment 3, whilst Table 18 shows the mean scores from each of the 
tasks.  
 
Between condition analysis. t-tests conducted between conditions of the R
s 
reported that there was a significant difference between conditions R1ND 
and R1D (t (29)= 6.60, p<0.001), R1D and R2ND (t(29)=11.192, p<0.001, 
² =.81), R1ND and R2D (t(29)= 6.517, p<0.001, ² =.59) and R2ND and 
R2D (t(29)= -2.177, p<0.05, ² =.14).  No significant difference was found 
between conditions R1D and R2ND (t(29)= -0.388, p>0.05, ²=.01) or 
conditions R1D and R2D (t(29)= -1.553, p>0.05, ² =.08), meaning that it 
was unlikely that effects of complexity could be observed. 
 
Correlational analysis. Two phases of correlational analyses were carried 
out.  The first looked at the relationships between task scores and the R
s
 (see 
Table 19).  The second compared task scores and the R
s 
within individual 
RPA conditions (see Table 20). 
 
The R
s
 was found to positively correlate with the Similarities (r = .417, 
p<0.05), Block Design (r = .363, p<0.05), Vocabulary (r = .422, p<0.05), 
and Mr.X (r = .392, p<0.05) tasks, whilst the Listening Recall Task was 
approaching significance (r = .355, p=0.054) tasks.  The Digit span and JND 
measures were not found to be related to R
s
 (p>0.05). 
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For condition R1ND the Similarities (r = .507, p<0.01), and Vocabulary (r = 
.422, p<0.05) subtasks were found to be positively correlated with the 
proportion of relational responses in this condition.   For condition R2ND 
the Mr.X subtask was correlated with the proportion of relational responses 
(r = .399, p<0.05).  For condition R2D the Similarities (r = .495, p<0.01), 
Block Design (r = .390, p<0.05) and Vocabulary task (r = .574, p<0.01) 
were all correlated with R
s
. 
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Table 19.    Correlational matrix for IQ/WM measures and relational responding 
 Similarities 
Block 
Design Vocab 
Digit 
Span Listening Mr.X JND 
Relational .417* .363* .422* .320 .355† .392* -.102 
Similarities  .469* .469** .729 .174 .311 .298 
Block   .352† .248 .349† .498* .310 
Vocab    .297 .212 .324 -.201 
Digit span     .786** .652** -.125 
Listening      .623** -.112 
Mr.X       .119 
†Correlation is approaching significance (between the 0.05 and 0.06 level) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
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Table 20.   Correlations between relational responding and individual difference measures (by 
RPA condition) 
  
Similarities Block Vocab 
Digit 
span Listening Mr.X JND 
 
 
R1ND .507* .310 .453* .223 .312 .228 .084 
 R1D -.010 .117 .097 .191 .189 .174 -.243 
 R2ND .342 .244 .101 .319 .337 .399* .065 
 R2D .495* .390* .574** .187 .217 .333 -.074 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
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ANCOVA  analysis.  Repeated-measures analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs) were conducted using the same means centred methodology as 
before (Delaney & Maxwell, 1988).  These were performed for all 
experimental measures found to be correlated with R
s
 (Similarities, Block 
Design, Vocabulary, Listening Recall and Mr.X).  This was done in order to 
see if they mediated conditions of complexity and distraction. 
 
Similarities task.  For the similarities-task covariate analysis, significant 
main effects of Similarities task (F[1,28] = 5.92; p<0.05, 
2
p =.18) complexity 
(F[1,28] = 27.06; p<0.05, 
2
p =.49), and distraction (F[1,28] = 10.02; p<0.05, 
=0.26) were found. Also, the interactions between complexity x Similarities 
(F[1,28] = 4.34; p<0.05, 
2
p =.13),  complexity x distraction  (F[1,28] = 61.76; 
p<0.001, 2p =.69) and complexity x distraction x Similarities  (F[1,28] = 5.47; 
p<0.05, 2p =.16) were significant.  No interaction between distraction x 
Similarities (F[1,28] = 0.004; p>0.05, 
2
p =.000) was reported. 
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Figure 14. Three-way interaction between complexity, distraction and the 
similarities-task. The median split for High/Low performers in the 
similarities task was introduced at 18.5. 
 
 
Although R
1
 conditions were easier than R
2,
 there was less reported 
difference between simple and complex conditions in participants who had a 
higher similarities score- meaning that high-similarities participants were 
better able to handle complexity effects.     
 
In order to represent the three-way interaction, a median split was 
introduced after removing outliers, to illustrate high and low similarities-
task scores (Figure 14).    
 
An independent samples t-test with the grouping variable of High/Low 
similarities was then performed in order to gauge the strength of the 
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interaction and why it was taking place (i.e. the difference between RPA 
conditions in high/low peforming similarities particiapamts may appear 
great in the figure, but may in fact be non-significant, disguising why an 
interaction was detected) .    
 
A significant difference was observed between high/low similarities groups 
in condition R1ND (t(28)= -2.803, p<0.05, ²=.22), R2ND (t(28)= -3.112, 
p<0.005, ² =.26); whilst the difference In the R2D Condition was 
approaching significance (t(28)= -1.973, p=0.058, ²=.12).  No significant 
difference was observed between low/high groups in condition R1D (t(28)= 
0.718, p>05, ² =.02).   
 
This analysis appears to show that participants with high similarities scores 
perform better than people with low scores, particularly in the no-distracter 
conditions (on both levels of complexity).  Participants who perform better 
at the similarities task eliciting a higher R
s
 in complex no distracter 
conditions (R2ND); an effect which was also true to a certain degree of 
complex conditions in general (the difference between low/high peformers n 
condition R2D approaching significance). 
 
Summary of the 3-way interaction: Participants in both similarities-task 
groups peformed at the same level in distracter
 
conditions, but generally 
high similarity peformers found conditions of complexity easier when they 
did not have a distractor present in them. 
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Figure 15. Three way interaction between complexity, distraction and the 
vocabulary task. The median split for High/Low performers in the 
similarities task was introduced at 18.5. 
 
 
Vocabulary task.   For the Vocabulary-task covariate analysis, main effects 
of Vocab (F[1,28] = 0.021; p<0.05, 
2
p =.18), complexity  (F[1,28] = 24.74; 
p<0.001, 2p =.000) and distraction (F[1,28] = 10.53; p<0.05, 
2
p =.27) were 
found.  Interactions were also reported between complexity x distraction 
(F[1,28] = 66.96; p<0.001, 
2
p =.71) and complexity x distraction x Vocab 
(F[1,28] = 8.29; p<0.05, 
2
p =.23) but not between complexity x Vocab (F[1,28] 
= 1.57; p>0.05, 2p =.05) or distraction x Vocab (F[1,28] = 1.44; p>0.05, 
2
p 
=.05). 
 
Once again, in order to interpret the three way interaction, a median split 
was introduced to the vocabulary score, separating high and low scoring 
participants (Figure 15).   An independent samples t-test with the grouping 
variable of High/Low vocabulary was then performed.  This showed a 
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significant difference between high/low groups in condition R2D (t(28)= 
2.777, p<0.05, ² =.22) whilst the difference between groups in condition 
R1ND was approaching significance (t(28)= -2.037, p=0.051, ² = 0.13).  
No significant difference was reported between groups R1D (t(28)= -0.576, 
p>0.05, ² =.01) or R2ND (t(28)= -1.153, p>0.05, ² =.05).    
 
Summary of the 3-way interaction:  The interaction centered on condition 
R2D, children with higher vocabulary scores eliciting more responses in this 
complex distracter condition then their low vocabulary counterparts. 
 
Block-design task.  For the Block-Design covariate analysis, main effects of 
complexity (F[1,28] = 24.46; p<0.001, 
2
p =.47), distraction (F[1,28] = 10.14; 
p<0.05, 2p =.27) were reported, whilst a main effect of Block design was 
approaching significance (F[1,28] = 4.18; p=0.051, 
2
p =.13).  Interactions 
were reported between complexity x distraction (F[1,28] = 53.68; p<0.001, 
2
p 
=.66) but not complexity x Block design (F[1,28] = 1.24; p>0.05, 
2
p =.04), 
distraction x Block design (F[1,28] =0 .353; p>0.05, 
2
p =.01) or complexity x 
distraction x Block Design (F[1,28] = 1.09; p>0.05, 
2
p =.04). 
 
Listening-recall task.  For the Listening-recall covariate analysis, main 
effects of  complexity (F[1,28] =  23.51; p<0.001, 
2
p =.46) and distraction 
(F[1,28] =  10.02; p<0.05, 
2
p =.26), as well as an interactions between 
complexity x distraction (F[1,28] =  51.76; p<0.001, 
2
p =.65).  No main effect 
of Listening Recall (F[1,28] =  3.85; p>0.05, 
2
p =.12) was reported, nor were 
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any interactions between complexity x Listening Recall (F[1,28] =  0.097; 
p>0.05, 2p =.003) distraction x Listening Recall (F[1,28] = 0.008; p>0.05, 
2
p 
=.000) or complexity x distraction x Listening Recall (F[1,28] =  0.05; p>0.05, 
2p =.002) 
 
Mr.X task.   For the Mr.X covariate analysis, a main effect of Mr.X (F[1,28] = 
4.99; p<0.05, 2p =.15), complexity (F[1,28] = 24.72; p<0.001, 
2
p =.469) and 
distraction (F[1,28] = 10.08; p<0.05, 
2
p =.27) was indentified, as well as an 
interaction between complexity x distraction (F[1,28] = 51.67; p<0.001, 
2
p 
=.65).  No interactions between complexity x Mr.X (F[1,28] = 1.54; p>0.05, 
2p =.05), distraction x Mr.X (F[1,28] = 0.17; p>0.05, 
2
p =.006) or complexity 
x distraction x Mr.X (F[1,28] = 0.002; p>0.05, 
2
p =.000).    
 
2.3.5 Discussion.     Experiment 3 sought to assess the relationship 
between STS, WMC and AR.  Whilst the involvement of STS remained 
inconclusive (no significant correlation being observed between this form of 
measurement and AR) the results of this study provided further evidence for 
the involvement of WMC in AR.   Experiment 3 underlined the observation 
from Experiment 2 that Mr.X was an important contributor to the solution of 
the RPA whilst also suggesting that other WMC measures may be important 
in the successful resolution of the task (the correlation between the R
s
 and 
second WMC task, the listening recall task, was approaching significance).  
 
Despite this, IQ measures were again shown to be better predictors of 
analogical success than WM, and whilst no WMC-complexity interactions 
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were reported, measures of IQ were once more observed to interact with 
factors of complexity and distraction.   
 
It was suggested in Experiments 2 and 3 that the lack of WMC and 
complexity interaction data may be due to floor/ceiling-factors; that is to say 
participants were finding the task too easy for their year group, and that the 
level of variance in the R
s
 was perhaps too small to elucidate significant 
conclusions from when comparing covariates such as WM and IQ in 
conditions of complexity and distraction (even in a single year group such 
as Experiment 3).  Yet whilst this is acknowledged
46
, significant interactions 
were established between the R
s
 and IQ tasks - providing important 
evidence that such interactions could be observed, despite the low power 
and variance of the score.  
 
This observation that IQ contributed more to the R
s
 than WMC presented a 
dilemma for the researcher.  Either because a) these IQ measures were better 
indicators of the memory processes underlying the resolution of complex 
problems then the WMC tasks of the AWMA (unlikely).  b) The same 
systems were facilitating an unrepresented mediatory effect of WM in 
complexity.  Or c) IQ processes could account for the resolution of 
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 This was reflected in both the between-condition analysis, which showed no significant 
difference between conditions R1D and R2ND, or R1D and R2D (meaning that participants 
found conditions of distraction equally as difficult regardless of levels of complexity) and 
the power analyses which suggested that 30 participants for a 2x2 analysis might not be 
sufficient in the RPA given that in all three experiments an average of 80% of the responses 
in the year five year group were analogical (relational) in nature and therefore „correct‟.  
This high level of correct responses is highlighted by the work of Krawczyk et al (2010a) 
who showed that despite administering the RPA to traumatic-brain-injury patients with 
“severe” executive difficulties, aged between 3 and 17 years, performance in any condition 
was still up to 90% in some conditions. 
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complexity problems solely through non-capacity „fluid intelligence‟ 
processes, i.e. the ability to choose an appropriate response regardless of 
relational-complexity 
 
In order to answer what processing systems could be supporting AR; the 
tasks found to be significantly associated with AR were appraised.  These 
were IQ and the Mr.X task 
. 
IQ measures.  The three IQ tasks (block-design, similarities and vocabulary 
tasks) were chosen as measures of general problem solving ability that may 
include, but which did not rely upon, storage components of WM (i.e. fluid 
intelligence, see section below).  It is notable however that unlike the block-
design-task, both the vocabulary and similarities tasks (which were found to 
be mediate factors of complexity/distraction) require very little active 
manipulation of visual stimuli, both having being chosen for their known 
association with „general‟ cognitive functioning (Prifitera et al, 2005; 
Flanagan & Kaufman, 2004, Sattler & Dumont 2004) as well as their 
representation of what Goswami (1992) terms „domain general knowledge‟.   
 
The prospect of domain knowledge being represented through increased 
vocabulary and knowledge of relations in the relations task, was however 
unlikely: the high rate of participant success in Experiments 1-3 supporting 
Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) original claim that the similarity-constraints 
used in the RPA are already represented in LTM by the age ranges being 
tested, and that the children understood the requirements of the task.  
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It was therefore considered feasible that what was being demonstrated by IQ 
measures in Experiments 2 and 3 was an efficiency quotient consisting of 
increased functionality (Prifitera et al., 2005) and processing speed (Kail & 
Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 1996).   This makes good etiological sense.  
Both the vocabulary and similarity tasks require strong associations between 
bound „chunks‟ of semantic information, as well as the rapid access of task-
relevant information stored in LTM (e.g. verbal fluency, see section below).  
Even the block-design task is a timed measure, requiring faster, more 
efficient executive functions (Brown, Brockmole, Gow & Deary, 2012), and 
where children who perform faster are rewarded with a greater score, 
regardless of whether they both complete the task.   
 
On this understanding, the arguments for the involvement of the concepts of 
fluid intelligence and processing efficiency (described here as „verbal 
fluency‟) in AR were laid-out.  Although it was considered that both might 
in fact represent aspects of the same processes, clear divisions were never 
the less suggested.  
 
Verbal fluency. “Verbal fluency” (see Salthouse 1996 for a review) has been 
described as the efficiency of neural networks and the speed in which 
cognitive operations associated with fluid-intelligence, planning and 
problem solving may be carried out (Fry & Hale, 1996).   Increased 
functionality is also beneficial in processes correlated with STS as faster, 
more efficient processing could reduce the amount of time a similarity-
201 
constraint or other representation of relational problem needs to be held in 
mind.  WMC may also potentially benefit through the number of cognitive 
manipulations (i.e. assessments) that may made within that reduced period, 
lowering the demands on capacity constrained processing resources. 
 
Verbal fluency has already been associated with the resolution of visually 
based reasoning paradigms (Bryan, Luszcz & Crawford, 1997); facilitating 
task-specific processes such as retrieval, encoding and rehearsal, all of 
which are understood to aid the abstraction of meaning in relational 
problems through increased speed as well as the ease in which bound 
information is recalled (Carpenter et al, 1990).     
 
This later aspect is of particular importance to the analogical researcher as 
theorists such as Holyoak (Cho et al., 2007; Gentner et al., 2000; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Hummel & Holyoak 2003) have 
proposed a connectionist view of analogical thought where concepts may be 
represented through the strength of bindings between semantic nodes held in 
mind.  Here stronger connections (indicated here as being measured by 
verbal fluency tasks) equate to easier and more readily availability 
associations attached to those concepts- leading to fewer incorrect responses 
in AR tasks and better overall conceptual clarity.  
 
 Although an approach such as this relies on aspects of cognitive control 
(specifically the inhibition of non-relevant relationships) it remains 
consistent with the maturational factors observed in both Experiments 1 and 
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2, as well the Richland series of experiments.  This is because, whilst 
increased real-world experience and interaction may lead to stronger 
bindings, speed of processing has also been shown to develop across 
childhood (Salthouse 1996, Chuah & Maybery, 1999). 
 
Fluid intelligence. “Fluid intelligence” is defined as the ability to understand 
complex relationships and solve novel problems (Martinez, 2000).  
Currently there is a great deal of debate as to whether fluid intelligence is a 
separate entity from WM (see chapter 1) and processing efficiency or 
whether it is independent.   In this instance it may be thought of as a 
reasoning system which is not dominated by a storage component.       A 
high fluid intelligence may be seen as being advantageous in AR as it would 
allow us to select and dismiss the correct (most relevant) relational object 
from a number of possible candidates, regardless of their levels of 
complexity.  In the RPA increased difficulty may conceivably be measured 
by either the number of relevant objects
47
 or the degree of similarity a 
candidate object shares with another.  Thus the difficulty is in recognizing 
the correct response, fluid intelligence equating directly to the relational 
primacy theory described by Goswami (1992).  
 
Mr.X task.    Adapted from an earlier (“Mr.Blobby”) measure by Hamilton 
et al (2003), the Mr.X task is a visuo-spatial measure that was selected due 
                                                 
47
 This is not relational (object) complexity but scene complexity 
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to its greater loading of attentional resources compared to other STS 
measures.    
 
As described in Experiment 2, in the Mr.X task children are required to 
store, and maintain information (in this case the location of a ball) whilst 
performing a secondary (not dual) task which impedes or at least diverts 
attention (by using up storage and processing components) from the 
primary.  Children with an increased WMC are thought to be able to 
complete the task through greater processing and storage capacities by being 
able to apply more resources to the problem whilst under increasingly heavy 
load.  The more problems a child is able to solve sequentially, and the more 
they can hold in mind whilst conducting secondary processing, the greater 
their Mr.X score.   
 
Despite representing overall capacity, the Mr.X task also engages a number 
of important executive systems as defined by Baddeley (2007).  For 
instance, the participant must inhibit non-relevant data, switch between two 
modes of thinking, and be able to divide attention- holding the location of a 
number of balls from a number of different problems whilst conducting 
extraneous tasks.    As with the IQ measures, performance of Mr.X is also 
likely mediated by an efficiency/speed of processing component: the ability 
to recall the visual locations of the Mr.X „ball‟ being determined not only by 
the ability to maintain visuo-spatial information against temporal decay, but 
also by the speed in which the participant recognizes and processes the 
primary and secondary tasks, and how quickly/flawlessly they are able to 
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switch between the two modes of thinking.  Dual and secondary task studies 
have already shown the benefits of returning to a primary task at faster 
speeds before it has had time to decay (Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, 
Arbor, & Hegarty, 2001).  
 
It was therefore considered that the Mr.X measure could represent three 
essential systems which are crucial for the resolution of the RPA.   Fluid 
intelligence and/or increased functionality executive processes, or WMC.   
 
Since the latter could be considered to be the product of the second (and had 
already been shown to be associated with AR in the previous experiments) 
and the first had been dealt with in IQ, attention was paid to the possible 
advantages of seeing executive processes as skills advantageous to the 
resolution of the RPA. 
 
Executive functions.   Executive control is known to be associated with other 
forms of inductive reasoning (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2008; De Neys, 
Schaeken, & Ydewalle, 2005; Gilhooly, 1998; Gilhooly et al, 1993).  Yet 
recent research has provided increasing evidence that it also has specific 
relevance to analogical reasoning, through neuroimaging (Crone et al, 2009; 
Cho et al, 2009; Krawczyk et al, 2010) and classical forms of 
experimentation (Iroise, Houlton, Kalina & Blakemore, 2010; Morrison et 
al, 2010; Richland & McDonough, 2010; Thibaut et al., in press)  
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It is suggested that Baddeley‟s (2007) executive functions -being able to 
coordinate incoming information, switch between strategies, update old and 
inhibit new information- have obvious applications in tasks such as the 
RPA.  Not only must a child choose relevant responses whilst holding others 
in mind,  a core requirement of scene based analogies is for a child to be 
able to bind previously existing rules to novel objects whilst consistently 
switching between featural (base) and relational (target) selection strategies.   
 
A fourth option has also been presented by Richland and colleagues 
(Richland et al., 2004, 2006; Morrison et al., 2010) who hypothesize that 
inhibitory control may play a key role in relational success at the RPA when 
two forms of response conflict and previously rule-sets (such as „what is the 
same as‟) require suppression (Davidson et al., 2009; Diamond et al., 2002; 
Indre, Viskontas, Robert, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel & Knowlton, 2004).   
 
However, inhibition may also conceivably play other role in AR where 
prepotent information (such as the appearance of a base object) may require 
inhibition because it is either forefront after being recognized in the base 
(Oberauer, 2005) or because selective pruning of semantic bindings controls 
relevancy (Hummel & Holyoak 1997; 2007). 
 
2.3.6 Conclusion.    Given the small sample size, caution must be 
made in interpreting many of the observations reported here; however these 
findings still offer important insights into the processes underlying AR. 
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In summary, by demonstrating a relationship between AR and WMC, this 
study has supported theories which implicate capacity based restrictions on 
analogical thought, such as the complexity-constraint hypothesis (Halford, 
1992, 1993, 1998).  However, it is proposed that an open mind be kept when 
reviewing these findings. 
 
Reduced relational responding in conditions of complexity (conditions 
R2ND and R2D) has previously been inferred both by Richland et al. (2004, 
2006) and this thesis (Experiment 1) as representing an increased load on 
WM brought about by the presence of extra relational objects.  A theoretical 
relationship existing between processing power used and the number of 
descriptive dimensions within an analogical argument (in the case of the 
RPA this would equate to the argument „chasing‟ requiring less WM 
resources to successfully compute than „chasing and being chased‟).  
However perspectives other than Gentner and Halford‟s complexity-
taxonomies may be applied to such findings.   
 
Goswami‟s relational primacy theory (1992) is one such approach, relying 
on the formation of schemas and learning sets which encourage a child to 
respond in a specific way without it being automatic and more importantly: 
without a demand being placed on WMC by the presence of extra relations.  
In other words the manipulations performed by fluid intelligence and 
executive control of relational concepts may determine relational responding 
without the size of the concept being relevant.  
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„Relational-error‟ objects in this way may camouflage the goal of the task 
without changing the similarity-constraint itself by diverting attention away 
from the relational object and exposing weak schemas that are more readily 
corrupted by distractions, temporal decay, or otherwise open to 
interpretation.   Whilst such ambiguity may be described by a complexity-
constraint approach (the more similar relationships an object holds to the 
base object, the more likely it is to be the right answer) it may also be 
described by incorrect assumptions in the rule-set required to solve the 
problem i.e. the incorrect „looking for objects involved in a chase‟ as 
opposed to the correct „looking for an object in the middle‟.    
 
This could potentially elicit the same pattern of data as presented earlier 
(reduced relational responding in complex conditions), it being argued that 
extra relations increases the number of admissible options- not because they 
are more complex, but because the reasoners understanding of the 
similarity-constraint is poor.    
 
Thus far in the thesis, the involvement of WM, and subsequently WMC has 
been indicated as arbitrating AR.  However, as reported in Experiments 2-3, 
IQ was shown to be a better predictor of analogical success.  
 
With such arguments firmly established, chapter 3 will investigate the 
nature of WMC‟s involvement in AR.  It will focus on the questions as to 
how much of a load the RPA may be placing on the WM system (which will 
be investigated in this instance through reaction time and dual task 
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experiments) as well as assessing what role the executive functions 
described by Baddeley (2007) may be playing in AR.  The latter question 
being postulated in an attempt to see if EFs can describe the relationship 
between WM and AR reported in Experiments 2 and 3. 
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Chapter three 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter 3 is intended to expand upon the findings of the previous chapter.  
Its main objective is to examine the function that WMC, as indicated in 
Experiments 2 and 3, may play in analogical thought in the RPA.  Using a 
Reaction Time (RT) paradigm, Experiment 4 will explore the possible 
loading effects of relational and featural response formats in the RPA; 
hopefully providing insight into Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) suggestion 
that featural inhibition, as a process of WMC, may be a central component 
of successful relational responding in the RPA by suppressing irrelevant 
forms of attributional response.   Effects of complexity will also be 
illustrated through RT‟s in this experiment in consideration of the 
possibility that differences in response timings may affirm complexity 
effects not visible in the proportion of relational responses. 
 
Experiment 5 will use a dual-task paradigm to see if processes known to be 
involved in WMC can be associated with performance in the RPA, 
attempting to demonstrate visible capacity constraint effects by increasing 
the loading of the task beyond its original format.  
 
Experiment 6 will continue from Experiments 3 and 5.  The intention being 
to potentially imply a new role for WMC in AR through the involvement of 
specific Executive Functions (EFs) in AR, the primary role of which is to 
divide and focus attention (Baddeley, 1996b) as well as mediate information 
from LTM (Baddeley, 2000) in WM. 
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3.1 Experiment 4 
Chapter 2 showed how the presence of a featural distracter and extra 
relational objects increased task difficultly in the RPA, and how WMC may 
play a significant role in arbitrating analogical thought-  although precisely 
why remained unknown.  Previously in the thesis interpretation of the 
relationship between WM and AR has focused on the complexity-constraint 
effect perspective of analogical thought (Andrews & Halford, 2002; 
Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998; Halford et al., 2002), however until now, no 
interaction between WM and relational-complexity in the RPA has been 
evident.    One possible explanation for this concerns executive control and 
the ability to suppress non-relevant material in the analogical scene 
(Richland et al., 2004, 2006, 2010). 
 
Cognitive inhibition has been described as an executive function involved in 
the “stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or 
without intention” MacLeod (2007, p. 4), its componential architecture 
being understood to be closely entangled with that which underlies WMC 
(Brewin & Beaton 2002; Redick, Heitz, & Engle, 2007).   Inhibitory control 
is one of Baddeley‟s (1996) core processes of the CE, tasked with the 
executive control, division and selection of attentional resources (see 
chapter 1).    
 
Whilst Experiment 6 will look at the executive processes in detail, this 
experiment will prime subsequent analysis by endeavouring to provide an 
understanding of how age related processing factors may work in the RPA.     
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Experiment 4 will utilise reaction times to investigate the potential loading 
effect on the reasoning process instilled by factors such as complexity and 
distraction in the RPA.  Experiment 4 will additionally attempt to provide 
insight into the potential relationship shared between whatever agents 
underlie the increased level of difficulty associated with these factors and 
inhibitory skill- which remains the most widespread theory of how 
executive control may constrain analogical thought.  
 
Over the last two years various theorists have suggested an inhibitory role in 
visually based analogical reasoning tasks through neuroimaging studies on 
normal (Cho et al, 2010) and abnormal patients (Krawczyk, Henten, Wilde, 
Li, Schnelle, Merkley, Vasquez, Cook, McClelland, Chapman & Levin, 
2010a
48
).  These have indicated the involvement of the prefrontal cortex and 
parietal regions of the brain known to be related to the executive selection 
and maintenance of information.   
 
Other theorists have taken a psychometric approach, using inhibitory 
paradigms in young adults/adults to show age based changes in the ability to 
suppress irrelevant information (Chuderska & Chuderski, 2009; Viskontas 
et al., 2004), the functions of inhibition being known to decline with age 
(Zelazo, Muller, Frye, Marcovitch, 2004), while some have inferred the 
                                                 
48
 Krawczyk and his colleagues running an fMRI study on the RPA paradigm with a small 
sample of Traumatic Brain Injury patients 
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effect from data patterns which are purported to represent inhibitory 
demands (Richland et al., 2004, 2006, 2010; Thibaut et al. 2010).   
 
Inhibition is thought to work in analogical thinking by blocking prepotent 
responses and strategies or by pruning inappropriate semantic connections, 
thereby establishing relevant meaning (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 1997; Krawczyk et al., 2008, 2009; 2010, Morrison et al, 2010; 
Oberauer et al., 2005; Thibaut et al., in press; Viskontas et al., 2004).    
 
Featural responses may be considered prepotent for a number of reasons.  
They could represent novel strategies or forms of response which are based 
on prior beliefs and intuition rather than novel (current) situations that are 
contrary to the prior inclinations of the child (De Neys, 2006a; Diamond et 
al., 2002, a concept exemplified by heuristic
49
 and analytical dual-reasoning 
processes (De Neys, 2006b).  Alternatively the visual similarity of the (base) 
query object to a (target) featural distracter could also mean that the concept 
held in mind needs to be overridden in order to consider other relational 
objects (Oberauer et al., 2005).    
 
Fortunately, this prepotent hypothesis is relatively easy to test in a simple 
RT experiment.  Gordon and Moser‟s (2007) eye tracking-RPA paradigm 
suggesting that participants (in this case undergraduates) spend significantly 
                                                 
49
 In such a manner, „heuristic‟ featural responses may be thought of as being innately 
preferable to „rational‟ relational responses which are engaged only when time is taken to 
consider their relevance, heuristic objects presumably being subsequently chosen at a faster 
rate. 
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longer times looking at informative regions of the problem (relational or 
relational error objects), and spend longer on complex trials compared to 
simple; whilst using the PPA
50
 Cho et al. (2007) predicts that as relational-
complexity increases, so the required inhibition necessary to resolve the 
problem. 
 
Although it is important to highlight the fact not every aspect of inhibition is 
purported to be explained by such a paradigm (i.e. the continuous inhibition 
of responses during protracted reasoning processes will not appear 
prepotent), it is postulated here that if erroneous attributional based objects 
are a prepotent response then featural responses should require less 
processing and be elicited faster than relational responses. Diamond, 
Kirkham and Amso (2002) proposed that anything under 3 seconds may be 
prepotent, with the likelihood increasing as RTs decrease. 
 
Of course whether such proposed differences are observable in a RT study 
remains to be seen; however such a methodology does afford the additional 
advantage of further investigating the role WMC may play in analogy.  In 
addition to this it also allows the additional testing of the complexity-
constraint methodology; it being argued that the added processing power 
required for assessing the relevance of relational objects may potentially 
equate to longer selection times for relational objects than featural 
(relational objects being more complex than featural).   
                                                 
50
 The People Piece analogies are a visual form of the classical analogy. 
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In this experiment, a younger year group (class Year 2) was included to 
investigate the development of inhibitory skill and processing speed, while 
possibly explaining the floor effects reported earlier.  It was accepted from 
the beginning that a RT experiment using the RPA would be susceptible to 
the repeated measures design of the scene based paradigm, where each 
question is repeated across four conditions and where each response is in a 
similar if not identical location.   In order to alleviate extraneous factors 
such as practice effects across conditions (which are identical in the RPA), 
only one RPA condition was administered to each child.  This created year 
groups with four independent conditions (representing each of the RPA 
conditions), which were combined to form experimental conditions of „no-
distraction‟ (R1ND + R2ND), „distraction‟ (R1D + R2D), „simple‟ (R1ND 
+ R1D) and „complex‟ (R2ND + R2D).  
 
The first question Experiment 4 aimed to address was whether relational 
responses in distracter and/or complex conditions took longer to elicit than 
no-distracter and/or simple conditions- providing additional evidence 
for/against the concept that complex/distracter conditions require greater 
degrees of processing power (WMC) than their counterparts (simple/no-
distracter).  The second question was to investigate whether featural 
responses are a result of prepotent stimuli, it being considered that if featural 
responses were the result of response-inhibition failure, then they would be 
elicited at a faster rate than thought-out relational forms of response.  
Richland et al. (2004, 2006) assumed that younger children had less 
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resources with which to inhibit prepotent stimuli, and would therefore 
perform worse at the RPA and inhibition tasks.  
 
3.1.1 Participants. In total, 96 children were recruited from class 
Years 2 (ages 5-6) and 5 (ages 10-11) from two primary schools from the 
North-East of England in accordance with the criteria adopted in the earlier 
studies.   Although no analysis would be conducted between individual RPA 
conditions and year groups due to the concerns raised in Experiment 2 about 
power, these children were divided up as equally as possible in the 
following manner:  9 Year-2 children in condition R1ND, 10 in condition 
R2ND, 12 in condition R1D and 10 in condition R2D; 12 Year-5 children in 
condition R1ND, 12 in condition R2ND; 14 in condition R1D, and 13 in 
condition R2D.      
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Figure 16. New „Example C‟ problem added to the RPA.  Constructed by 
the author this was introduced in order to encourage children to respond 
faster without detracting from the original instructions. 
 
 
3.1.2 Materials and Design.   Using a between-subjects design, the 
mean response times for relational and featural answers in Years 2 and 5 
were compared using four experimental conditions (participants in each 
group received only one condition, experimental conditions being 
constructed from two independent RPA conditions): no-distracter (R1ND + 
R2ND), distracter (R1D + R2D), simple (R1ND + R1D) and complex 
(R2ND + R2D).   Further comparisons were also made between types of 
response in all RPA conditions and in both year groups combined. 
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For this a computerized version of the RPA (Richland, 2008) was created 
specifically for use in this experiment. The same analogy problems as the 
paper version were presented on the screen, one at a time.  Responses were 
recorded using a touch-screen monitor, the data including the child‟s 
response (i.e. featural or relational), as well as the amount of time taken to 
make the decision.   
 
3.1.3 Procedure.  This experiment was conducted in a single one-to-
one session, lasting on average 15 minutes.    
 
In addition to the standard instructions, an extra novel practice question 
(Figure 16) was created from the original object-drawings used by Richland 
et al. (2004, 2006) where the children were taught to respond as quickly as 
possible.  This was done by inserting the following two paragraphs to the 
normal read-aloud standardized instructions: 
 
 “We are about to do the last practice before we start.  The final rule to the 
game is that we need to answer as quickly as possible.  The quicker we 
answer, the more points we get… so it is very important to touch the correct 
answer as soon as you think you see it.   Are you ready?  Good, now as 
quickly as you can, touch the correct answer on the bottom picture.  On your 
marks, get set, go.  
 
[Child is shown the final practice question.  Regardless of the child‟s 
response, the next paragraph is read out]. 
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Remember to be as accurate as possible.  If you select the wrong part of the 
pattern, or miss, you‟ll get no points! Have a closer look here, 
[experimenter, indicates by pressing an open space on the bottom half of the 
screen]. You see? That would be wrong.    
 
Now again, the arrow shows us part of the pattern we have to find in the 
bottom picture.  The arrow is pointing at the…. [child responds]. Very good, 
so what is the answer here?  Remember as soon as you see it, touch the right 
answer!  [Wait for child‟s response]. Here, the woman is correct. Again 
they‟re the same, but they look different.  They are doing the same thing.   
The woman is on the roof, the monkey is on the roof.”  
 
Despite the apparent time limit, children were given as long as they needed 
to answer each question in accordance with the original RPA design, 
however they were frequently reminded to be as quick as they could (after 
they had responded) if they seemed to be taking too long. 
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 Table 21.  Mean relational and featural response times (by RPA condition and year group)  
    No Distracter  Distracter  Simple  Complex  
 Year groups All SD R1ND+R2ND SD R1D+R2D SD R1ND+R1D SD R2ND+R2D SD 
Rel Both 3892.58 1075.59 3602.73 792.02 4188.73 1243.61 3823.9 1065.59 3959.8 1092.54 
 Y2 4219.97 1250.31 3772.32 890.79 4624.98 1404.14 4243.09 1277.47 4196.85 1255.3 
 Y5 3645.5 854.21 3487.66 711.15 3822.28 974.87 3501.46 744 3784.2 940.79 
      R1D+R2D SD     
Feat Both 
 
4715.44 1993.41 
 
 Y2 5498.75 2211.79 
 Y5 4057.46 1544.7 
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3.1.4 Results.  Prior to analysis, strict procedures were put into place 
regarding data outliers.  Touch-screen RT data was seen as being 
particularly sensitive to extreme scores from accidental presses or from the 
child‟s desire to select any response based on speed rather than the need to 
select a correct response.   Participant RT data was therefore rejected from 
each RPA trial that a) was above two standard deviations from the mean 
(i.e. not following instructions to select a response as quickly as possible) 
and b) less than 200ms, which was classed as anticipation.   
 
In addition to this, three participants were excluded from the distracter 
analyses as they gave no featural responses in their distracter condition.  
These five participants were as follows: two Year 5 participants from 
condition R2D, two Year 5 participants from condition R1D and one Year 2 
participant from condition R1D.   
 
Table 21 shows the RT mean scores for Experiment 4.    In the following 
analysis two analyses would be conducted, one comparing featural and 
relational RTs in conditions of distraction, and one comparing relational 
RTs between complexity conditions.  No 2x2 analysis of the four RPA 
conditions or 2x2x2, year x RPA conditions, would be conducted on the 
assumption that the division of responses in each RPA condition was too 
low to achieve significant computational power, this experiment being 
concerned with factors of complexity and distraction, not how these 
conditions interacted. 
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Figure 17.  Mean reaction times (by RPA condition).   Bars represent 
standard errors.  
 
Distraction.  Figure 17 shows the mean RTs for Experiment 4.  Figure 18 
shows the reaction times by each group. A paired samples t-test across all 
conditions reported that the mean RTs for relational responses was 
significantly less than featural (t(45)=-2.315, p<0.05, ²= .11), featural 
responses taking longer to elicit. 
 
A paired sample t-test comparing relational RTs to featural RTs in both 
class years showed that Year 2‟s featural RTs were significantly greater than 
its own relational RTs (t(20)= -2.249, p<0.05, ² =.20), however no 
significant difference was observed between relational and featural RTs in 
Year 5 (t(24)= -0.921, p>0.05, ²=.03); older children taking the same 
average time to select a response.  An independent samples t-test on the 
relation and featural RTs with the between subjects factor of class year 
showed that relational RTs (t(65.24)= 2.499, p<0.05, ² = .09) and featural 
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RTs (t(34.86) = 2.515, p<0.05, ² = .15) were  greater in Year 2 than Year 
5.  That is, younger children took significantly longer on the RPA for either 
form of response. 
 
Relational RTs were significantly longer in distracter than no-distracter 
conditions in both years combined (t(76.09) = 2.704, p<0.05, ² =.09), Year 
2 alone (t(34.23)= 2.315, p<0.05, ²= .14), but not for Year 5 (t(43.5)= 
1.413, p>0.05, ² = .04). 
 
Complexity.   An independent samples t-test within the within subjects 
factor of complexity showed that relational RTs were the same in either 
condition (t(91)= -0.607, p>0.05 ²= .00).  The same analysis for Year 2 
(t(37.99)= 0.115, p>0.05,²=.00) and Year 5 (t(49.19)= -1.215, p>0.05,² 
=.03) also showed no effect of complexity  
 
An independent samples t-test on relational RTs in complex conditions with 
the within subjects factor of class year showed no significant difference 
between class Years 2 and 5 (t(33.82)= 1.235, p>0.05, ²=.04). 
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Figure 18.  Mean reaction times (by year group and RPA condition).  Bars represent standard error
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3.1.5 Discussion.   This experiment has demonstrated similar 
findings to that of Experiment 1 in that it has been shown that conditions of 
distraction increase task difficulty, increasing the time spent in the solution 
of the problem.   While complexity factors have not been identified, this 
study provides practical evidence for the Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
hypothesis that, despite understanding the similarity-constraint, younger 
children are less able to process conditions of distraction. 
 
The developmental difficulty younger children appear to be demonstrating 
when processing problems within which a distracting featural object is 
present is thought to illustrate an important aspect of the floor effect 
reported in chapter 3.  Representing cognitive growth in fluid intelligence, 
WMC and/or the increased efficiency of executive systems facilitating 
higher level processes (including processing speed).    
 
 As discussed earlier, one factor suggested by Richland et al. (2004, 2006) 
that may contribute to maturational analogical skill is inhibitory ability; 
younger children being less able to actively suppress alternative 
inappropriate methodologies, such as those presented by the attribute based 
featural distracter.     
 
While this experiment further endorses such an approach, it is suggested 
that the potential role cognitive inhibition may play in AR may be centred 
less around the suppression of prepotent visual stimuli rather than the ability 
to cognitively select appropriate rationale/thought processes. I.e. being more 
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computational in orientation (Conway & Engle 2004; Friedman & Miyake, 
2004
51
) and requiring more in-depth processing than simply dismissing 
something that simply looks the same- occurring regardless of whether a 
relationship is featural or relational.    Such an inhibitory role is indicated by 
spreading activation models of analogical thought, such as LISA (Hummel 
& Holyoak, 1997) where the synchronous binding of partially distributed 
representations in WM and LTM is determined by a selective activation 
process wherein a method of executive control inhibits competing node.   
Pruning semantic connections (in accordance with the goal) until a matrix of 
strong associations remain, representing our understanding of object 
relevance.  Indeed, none of data reported here may be considered to suggest 
that featural responses are prepotent, with featural RTs in younger children 
considerably higher than relational RTs at almost 5.5 seconds. Diamond, 
Kirkham and Amso (2002) suggesting that anything up to 2,500 MS may be 
considered to be prepotent in 4 year olds, with prepotent responses typically 
falling between 1,000 and 1,500 MS in 5-6 year olds.   
 
Although such a long featural delay suggests that young children are not 
selecting responses at random (as suggested by Thibaut et al, 2010) or 
because of anticipation, it also offers a counter explanation to that of 
inhibition- that in situations where the child is unsure of the answer they are 
taking longer to resolve the problem and are therefore more likely to make 
an incorrect response.  Whilst pointing at a difficulty in processing which is 
                                                 
51
 For other non-processing roles of inhibition, see Rowe et al, 2010; Chiappe, Siegel & 
Hasher; 2002; Zacks & Hasher,1994. 
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similar to what Richland et al. (2004, 2006) is arguing, it may also be seen 
that what is being manipulated in distraction conditions is not forms of 
prepotent response, but the ambiguity of the problem (Goswami, 1992; 
Oberauer et al., 2005).   In which case considerable processing resources 
may have to be used in addition to Gentner one-to-one mapping 
comparisons in order to determine what the experimenter is demanding and 
what response is therefore most appropriate.  How this processing may be 
thought of, and whether it can be explained by the concept of fluid 
intelligence or executive functionality of WM remains, including inhibitory 
skill, remains to be seen in the Experiment 6. 
 
3.1.6 Conclusion.  As in Experiment 1, Experiment 4 failed to 
associate effects of complexity with relational responding; a finding directly 
contrary to the Cho et al. (2007) study which found marked complexity 
differences and which illustrates the difficulties in establishing the concept 
of analogy in a field governed by multiple measures of AR.  
 
However distraction, which in Experiments 2 and 3 has been demonstrated 
as being associated with aspects of fluid-intelligence and verbal fluency, 
was shown to be associated with what was hypothesized to be an increased 
processing load.   An important finding from Experiment 4 has been that 
maturation plays an important role in the solution of the RPA, and that older 
children are much less hampered by featural distracter then those who are 
considerably younger.  This could imply that the effectiveness of the RPA to 
discriminate large distraction effects is limited when utilizing children 
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above a certain age ceiling (that of 5) and that the complexity/distraction 
interactions reported by Richland whilst using in older age ranges in the 
RPA (Richland et al., 2004, 2006, 2010) may be associable with factors 
other than the proposed WMC constraints.  Children above the age of 5 
appear to have sufficient processing power to complete the RPA at a high 
enough level to make meaningful error data virtually impossible to gain.  
 
In conclusion, this experiment suggests that greater levels of processing may 
underlie the erroneous selection of featural responses than is predicted by a 
prepotent explanation.   Two assertions are believed to explain the pattern of 
data: that the processing difficulties exist due to either limited WMC 
(explained in the form of reduced processing power or inhibitory skill) or 
increased ambiguity, which has resulted in the selection of erroneous 
featural responses do to a lack of clarity regarding experimental demand.  
Experiment 6 will attempt to resolve this issue by assessing how the 
reported association between executive WMC and AR in Experiments 2 and 
3 may potentially be represented according to the former: deconstructing the 
CE into individual executive functions described by Baddeley (2007) and 
Miyake (2000). 
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3.2 Experiment 5 
The complexity-constraint theory (Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998) suggests that 
that capacity, defined by the number of conceptual chunks and 
segmentations of information in WM, may constrain AR.  As children 
develop, so their capacity matures, expanding to a landmark developmental 
stage where they can begin to process complex relations previously out of 
reach (Halford, 1998).  At the age of five-years it has been hypothesized that 
children are able to process ternary relations (Ratterman & Gentner, 1998), 
such as those used in the RPA, potentially explaining why WMC-
complexity interactions have not been observed thus far.  
 
To resolve this problem, the current experiment was designed to load the 
RPA by using Baddeley‟s (1986) dual task paradigm.  This methodology 
requires the simultaneous application of a task alongside the primary 
measure of reasoning.  If either task uses the same processing resources then 
an interference effect should be visible in the data, with a reduced level of 
task performance potentially being observed in either measure.  As WM is 
modular (Baddeley, 2000), tasks can be run which use visual-spatial, 
phonological or executive (attentional) resources, or combinations of all 
three.    
 
To this end a battery of three dual tasks was assembled for the RPA, the aim 
being to see if the scene based analogies created by Richland et al. (2004, 
2006) were loading WMC enough for factors of complexity or distraction to 
be detected.     The dual-tasks chosen were the articulatory suppression task, 
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the visual spatial tapping task, and the random number generation task: all 
three of which have traditionally been associated with the functioning of the 
CE (Baddeley, 1986; see section 1.3.1) and which represented the visuo-
spatial/verbal/executive modularity of the WM model.   The idea being that 
if AR strongly relied upon any of the individual modules storage/processing 
resources then creating additional competition for those specific 
visual/verbal or executive resources should be detrimental to the analogical 
process.     
 
Again, a touch-screen version of the RPA is used, this time to allow the dual 
task to be performed more easily whilst conducting the main task.   In order 
to reduce the loading effect of remembering previous trials, a between 
participants design was adopted with an increased number of participants in 
order to mitigate the difficulties extrapolated from the previous study.   
 
To increase the statistical power of the paradigm, Experiment 5 would only 
utilize a single complex condition (i.e. R2, collapsing conditions R2ND and 
R2D into a single variable, complex conditions being indicated in 
complexity theory as representing a larger cognitive load). It would not 
compare the effect of no distraction/distraction or high/low complexity
52
.   
 
Since a relational analysis only would be conducted, both conditions would 
be combined in order to maximise the power of the design.   
                                                 
52
 As will be seen in the following section, the variance between these was not great, and 
was considered too small to ascertain significant results.  Therefore, the experiment 
focussed on the effects of dual tasks. 
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In accordance with the observations from Experiments 2 and 3 which 
suggested an association between WMC and AR, the Hypothesis for 
Experiment 4 was that „executive‟ WMC (storage and processing capacity 
defined by attentional control), rather than STS (storage components only), 
could be shown to be further associated with analogical performance by 
reducing the WMC available to reasoners, through dual task interference.    
 
Given the results of the previous experiments we might expect articulatory 
suppression or spatial-tapping tasks to have little impact on relational 
performance, whilst more executive heavy tasks such as Random Number 
Generation may impede relational accuracy.  This is because the latter 
requires the ability to manipulate stored information - hypothetically using 
the same WMC resources that are required to solve the analogical problem.   
Similarly, if a distracter condition in an RPA question uses more WMC than 
a no-distracter condition then it is conceivable that a drop in performance (in 
distracter conditions) may be visible in dual-task conditions which use 
similar resources: possibly providing evidence for the Richland assumption 
that attentional resources are necessary in the inhibition of featural stimuli.     
 
3.2.1 Participants. For this experiment, due to difficulties observed 
testing younger participants using a touch-screen in Experiment 4, 119 
children from Year 5 only (ages 10-11) were recruited from nine new 
primary schools in the North East of England using the ethical consent and 
recruitment procedures as previous studies.  
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3.2.2 Materials and Design.   Using a between-subjects 2x4 dual 
task design, normal analogical performance (measured by the number of 
relational responses elicited) in the two complex conditions of the RPA 
(with and without a distracter present: i.e. R2ND and R2D) was compared 
to performance under visuo-spatial, verbal and executive interference (the 
fourth condition being the control). 
 
Each of the 8 conditions (including both controls) contained 15 participants 
with the exception of the random-number-generation trial within condition 
R2ND, which held 14 participants. For the primary task the experiment was 
conducted using the computerized version of the RPA under the same 
procedure as Experiment 4.  Each dual task was chosen in accordance with 
the measures of EF popularised by Baddeley et al. (Baddeley, 1986; 2007) 
and that were known to reduce reasoning performance in certain domains 
(Baddeley, 1986, 1996b): each task covering one of the three primary slave 
systems of Baddeley‟s (2000) modular multiple resource model (visuo-
spatial, verbal and CE). 
 
Dual Tasks. 
Control:  No dual task was used.  
 
Articulatory suppression (AS):  Children were required to articulate the 
word “rhubarb” continuously at a rate of 1 per 1500ms.   After every 
problem a break was provided before progressing onto the next screen in 
order for the child to regain their breath. 
232 
Visual spatial tapping (ST):  Children tapped out (unseen tapping) a 
pattern/sequence of 4 buttons (up, down, left right) on a USB numeric 
keyboard at a rate of one button press per 1500ms.  The keyboard has 
hidden from view by the use of a dividing screen.  A break was provided 
half way through the trial to allow the children to rest.  
 
Random number generation (RNG):   The random-number-generation task 
(RNG) was the original measure of executive functioning used by Baddeley 
(1966; 1987) to form the concept of executive attention as a resource.  RNG 
is believed to measure the ability to suppress automatic responses in favour 
of directed possessing; it also is a measure of WMC. 
 
For this task children were given a number-line diagram consisting of the 
numbers between one and nine.  In accordance with the original design 
(Baddeley, 1966; 1996) they were then asked to vocalize as many numbers 
as they could in the space of two minutes, at a rate of one every two 
seconds.   To aid them in this, a computerized metronome was introduced; 
giving a low background beat every 2000ms. 
 
Although they could say the same numbers as many times as they liked (so 
long as they were between one and nine) they could not say the same 
number immediately after itself or say numbers adjacent to one another on 
the number line (e.g. if 3 was chosen they could not say 2 or 4 immediately 
afterwards). To help facilitate this, children were told to be as “random” as 
possible, the concept of which was aided by analogy that they were pulling 
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random numbers from a bag whilst blindfolded.   An additional rule was 
that they could not use „easy‟ patterns to „cheat‟ such as alternating between 
numbers or going up in two‟s or threes (in which case they were warned and 
asked to choose another, different number).     
 
The task was measured by the amount of numbers successfully generated 
within two minutes.  Answers which broke the rules did not count.  For 
patterns the first number of each identified pattern was allowed whilst the 
others in the string were disallowed until the pattern had been abandoned.    
 
Children were first given an unlimited practice time, at the end of which 
they were required to be able to articulate numbers randomly.  During this 
practice they were first allowed to see the number line, and once they were 
able to generate numbers fluently, were then asked to generating numbers 
without it, before progressing to the main task.    No reliability data for this 
task was available. 
 
After the experiment it was intended that the number of randomly generated 
responses in the task be measured for order- using a computerized measure 
of randomness (Towse & Neil, 1998).  However this was not performed. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure.  Testing was conducted in a single session lasting 
20 minutes on a one-to-one basis with the experimenter in a quiet location 
within a previously untested school.  Each dual task condition was 
conducted simultaneously with the computerized RPA programme.  
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Due to time constraints imposed on this experiment study, only conditions 
R2D and R2ND were used out of the four conditions available.  This, it was 
believed, would most likely provide the best chance to detect loading effects 
as both were complex (theoretically representing the largest cognitive load 
in the RPA) whilst including both a distracter and a non-distracter condition.  
Theoretically (according to complexity-constraint theory) condition R2D 
should also represent the largest demand on WM possible in the RPA.   
 
3.2.4 Results.  Table 22 shows the mean proportion of relational 
responses in each RPA and dual task condition in Experiment 5.  Prior to the 
experiment an independent samples t-test was performed on the two RPA 
conditions to make sure that a significant difference was reported between 
the relational and featural responses.   
 
In order to see if the dual tasks were effectively loading the RPA, a one-way 
ANOVA with the factor of „dual task condition‟ (Control, AS, ST, RNG) 
was conducted for the proportion of relational responses elicited within both 
RPA conditions (R2ND and R2D).   The post-hoc analysis would therefore 
allow a comparison between the control condition and the three dual task 
conditions. 
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Table 22.   Mean proportion of relational responses (by RPA and Dual-Task condition) 
 Control 
 
Spatial-
Tapping 
   Random 
Number 
generation 
 
  Articulatory  
SD SD Suppression SD SD 
Condition 
R2ND 13 1.65 13.13 1.81 12 2.07 11.36 1.39 
Condition 
R2D 12.27 2.52 11.07 2.87 10.27 2.74 11.67 3.18 
 
 
 
For condition R2ND the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of dual 
task condition for the relational score (F[3,55] = 3.37; p<0.05, 
2
p =.16), 
meaning that, overall, relational responding decreased when dual tasks were 
implemented alongside the analogical task.    However, post-hoc testing 
using the Bonferroni analysis revealed no significant difference between the 
number of responses within any of the dual tasks conditions (all p>0.05)
53
; 
the dual-task effect being prescribed to the difference between RNG vs. ST 
which was approaching significance (p=0.051).  The second one-way 
ANOVA for condition R2D showed no main effects of the relational score 
(F[3,56] = 1.37; p>0.05, 
2
p =.07).  
 
3.2.5 Discussion.  Compared to the previous experiments, Experiment 5 
proved to be inconclusive. The inability to find a dual task loading effect, 
so-often reported in other reasoning tasks, points to either experimenter 
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 In order to correct for multiple comparisons, in SPSS the p value corresponding to each 
comparison is multiplied by the number of comparisons (i.e. 6).  
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effects, (i) poor design methodology (e.g. the number of children, between 
methods design), or (ii) the fact that the RPA does not load WMC to a 
sufficient enough  level for any effects to be observable.   
 
(i) Poor design methodology comes into consideration when it is observed 
that the expected loading effect of dual tasks did not have the effect on 
relational responding that was anticipated.  This could indicate that the dual-
tasks chosen were not conducted in an appropriate manner and that, despite 
best efforts of the experimenter (which including the use of a metronome 
and practice sessions) the children were not articulating words frequently 
enough in the RNG or AS conditions.  Not being random enough in the 
RNG condition, or not regularly following the correct sequence in the ST 
condition.    
 
Tasks such as the RNG might also have been too hard to conduct as a dual 
task for this age range alongside the RPA- even with a touch screen. 
Conversely, another explanation is that that the low between-condition 
variance of the RPA was insufficient for differences to be observed between 
executive and domain-specific capacities.  That is to say RPA was too easy 
for dual task effects to be shown.  In order to judge whether this may or may 
not be the case it is proposed that in the future more attention be focused on 
dual-task as well as primary-task performance. 
 
A final point regarding the methodology used is that the executive loading 
effect anticipated was not found because the RNG task failed to utilize 
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faculties which were similar or identical those used in relational reasoning.  
In such a manner it might be a potential avenue for further research to either 
increase the difficulty of the dual tasks or find those tasks which might 
conflict more during processing (such as retrieving names from a semantic 
set, such as the animal naming task). 
 
(ii)  It might be considered that the failure to find loading effects is entirely 
in-line with Goswami‟s relational primacy perspective.  However, 
conclusions from non-significant relationships cannot be drawn, especially 
given the potential explanations for the failure listed in (i) above.   Further 
research is therefore necessary to lend support to the concept that increased 
complexity does not represent an additional cognitive load.    
 
3.2.6 Conclusion.   Evidence provided thus far suggests that 
children may have enough WMC to be able to handle the RPA, a point 
which is in accordance with the view of Goswami (1992) and Richland et al. 
(2004, 2006, 2010), the latter of whom suggests that older children with 
greater WMC may be able to successfully manipulate similarity-constraints 
above younger children with lower WMC.    
 
If this assumption is true then this experiment failed to show that older 
children could be induced into making errors in AR on par with younger age 
ranges, by lowering the available WMC with which to manipulate relational 
similarity.  Yet while this potentially may be indicative of a lack of 
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cognitive weight associated with AR, it is more likely that the methodology 
used was insufficient for effects to be observed and conclusions be drawn. 
 
Although it is accepted that this study was not successful in any of its aims, 
future studies should take into account the difficulties faced here, 
specifically the age ranges used, the dual tasks administered and the 
methodologies followed in the experimental use of those tasks (i.e. how the 
dual tasks are chosen).  Regarding this latter point, this experiment suggests 
that because of the low power inherently associated with the RPA, more 
powerful testing be conducted with either larger participant pools or smaller 
pools using within groups designs (despite the dangers of practice effects in 
repeat-conditions). 
 
The next experiment (Experiment 6) would now change focus, returning 
once more to investigate the association between analogical competency and 
cognitive faculties associated with Baddeley‟s (2000) model of WM.  
Although thus far in chapter 3 it has been suggested that relational 
responding in AR tasks might not tax WMC as much as might have 
previously be assumed- earlier findings from chapter 2 have already 
indicated that executive WMC may still strongly mediate this form of 
response.   Experiment 6 would therefore reconsider this issue by exploring 
the role of individual EFs in AR (as indicated in chapter 2): its aim being to 
see if certain executive faculties may be associated with relational 
responding and whether this could account for the WM and IQ data reported 
in Experiments 2 and 3.  
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3.3 Experiment 6 
Scene based analogies such as those used by Markman and Gentner (1993) 
and Richland et al. (2004, 2006) have shown that although WM may be 
necessary for the resolution of analogical problems, the ability to recognize 
the similarity-constraint may not be sufficient to explain differences in 
relational responding when a child is faced with conditions which offer 
alternative solutions to the task (Morrison et al., 2010; Richland et al., 2004, 
2006, 2010, Thibaut, et al, 2010). 
 
Richland and her colleagues prescribed these effects to the complexity-
constraint hypothesis.   However, the theory also implicated executive 
functioning in mediating the relationship between maturation and the impact 
of distraction (Morrison et al., 2010)
54
.  
 
Executive functions (EFs) are processes involved in the active control of 
information in WM, the primary role of which appears not to be the 
representation of information but the division and selection of it (Baddeley, 
2007).  EFs are most commonly associated with precepts such as cognitive 
flexibility, multitasking, novel strategy development, the manipulation of 
information for meaning and, as discussed in Experiment 4, the ability to 
suppress non-relevant stimulus–response associations (Gilbert & Burgess, 
2007). 
                                                 
54
 As Baddeley (2007) states, the concept that inhibition is an important component of 
WMC is not a new one.  Inhibition having been conceptualized as a capacity since the work 
of Hasher and Zacks (1999), which showed age related changes in an attentional system 
could be strongly interpreted as a declining limited capacity system.  
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In the past decade, emergent evidence for an EF role in AR has arisen 
through neuroimaging studies (Cho et al, 2009; Christoff, Prabhakaran, 
Dorfman, Zhao, Kroger, Holyoak, & Gabrieli, 2001; Crone, Wendelken, 
Leijenhorts, Homomichl, Christoff & Bunge, 2009; Dumonetheil, Houlton, 
Christoff & Blakemore, 2010; Krawczyk et al, 2010b), and more recently 
Chuderska and Chuderski (2009), who, in an experiment involving several 
measures of EF and figural visually based analogies in an undergraduate 
population, found that AR was significantly correlated with goal monitoring 
(planning) and inhibition.   
 
As stated in Experiment 4, despite recent interest in the field, little direct 
evidence has been shown for EF‟s involvement in AR in younger children, 
particularly in scene based analogies - the RPA being used to describe both 
the complexity-constraint effect and the role of inhibition in successful 
reasoning (Morrison et al., 2010).   This is an important gap in the literature; 
as shown in chapters 1-3, several possible interpretations of WMC‟s 
involvement in the RPA exist, and each has important implications on how 
we perceive a child‟s ability to develop analogical skill.   Specifically the 
question is raised as to whether EFs facilitate our understanding of an 
analogical problem via the formation of rule-sets, or whether they mediate 
performance by constraining parallel processing.  
 
The current experiment was designed to further evaluate executive 
involvement in the RPA given the emphasis in Experiment 4 on prepotent 
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processes.  This will utilize Baddeley‟s four (1995, 1996, 2000) and 
Miyake‟s three (Miyake et al., 2000) component executive processes (see 
chapter as well as the thesis' concept of processing (see chapter 2) to 
construct a battery of six EFs which were considered to have theoretical or 
previously shown involvement in AR. 
 
The measures
55
 (see below) selected were the Tower of Hanoi task or 
„TOH‟ (planning, inhibition and control), STOP-IT (inhibition), Random 
Number generation or „RNG‟ (directed processing), a Local global Task or 
„LGT‟ (task switching- this task was a replacement for the Wisconsin Card 
sorting task which was found to be too difficult for participants at this 
age
56
), the FAS task (processing efficiency, semantic recall) and a speed of 
processing task or „SOP‟ (processing efficiency).   
 
Whilst the role of inhibition (Experiment 4) and SOP (Experiments 2 and 3) 
has already been discussed, the other measures of EF described here may 
also be considered to potentially contribute towards analogical success.    
 
Directed processing and planning measures were chosen because in the RPA 
a child is required to develop and maintain an operational schema which 
must include, at least in part, the rule that featural objects must be 
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 Whilst none of the above functions are necessarily intended to be viewed in isolation 
(speed of processing and inhibitory skill, for example, potentially being mediators of all the 
measures chosen) it was considered that the experiment would help determine whether a 
„blanket‟ faculty covering most cognitive faculties, or specific cognitive functions(s) helped 
contribute towards analogical success. 
56
 This represented a major change in paradigm for experiment 6, the WCST also being a 
measure of rule learning and interpretation rather than just switch-cost. 
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dismissed; the child directing their responses accordingly in goal directed 
behaviour.  The importance of planning, maintenance-of-aim (focus) and 
control are well known when considering the overall objective of the 
reasoning problem (Holding, 1989; Baddeley, 1996).   
 
Task switching was incorporated because a switch cost between modes of 
thinking has previously been associated with analogical thought in the 
classical analogy format (Churderska & Chuderski, 2009; De Neys, 2006); 
and because switching between strategies may also be associated with 
mental fluidity (that is, how easily multiple relations and rules may be 
sequentially attended to in WM).  In the RPA it is also highly relevant 
because of the necessity to direct thinking from any pre-held concepts of 
similarity (i.e. what looks the same) to novel task specific strategies (i.e. 
what does the same).   However, it should be noted that the RPA does not 
require the participant to continuously alternate between two opposing 
strategies (reverting from one to another), instead requiring them to 
maintain a consistent one.  Planning and inhibition were therefore 
anticipated as possibly (although this by no means certain) being more 
explanatory of analogical success than task-switching. 
 
A further executive function considered relevant was the Episodic-buffer‟s 
ability to associate (bind) data and retrieve relevant information from LTM.   
Whilst this remained difficult to practically test due to the uncertainty as to 
whether binding may effectively be shown to be an effortful, resource 
demanding process (which it appears it is not, Allen et al., 2006; Baddeley, 
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2007); functional aspects of it, such as retrieval speed and the strength of 
associations between semantic chunks may be measured indirectly through 
free-recall or verbal fluency measures.  The strength of individual bindings 
are believed to contribute to the ability to think relationally and come to an 
acceptable conclusion (Hummel & Holyoak, 1993).   
 
This experiment is designed to establish whether specific executive 
functions of WM (i.e. those defined by Baddeley, see p.65) are associated 
with relational performance.   It is hypothesised that WMC constrains AR 
through the system-limiting distribution of attentional resources to faculties 
involved in the capacity to focus, divide or switch attention, or to retrieve 
information from LTM.  In order to investigate this, the current experiment 
will adopt the same methodology as previous used in Experiments 2 and 3; 
specifically a 2x2 repeated measures design using the  (2 level) factors of 
complexity and distraction (utilizing the relational scores as the dependent 
variable) and an experimental covariate  in the form of six measures of EF.   
 
3.3.1 Participants.  Twenty-nine children aged between 10 and 11 
(Year 5) were recruited from two primary schools in the North-East of 
England not previously enrolled in Experiments 1-5.   Participants were 
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studies. 
 
3.3.2 Materials and Design.  In addition to a paper version of the 
RPA, six measures of EF were chosen (see below) whilst the Block design 
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was again chosen as a measure of non-verbal IQ.   A simplified version of 
the Wisconsin card sorting task was also planned, but it proved too difficult 
for the children to learn given the scope/time frame of the study and this sub 
task was abandoned. 
 
Tower of Hanoi task.   Based on the original task design by Shallice (1982), 
the tower of Hanoi task is well known to be associated with the functions of 
the prefrontal cortex and executive processes therein (Cardoso & Parks, 
1997).  It has been described as a function of planning and strategy (Simon, 
1975), and was chosen because of its association with inhibition (Goel & 
Grafman, 1995), updating, goal management, and conflict resolution (Wager 
et al., 2000).   
 
For this version the child was presented with four disks of decreasing size 
placed on the far left of one of three pegs (largest disk on the bottom, 
smallest on the top).  The child was asked to get all the disks from the peg 
on the left to the peg on the right.  Specific rules were then given to 
complete this task, namely that any disk could be moved to any peg so long 
as only one disk was moved at a time and larger disks were not placed on 
top of smaller ones.   The score was derived from the number of moves it 
took for each child to complete the puzzle.  Reliability for the TOH task 
varies (Bishop et al., 2001) however, .72 has been quoted on a similar 
format of task by Gnys and Willis (1991).  
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Random number generation.  The Random number generation task (RNG) 
was the original measure of executive functioning used by Baddeley (1966; 
1987) to form the concept of executive attention as a resource.  RNG is 
believed to measure the ability to suppress automatic responses in favour of 
directed processing. 
 
In accordance with the original design (Baddeley, 1966; 1996) children are 
asked to vocalize as many numbers as they can in the space of two minutes, 
at a rate of one every two seconds.   To aid them in this, a computerized 
metronome was introduced; giving a low background beat every 2000ms. 
 
Although they could say the same numbers as many times as they liked (so 
long as they were between one and nine) they could not say the same 
number immediately after itself or say numbers adjacent to one another on 
the number line (e.g. if 3 was chosen they could not say 2 or 4 immediately 
afterwards). To help facilitate this, children were told to be as “random” as 
possible, the concept of which was aided by analogy that they were pulling 
random numbers from a bag whilst blindfolded.   An additional rule was 
that they could not use “easy” patterns to “cheat” such as alternating 
between numbers or going up in two‟s or threes (in which case they were 
warned and asked to choose another, different number).     
 
As the RNG trial was considered a reasonably complicated task, a minimum 
of five minutes training was given for each participant in this condition.  
During this time a number line was provided and the children were shown 
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what was meant by “cheating” with number patterns. Once they were able to 
generate numbers fluently they progressed onto generating numbers without 
it, before progressing to the main task.    No reliability data for this task was 
available. 
 
The task was measured by the amount of numbers successfully generated 
within two minutes.  Answers which broke the rules did not count.  For 
patterns the first number of each identified pattern was allowed whilst the 
others in the string were disallowed until the pattern had been abandoned.    
 
STOP-IT.  A computerized measurement of response inhibition in the 
prefrontal cortex (i.e. stopping a response that is otherwise automatic) the 
STOP-IT task (Verbruggen, Logan & Stevens, 2008) is based on the 
original Stop-Go paradigm of Logan (1994) where two forms of trial are 
presented to the participant: “GO” trials are where the child is expected to 
respond with a button press, and “STOP” trials are where a signal (is 
presented after the “GO” stimulus and the child is required to refrain from 
pressing the button.   
 
The STOP-IT software was loaded onto a laptop.  For this version of the 
paradigm children are asked to press a button on the left (be specific, which 
key?) if they saw a square and a button on the right (as above) if they saw a 
circle (the “GO” signal), but not to press anything if they heard the STOP 
signal (in this case an auditory cue).  Throughout the practice trials the 
children were primed to answer as quickly as possible in order to create a 
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prepotent response.    Success was judged by a trial on which a STOP signal 
was presented and the subject successfully managed to suppress their 
response to press the key.  Failure was judged by the inability to suppress 
this response.  
 
STOP-IT consisted of 32 practice trials, followed by 3 experimental blocks 
of 64 trials each, with a delay of 250ms between the trial and the stop signal.  
In accordance with Verbruggen et al. (2008), a number of measures exist for 
STOP-IT, the majority based around the presence of the STOP signal. 
  
 Mean probability of responding on stop-signal trials (PRS):  
 Mean stop-signal delay (S-D) 
 Mean stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) 
 Mean reaction time on signal-respond trials (SR-RT) 
 Mean reaction time on go-signal trials (NS-RT) 
 Mean percentage of correct responses on no-signal trials (NS-HIT) 
 
STOP-IT was chosen for this experiment as a measurement of the ability to 
override automatic mental processes within WM (Macleod, 2007), 
specifically the suppression of irrelevant information, highly likely 
alternatives, and/or recently examined stimuli (Nigg, 2000; Rafal & Henik, 
1994).    However, there is substantial debate as to how inhibition measures 
may be interpreted and whether they represent the ability to dismiss non-
relevant thought (either task relevant or not-task relevant) or whether they 
are measures of the efficiency of executive decision making processes 
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(Macleod, 2007). No reliability measures were available for the STOP-IT 
task.)  
 
Verbal fluency: FAS/animal-naming task.  Two well established measures 
of the function of the CE are the FAS/Animal naming tasks (Borkowski, 
Benton, & Spreen, 1967). These are measures of “directed processes” within 
the prefrontal cortex (Perret, 1974), specifically verbal fluency (Shelton et 
al., 2010) and search and retrieval processes from LTM (Baddeley, 1996).   
 
For this task, participants had 90 seconds (per category) to generate as many 
words as possible from categories which included words starting with the 
letter F, then A, then S, followed by animal names.  The total score was 
based on the correct number of appropriate responses minus the number of 
incorrect responses (i.e. repetitions or non-appropriate responses not fitting 
the category). No reliability measures for the FAS or animal naming tasks 
was available. 
 
Local-global task.   A measure of the executive ability to shift attention 
(Baddeley, 2000) the local global task (LGT), requires participants to switch 
between specific operations, specifically one information set to another.   
 
Children were given 3 trials, each of which consisted of a sheet of paper 
(trials one, two and three) containing 52 geometric shapes known as Navon 
figures (Wager et al, 2000) which are themselves made up of smaller 
geometric shapes.  Navon figures are either congruent (such as a triangle 
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made up of smaller triangles) or incongruent (such as a square made up of 
identical circles).   For each trial participants were given 90 seconds to count 
the number of sides each figure was composed of:  for trial one these were 
the sides of the larger Navon figure (one for a circle, three for a triangle or 
four for a square). For trial two (an identical sheet to trail one) they were 
asked to ignore the larger shapes and focus on the number of sides of one of 
the smaller shapes within the figure (i.e. if a circle was made up of triangles, 
the answer would be three).  For trial three (a new randomised order which 
was standardized between participants) they were asked to alternate between 
the two strategies learned in the earlier trials; the final score being the 
number of figures correctly identified in trial three.  No reliability data was 
available for this subtask.  
 
Speed of processing task (SOP).   The local global task is divided into three 
trials, the first of which requires the child to complete a speed of processing 
task which can then be used to compare against the second trial if the task is 
scored by the difference between trial 1 and 2.  Since this experiment used 
the alternative form of marking for the LGT (that of the third trial which 
consisted of the ability to swap between two modes of thought) the first trial 
was used as a measure of speed of processing. 
 
3.3.3 Procedure.  This experiment took place over the course of 
three sessions lasting an average of 30 minutes each.   For the first session, 
RPA conditions R2D and R1ND were administered followed by the Block 
design task.  The second session consisted of the animal naming, RNG, 
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FAS/Animal naming, Local/Global and Tower of Hanoi tasks. The third 
session consisted of the RPA conditions R1D and R2ND and the 
computerized STOP-IT task.  For each executive functioning task which did 
not have a practice session included, participants were given five minutes of 
training task prior to testing, except for the RNG, which was given an 
unlimited practice time at the end of which the child was expected to be able 
to fluidly articulate random numbers.    The range for this was between five 
and ten minutes. 
 
3.3.4 Results.   See Tables 24 and 25 for the mean scores for the 
experimental measures/RPA in Experiment 6. During testing it was found 
that children inexplicably underperformed at the FAS task (mean response 
was 19 although several scored under 10, which is exceptionally poor), 
stating that it was too hard to complete, despite giving enough answers to 
show that they were able to complete the task.   Post-testing it was decided 
that the Vikki and Hoist (1994) methodology might have been a more 
appropriate methodology to adopt for the FAS measure (where children are 
measured not on the number of items they produce, as was used here, but on 
the time taken to produce a set number of responses).  However, no timings 
for the FAS had been undertaken and this was impossible: meaning that the 
analysis was confined to the amount of words produced. 
 
 
 
 
251 
Table 23.  Mean relational scores (by RPA condition) 
_____________________________________________ 
Relational Score Mean SD 
 
All Conditions 63.34 6.24 
Complex (R2ND and R2D)  30.66 3.89 
Simple (R1ND and R1D) 32.7 3.28 
Distracter (R2D and R1D) 30.52 4.3 
No-Distracter (R2ND and R1ND) 32.83 2.7 
 
Table 24.  Mean experimental measure scores. 
_______________________________________________ 
Measure Mean SD 
 
Block Design Task 42.79 11.19 
FAS Task 20.17 7.43 
Random Number Generation (RNG) 19.55 4.48 
Local Global Task 14.57 7.12 
Speed of Processing (LGT task A) 30.035 2.32 
Tower of Hanoi 42.55 24.12 
PRS (STOP-IT) 31.2 6.66 
SSD (STOP-IT) 140.6 121.75 
SSRT (STOP-IT) 144.6 80.58 
SR-RT (STOP-IT) 450.7 85.91 
NS-RT (STOP-IT) 476.9 95.59 
NS-HIT (STOP-IT) 73.4 5.68 
252 
Correlation analyses were then conducted between relational responding and 
each subtask (Table 25). 
 
For this analysis, the TOH task (r=.438, p<0.05) and SOP tasks (r=.408, 
p<0.05) were found to be significantly positively correlated with the 
relational score, whilst the correlation between the block-design task 
(r=.359, p=0.056) and local global task (r=.333, p=0.078) and the relational 
score was found to be approaching significance.   The FAS (r=.016, p>0.05) 
and RNG (r= -.091, p>0.05) were not significantly correlated with relational 
responding. 
 
For the STOP-IT task each measure was assessed individually, the PRLS 
(r= .148, p>0.05), SSD (r=-.205, p<0.05), SSRT (r=.087, p>0.05), NSRT 
(r= -.185, p<0.05), and NS-HIT (r=.239, p>0.05) were all not significantly 
correlated to relational responding.   However, the SS-RT (the signal-
respond reaction time) was found to be approaching significance (r=-.365, 
p=0.051).   
 
Signal respond trials are described as trials in which a stop signal occurred 
but the subject failed to withhold a response (De Jong, Coles, Logan & 
Gratton, 1990), in the case of STOP-IT this is the mean reaction time for 
such trials (Verbruggen et al., 2008).   Such data may best be viewed from 
the „first out of the gate‟ model of inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984) which 
suggests that a degree of competition exists in STOP-GO paradigms 
whereby attended control is pitted against unattended heuristic processes; 
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the first process to be activated being the one that is acted upon.  In this 
experiment increased relational responding was correlated with participants 
who were slower at eliciting non-suppressed prepotent responses, meaning 
that out of all of those who responded incorrectly, those who were not as 
quick to go on a no-go trial were more likely to have a higher relational 
score.  
 
Since the mean reaction time on go-signal trials (NS-RT) was not negatively 
correlated with the relational score it is unlikely that this represents 
participants who were prudently waiting longer to see if a stop signal was 
elicited, suggesting instead that some form of processing conflict was being 
reflected in the SS-RT delay.  This can be interpreted in a number of ways, 
but two explanations are considered the most plausible: that these are either 
individuals whose executive control processes are, despite the error, more 
effective than their counterparts, in which case this may conceivably be a 
measure of inhibition, despite the proportion of incorrect no-go responses 
(PRS) being uncorrelated.  Or that this is a measure of processing speed as 
these individuals have been quick enough to recognize that there is a 
conflict between controlled and prepotent responses but have been unable to 
successfully resolve it.      
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Table 25.   Correlational matrix for experimental measures and relational responding 
 
  Block FAS RNG LGT  SOP TOH 
STOP 
(PRS) 
STOP 
 (SSD) 
STOP 
(SS-RT) 
STOP 
(SR-RT) 
STOP  
(NS-RT) 
STOP 
(NH-HIT) 
Relational 0.359† .016 -0.091 .333 .408* .438* .148 -.205 -.087 -.365† -.185 -.239 
Block  .282 -0.09 .364† .368* .133 .095 -.009 -.293 -.136 -.263 -.022 
FAS   .229 .408* .447* .223 -0.001 .152 -.517** -.083 -.235 -.241 
RNG    .164 -0.001 .028 .248 -.105 .112 -.064 -.021 -.003 
LGT     .705** .333 .166 .137 -.416* -.156 -.166 -015 
SOP      .353 .195 .146 -.499** -.181 -.228 -.204 
TOH       .045 .025 .001 .123 .026 .007 
† Correlation is approaching significance between the 0.05-0.06 level 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
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Repeated-measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted 
using the mean centred approach (Delaney & Maxwell, 1988) adopted 
earlier, the ANCOVAS being carried out for the TOH and SOP tasks 
respectively in order to see if these measures could provide a complexity 
interaction (missing from Experiments 2 and 3) which may be interpreted as 
a function of WMC. 
 
TOH.  For the TOH covariate analysis, the main effects of  
TOH (F[1,27] = 6.40; p<0.05, 
2
p =.19), complexity (F[1,27] = 10.81; p<0.05, 
2
p 
=.29) and distraction (F[1,27] = 11.43; p<0.05, 
2
p =.30) were identified.  
Interactions were also found between complexity x TOH (F[1,27] = 5.14; 
p<0.05, 2p =.16) and complexity x distraction (F[1,27] = 44.11; p<0.001, 
2
p 
=.62).  No interactions were reported for distraction x TOH (F[1,27] = 0.04; 
p>0.05, 2p =.001) or complexity x distraction x TOH (F[1,27] = 2.44; p>0.05, 
2p =.08). 
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Figure 19.  Interaction between complexity and the TOH task.   The median 
split for High/Low performers in the TOH task was introduced at 34 moves. 
 
 
Paired sample t-tests reported a significant difference between condition R1 
and R2 in low TOH performers (t(12)= 3.196, p<0.05, ²=.46) but not 
between high TOH performers (t(15)= 1.444, p>0.05, ² =.12). 
 
An independent sample t-test with the grouping variable of TOH 
performance found no significant difference between high and low TOH 
performers in condition R1 (t(27)= -0.485, p>0.05, ²=.01) or condition R2 
(t(27)= 1.659, p>0.05, ² =.09). 
 
As can be seen the difference between simple and complex conditions was 
less for participants who were better (high) performers at the TOH (i.e. took 
the least number of moves to complete the task)  
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Figure 20.  Interaction between complexity and the SOP measure. The 
median split for High/Low performers in the SOP measure was introduced 
at the 29 level. 
 
 
SOP. For the SOP task, a significant effect of SOP (F[1,27] = 5.38; p<0.05, 
2p =.17), complexity (F[1,27] = 10.17; p<0.05, 
2
p =.27), and distraction (F[1,27] 
= 11.46; p<0.05, 2p =.30) was reported, as well as significant interactions 
between complexity x distraction (F[1,27] = 44.46; p<0.001, 
2
p =.62).  No 
interactions were observed between complexity x SOP (F[1,27] = 3.24; 
p>0.05, 2p =.11), distraction x SOP (F[1,27] = .10; p>0.05, 
2
p =.004) or 
complexity x distraction x SOP (F[1,27] = 2.67; p>0.05, 
2
p =.09) were 
reported. 
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Paired sample T-tests reported a significant difference between condition R1 
and R2 in low SOP performers (t(11)= 2.818, p<0.05, ²=.42) but not 
between high SOP performers (t(16)= 1.570, p>0.05, ² =.13). 
 
An independent sample t-test with the grouping variable of SOP 
performance showed a significant difference between high and low SOP 
performers in condition R2 (t(27)= -2.122, p<0.05, ² =.14) but not 
condition R1 (t(27)= -0.714, p>0.05, ² =.02). 
 
3.3.5 Discussion.    These findings support the view that executive 
functions are involved in analogical thinking.  Although it has not been 
demonstrated that specific processes are associated with relational 
responding (such as task-switching, or inhibition); Experiment 6 has never-
the-less demonstrated that a more general approach to cognition (i.e. one 
which takes into account the speed and efficiency of the systems utilized, as 
well as planning and the capability to construct strategies beneficial to the 
outcome of the task
57
) may account for analogical success in the RPA.   It 
has also provided important evidence that executive ability may mediate 
relational responding under conditions of increased complexity (the 
complexity-constraint hypothesis). 
 
                                                 
57
 Flexible representations of goals and intentions being a salient component of our concept 
of executive functioning (Gilbert & Burgess, 2007) in that they represent non-routine 
processes where the ability to recognize and adjust sub-optimal performance in reasoning.    
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This conclusion was reached from the observation that both the SOP and 
TOH tasks were correlated with high relational scoring, whilst participants 
efficient in TOH or SOP appeared less affected by higher levels of 
complexity: their relational scores in complex condition being more 
comparable to the proportion of responses elicited in simple conditions.  
Whilst it is understood that conclusions ascertained from a correlational 
study are risky in that they may be the result of extraneous variables, this 
finding is in-line with the earlier research from Experiments 2-6 which 
reported a moderate-strong contribution of SOP/Verbal Fluency towards 
successful AR in the RPA.  It also supports the work of Chuderska and 
Chuderski (2009) who described planning and strategy as a key attribute in 
AR
58
. 
 
While the potential role of SOP in AR has been described in previous 
experiments
59
, the role of the TOH task can be viewed from two 
perspectives.  Either as a general ability to develop strategies and learn 
rules; or as a „mixed bag‟ of specific processes, such as task-switching, 
inhibition of ineffective behaviour and the focusing of attention.   In either 
case the two main theories of AR, relational-primacy and complexity-
constraint, interpret the contribution of this measure differently.  
  
                                                 
58
 Although this study utilized visually based classical analogies and not scene-based 
analogies.  
59
In the context of EFs the explanation of SOP‟s involvement is likely to fall into two 
categories, representing either more efficient bindings and/or the increased efficiency of the 
executive selection processes 
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Relational primacy theory (Goswami, 1992) presents a hypothesis which is 
based on the creation of schemas (non-automatic actions or strategies that 
have become automatic) to facilitate the resolution of the task: describing 
task-understanding as a performance factor for analogical success.   
Although no connection is ever drawn by Goswami directly connecting her 
theory to Norman and Shallice‟s (1986) conceptualization of the CE, it is 
suggested here that it is self-evident how the formation of new and the 
adaptation of old schema, as described in the SAS model (see chapter 1), 
may be seen as being synonymous with Goswami‟s view of rule-building.   
The processes associated with the TOH task (planning and directed goal 
driven behaviour) are argued to reflect part of the ability to interpret 
experimental demand. 
 
Like Gentner (1983) Goswami‟s (1992) relational primacy theory 
potentially explains the TOH‟s mediatory effect of complexity through 
mapping, which allegedly only occurs when a problem is ambiguous: in this 
case through an increased number of relational-error objects which would 
represent increased levels of task ambiguity.  
 
 It could be that a better understanding of the rules represents the ability to 
determine a better-fit from the options available, however this still requires 
an assessment of the qualities that the base and potential targets possess 
(mapping) and unfortunately Goswami does not describe how mapping may 
take place in accordance with her views on cognitive loading. 
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Halford‟s complexity-constraint theory (1992, 1993, 1998), as well as 
(computational) spreading-neural-activation-models such as LISA (Hummel 
&  Holyoak, 1997, 2003) are more forthcoming in terms of how the TOH 
may be applicable to mediating complexity.   As with relational primacy 
theory, these also highlight the role of the CE in the AR, the TOH task most 
likely representing the ability to ascertain the more optimal paths for task 
success, or the ability to inhibit incorrect modes of thought. The main 
difference being that Halford suggests that children with greater WMC are 
better able to represent more complex relationships during mapping and are 
therefore more likely to be better relational-thinkers..    
 
Both theories may therefore claim to predict the complexity data presented 
in Experiment 1, as well as the TOH‟s/SOP‟s mediation of complexity 
reported here. Goswami, through the difficulty in initially representing the 
problem and how it may be resolved- a greater understanding reducing 
ambiguity among similar (relational-error) objects.  Halford through greater 
levels of WMC and the number of relations accessed simultaneously. 
 
While given the age ranges tested it has been difficult to establish in 
Experiments 1-6 that increased complexity may or may-not load WMC, the 
question must still be asked as to whether ability at the TOH may be 
representative of WMC resources, and therefore interpretable within the 
boundaries of complexity-constraint theory? 
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Despite a relationship no firm relationship being established between WMC 
and the TOH task, it is possible that elements of the TOH measure may be 
considered representative of WMC.   In the past VSWM and executive 
WMC have been strongly associated with the TOH task, as well and the 
ability to plan (Handley, Capon, Copp & Harper, 2002; Numminen, Lehto 
& Ruoppila, 2001; Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell, & Stein, 1999), findings 
which are in-line with the Mr.X effect reported in Experiments 2 and 3. 
 
Reassuringly, for the complexity-constraint perspective Halford (1992, 
1993, 1998) also believes that WMC constraints may be represented by 
SOP, which mediates the number of relationships that may be processed in 
parallel and the efficacy of sequential processing.  Increased processing 
speed having recently been linked to the ability to complete variations of the 
TOH task (Sorel, & Pennequin, 2008), something which is supported by the 
SOP findings from Experiments 2, 3 and 6, despite no significant 
association being observed between SOP and TOH here. 
 
It was therefore considered possible that the interactions between the TOH 
and SOP tasks and complexity might be interpreted as being representative, 
at least in part, of the thus-far unidentified WMC constraint effect on AR 
postulated by Halford (1992, 1993, 1998). 
 
Inhibition and task switching. It was predicted that inhibitory skill or 
switch cost would be directly associated with RPA performance, either of 
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which would provide evidence for the selective control of attention within 
WM. However, this was not the case.   
 
Despite this, it should be noted that the possible lack of prepotent-responses 
(which the STOP IT task is designed to measure) had already been predicted 
in Experiment 4.  Whilst the risk of Type I or II errors is always great when 
interpreting null findings, this could indicate that the selection of relational 
objects in the RPA is not as automatic as has been previously suggested 
(Morrison et al., 2010) and may be more controlled.  In which case featural 
responding may be less about prepotent distraction (as suggested by 
Richland et al., 2004, 2006) than about a failure to fully comprehend the 
goal of the task (Goswami, 1992), and correctly inhibit irrelevant 
conclusions.  Future research should readdress this issue. 
 
3.3.6 Conclusion.   Executive control has been proposed as an 
explanation for the pattern of relational responding reported in Experiment 
1, both through the functionality of skills such as planning and goal 
maintenance, as well as computational aspects such as processing efficiency 
and the speed of EFs. 
 
Although the role of inhibitory skill has been strongly indicated in previous 
research (see Experiment 4) the current research remains inconclusive as to 
whether this may be applicable to the paradigm being used here (i.e. the 
RPA).  It is suggested that one direction for future research explores this 
possible role, specifically determining whether featural relationships 
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represent a heuristic (non-analytical) form of response, or whether, as 
suggested in Experiments 4 and 6, inhibition is more actively involved.   
The implications of this experiment are further discussed in the thesis 
conclusion (chapter 4). 
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Chapter Four 
 
4.0 Discussion 
 
4.0.1 Summary of Experiments 1-6.  Experiment 1 reported a 
pattern of data similar to Richland et al. (2004, 2006) suggesting that 
relational responding was arbitrated by conditions of increased complexity 
and/or distraction.   Experiment 2 compared psychometric measurements of 
IQ and WM as predictors of AR.  Results suggested that although WMC 
(from the Mr.X measure) appeared to be significantly contributing to AR, 
IQ appeared to be the greatest contributor to relational responding.  
Experiment 3 extended the research on WM‟s perceived involvement using 
additional measures which measured storage and processing roles. The 
results suggested that the constraint effects that had been demonstrated in 
the previous experiment were more likely to be related to processing than 
storage aspects of the WM model.   Verbal fluency was also suggested as a 
contributing factor to both AR and WM performance, increased efficiency 
being indicative of increased relational responding. 
 
Although Experiment 5 failed to show significant WMC effects, 
Experiments 4 and 6 provided further evidence to support the notion that 
differences in the processing capacities of WM could account for individual 
differences in task performance.  Experiment 4 suggested that although 
inhibitory skill might be involved in AR, it was unlikely to involve 
prepotent forms of response.  Furthermore, Experiment 6 showed that 
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executive planning, processing speed and efficiency were strongly 
associated with AR.     
 
4.0.2 Relational primacy and complexity constraint theory.  By 
highlighting the role fluid intelligence and executive processes may play in 
the resolution of analogical scene-based problems where the similarity-
constraint is recognized and understood by the participant prior to testing, 
this thesis has demonstrated that the relational primacy theory (Goswami, 
1992) may not be an adequate explanation of AR. 
 
Relational primacy.  Despite understanding the analogies used in the task, 
as evidenced by both the high success rate in Experiment 2-6 and by 
Richland et al.‟s claims that the similarity-constraint is capable of being 
represented (as claimed by Richland et al. 2004, 2006, 2010); children 
between the ages of 5 and 10 consistently elicited a pattern of relational 
responses that were indicative of competing response-stimuli influencing 
the mapping (comparison) stage of the reasoning process.  Thus an extreme 
knowledge approach, i.e. one that proposes that all a child needs to 
successfully reason analogically is to recognize the underlying analogy, is 
insufficient to explain the data presented in Experiments 1-6. 
 
This conclusion is partly due to the fact that the relational primacy theory 
was never fully developed to take into account the ambiguity of relational 
problems. Formulated in the early 1990‟s, Goswami‟s approach was 
advanced almost entirely as a reaction to the traditional structuralist 
267 
argument that young children were unable to reason analogically.  As such it 
was highly successful, providing almost insurmountable evidence that even 
the youngest ages can and do reason relationally, so long as they understood 
the task and what was required of them.   However, resultant criticism 
surrounding the theories inability to describe how distracting featural stimuli 
may affect mapping, or what defines ambiguity, has meant that it has been 
increasingly left behind in an age where information processing theories 
seek to provide increasingly accurate computational accounts of the 
reasoning process. 
 
In defence of relational primacy one of the greatest problems in the 
literature has been to assume that the theory does not take information 
processing into account.  In fact it does, asserting that mapping is only 
necessary when the analogy is unclear; individual differences in analogical 
success being explained by performance factors mediating the ability to 
form abstract schemas appropriate for the resolution of the problem.   Such a 
conceptualization is based on the work of Norman and Shallice (1988) and 
Piaget et al (1977) and it is likely that such functions relate to a child‟s 
general reasoning ability, fluid intelligence and executive WMC, all of 
which play a role in determining relevance and the division and selection of 
appropriate (relevant) responses.  
 
If this is supported then children will construct an initial schema for the 
RPA during training with individual differences determining how well the 
overall goals of the task are understood from the rules provided.  This 
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schema will then be developed across the task to accommodate the 
individual base scene before being challenged in the target scene by 
competing forms of response (objects which share a high number of 
relations with the base query object increasing ambiguity). 
 
From this evidence it is suggested that if relational primacy theory is 
developed to better incorporate the latter-stages
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 of reasoning (mapping) in 
circumstances where the similarity-constraint may be fully understood; then 
such a perspective may, in the future, prove to be a valuable contributor to 
the field, beyond its already influential work in providing evidence for 
young-reasoners (chapter 1).    
 
Complexity-constraint theory. Given the above it must therefore be 
considered whether complexity-constraint theory, which predicts that higher 
WMC equates to the degree of complexity that can be processed in parallel 
(Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford, 1992; 1993; 1998; Halford et al., 2002) 
is more explanatory of the mapping process than relational primacy.   
 
In this thesis a correlation between WMC and relational responding has 
been indicated in Experiments 2,3,4,5 and 6.  This provided evidence which 
could be construed as supporting both relational primacy (through task 
understanding) and complexity-constraint (through capacity limits) theories.  
                                                 
60
 I.e. by moving away from a stance which suggests that AR will always be successful 
when the similarity-constraint is fully understood; incorporating the possibility that errors 
may be made when candidate relations compete.  
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However, important evidence for the latter was missing, specifically crucial 
WMC/complexity interactions.  
 
It has since been argued that SOP, verbal fluency, and the efficiency of 
executive systems may represent Halford‟s concept of WMC (Halford, 
1992, 1993, 1998) by placing limitations on reasoning.  These constraints 
may account for the IQ-complexity interactions reported in Experiments 2, 3 
and 6, in that those participants who are more efficient processors are more 
likely to choose relational forms of response in conditions where complexity 
is higher.    
 
Early in the thesis it was argued that the children tested in this series of 
experiments may have passed the ability threshold to process ternary 
relations (Halford, 1993, 1998, Halford et al., 2004).  This ability to 
maintain and process ternary relations (the developmental milestone being 
described by Ratterman and Gentner (1998) and Halford (1998) as taking 
place around the age of 5) could explain the lack of significant WMC-
complexity interactions in Experiments 2 and 3; as well as a lack of 
significant individual contributions to relational responding from WM 
measures other than Mr.X. children can represent the relationships involved 
in “chasing being chased” ergo increased WMC may not be as beneficial to 
older children. 
 
However, Halford himself states that only 50% of children may be able to 
process such problems at the age of five and that this ability grows during 
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childhood (Halford, 1993, 1998), meaning that it was by no means certain 
that individual differences in WMC were constraining the problem.   
 
It is therefore proposed that the data presented thus far supports processing 
models such as those described by Halford et al, which allow the possibility 
of processing constraints being present in the latter stages of the mapping 
process.  It is suggested that the CE plays a directorial role whereby the 
control of attention results in the selection or inhibition of relevant meanings 
in regards to the goal.  As suggested earlier increased efficiency (i.e. verbal 
fluency and processing speed) appears to facilitate the reasoning process, 
allowing the CE to establish and reject bindings faster and more accurately 
(as in Hummel & Holyoak‟s (1997) LISA model)61, as well as possibly 
placing a limitation on the speed in which relations may be processed in 
parallel. 
 
Summary:   Relational primacy and complexity-constraint theories 
encompass different focuses on early and late stage processing in analogical 
problem solving.  As has been shown (chapter 1) the two theories possess a 
number of individual standpoints that make them unique, however besides 
from Goswami‟s statement that knowledge of the similarity-constraint is all 
that is needed to reason successfully, the chief difference between the two 
may be reduced to Goswami‟s (1992) belief that additional complexity 
should not represent an additional cognitive load for the reasoner. 
                                                 
61
 Interestingly high verbal fluency measures may also indicate stronger, more-established 
connections allow more efficient chunks of data to be recalled, reducing the processing 
requirements. 
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As previously noted (chapter 1), the term „complexity‟ is perceived 
differently by different theorists, however the RPA (which follows 
Gentner‟s (1983) and Halford‟s (Halford, 1993, 1998) views of complexity) 
relies on the concept that the more descriptive axes exist, the more 
relationships are needed to be maintained in parallel and the greater the 
processing power required to select the correct response. 
 
Despite this, recent studies investigating the processing weight of 
conceptual „chunks‟ (containing multiple dimensions of bound arguments) 
are surprising in that they suggest that bound information and the 
conceptualisation of groups of relationships may not be as resource 
demanding as might have been imagined (Baddeley, 2007; Baddeley & 
Hitch, 2006).  The WM system having been shown to be capable of holding 
reasonably complex bindings (Allen et al, 2007; Vogel, Woodman & Luck, 
2001): meaning that increased complexity may not necessarily equate to a 
greater processing demand.    
 
In short, the practical value of considering complexity as being demanding 
of WMC resources may be considered limited if the demands of the task do 
not tax the overall processing capacity of the child.   Equally, if the child has 
passed a developmental milestone which means they have sufficient 
cognitive resources to handle effects of distraction and/or complexity- then 
interactions may be so small that their precise measurement, as well as their 
value as an indicator of analogical success, will require highly detailed 
computational modelling.  It remains to be shown whether extraneous task 
272 
demands on measures of analogical reasoning such as the RPA, may be able 
to reduce WMC to a level where performance is significantly reduced. 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
Overall, the present study has helped define the role of WM and fluid 
intelligence in analogical thought, offering support for theories which focus 
on the active processing of relations maintained in conscious thought.  
 
Although it is suggested that the relational primacy theory be expanded 
upon to increase late-stage reasoning processes in order to address the 
concerns of modern structuralists, these results do not clearly distinguish 
whether the relational primacy or complexity-constraint theory may be seen 
as applicable to the current study.  The present findings failing to address 
the WM requirements imposed on reasoning through an increased number 
of contextual bindings in relational objects (the core element which 
separates the two theories).  Further research will be required to ascertain 
the true loadings of relational objects in the RPA, wherein the proportion of 
descriptive relations is manipulated against interference from dual-tasks, 
 
It is still not clear what role the slave-systems of WM play in the analogical 
process when the demand of the (scene based) problem is within the 
boundaries of the constraint theoretically imposed by WMC on AR; 
although the current research suggests that the VSSP and PL may play a 
secondary role to higher-order executive decision making processes 
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associated with fluid-intelligence, the central executive and/or the episodic 
buffer.    
 
Such a theory is consistent with the idea of selective attention and executive 
control outlined by Baddeley (1996
b
; 2000) and Norman and Shallice 
(1986).  For these theories, active attentional processes (EFs) attend to 
meaningful information (i.e. believed relevant to overall goals) held in WM. 
Such a perspective is in accordance with one of the central observations of 
this study, in that cognitive abilities such as the CE and fluid-intelligence, as 
well as the overall efficiency of these systems, have been associated with 
success in scene based analogies-providing important implications for both 
the modelling of the reasoning process, as well as the perceived role of 
WMC.     
 
It is speculated that the mediatory effect of Mr.X reported in Experiments 2 
and 3 may fall into one of these facilitatory categories- the task possibly 
being more demanding than other WM measures in terms of its 
requirements for faster, more efficient processes- but this by no means 
certain. 
 
It is also conceivable that Mr.X is a more sensitive measurement of WMC: 
potentially being more demanding than other WM tasks and therefore more 
likely to discriminate smaller differences in a child‟s WMC.   Further 
research is recommended, particularly in determining whether the 
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contribution of Mr.X to relational responding is predominantly due to a 
global WMC resource, or a visuo-spatial processing capacity.   
 
 Certainly the concept that visual storage and processing limits constrain 
visual analogical problems is enticing, however given the current findings it 
is considered more probable that Mr.X possesses unique functions also 
associated with the resolution of scene based analogies, rather than the 
ability to maintain and manipulate information. 
 
Regarding functionality, although processing speed and verbal fluency have 
been consistently shown to be associated with analogical success, it is not 
argued that these factors are the only predictors of AR.   Despite both almost 
certainly representing the speed at which executive processes can operate 
(facilitating complex thought and reducing the loading of the VSSP and PL 
by reducing the time information has to be maintained) as well as the 
strength of bindings separating semantic concepts (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003), efficiency components are alone unlikely to represent the 
decision making process underlying processing.  There is supporting 
evidence to suggest that while important to the overall functioning of the CE 
and integral to reasoning (Baddeley, 2008), speed alone is insufficient to 
explain most deductive processes (Bayliss, Jarrold, Baddeley, Gunn, & 
Leigh, 2005; Colom et al., 2004; Kyllonen, & Stephens, 1990).    
 
However, such factors are likely to contribute towards the concept of the 
hypothesized constraints imposed by a maturationally developing capacity 
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as described by Halford (1992, 1993, 1998): Halford specifically indicating 
that developmental increases in processing speed may be one of the factors 
involved in this constraint. 
 
Despite this prediction, Richland et al. (2004, 2006, 2010) and Morrison et 
al. (2010) have recently hypothesised that the capacity limitations may also 
be defined by inhibitory skill.  Yet the current research has been unable to 
find evidence to support such a suggestion, it being argued that  the 
childhood development of processing efficiency may potentially equally 
account for Richland et al.‟s (2004, 2006) observation that the presence of a 
distracter object reduces relational responding.  Cognitive factors beyond 
inhibition possibly underlying the decision making process (such as those 
determining relevance) rather than the dismissal of prepotent responses.  
 
Although a traditional storage and processing approach to WMC is arguably 
not the most appropriate framework to explain relational responding, other 
methodologies have been more productive: particularly those centring on 
executive functionality of the WM model.     
 
For example, viewing the WM concept of capacity as defined by Halford 
(1998) as a set of constraints imposed by faculties which aid decision 
making and planning/strategy development, has allowed us to accommodate 
both Goswami‟s early (1992) “facilitation gradient” hypothesis as well as 
Gentner‟s concept of late-stage processing.  Thus, the passive representation 
of similarity (when analogies have been successfully represented in short-
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term memory) has been side-lined in favour of more active executive 
decision making once representation has taken place.   
 
It is hoped that future research will be able to further this insight, by more 
clearly defining the roles component processes of the CE may or may not 
play in AR. 
 
4.1.1 Critical evaluation of the RPA.  Although correlations 
between relational responding and WMC were obtained, no interactions 
between WM measures and complexity/distraction were ever reported in 
Experiments 2 and 3.   This lack of data may be interpreted by both 
relational primacy and complexity-constraint theories which suggest that 
children (of the ages tested here) possess the cognitive ability comprehend 
the demands of the task (Goswami, 1992) or represent the binary or ternary 
relation used (Halford, 1992, 1993, 1998).   However, it does not explain 
why complexity effects have been consistently reported in age ranges above 
10-11 years using other analogical paradigms such as the people-piece-
analogies
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 (Cho et al., 2007; Morrison et al., 2001; Viskontas et al., 2004), 
nor does it explain the observation from this series of experiments that the 
                                                 
62
 As discussed in chapter 1, the concept of complexity in the PPA is hypothetically the 
same as the RPA, in that the number of relationships attended to defines complexity.  
However, unlike the RPA the PPA is a classical paradigm, and an increased number of 
descriptive relationships in the mapping of terms is viewed by Morrison et al (2001) to 
make the analogy easier.  A line is therefore drawn between actual complexity of the 
problem (how many similar dimensions the terms share) and the number of items being 
processed (the number of relationships required to be attended); complex analogies being 
defined by those with low actual complexity, and high attended complexity (requiring the 
participant to select the correct relationship from a number of candidates according to 
experimental demand.  This raises an important question as to whether the two views of 
complexity are compatible. 
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featural score in the RPA is reduced under conditions of complexity, and not 
increased as predicted by Waltz et al. (2000).  
 
One possible explanation for this is that complexity, as presented in the 
RPA, may not load WMC enough for WMC-complexity interactions to be 
observable; a claim similar to the one made by Morrison, Holyoak and 
Truong (2001) regarding the original Markman and Gentner (1993) scene-
based cross-mapping paradigm. 
 
Establishing that processing speed and efficiency may be a possible 
candidates for the maturational constraint effect indicated by Richland et al. 
(2004, 2006) and Halford (1998) and not inhibition (see chapter 1), leaves 
the important question unanswered as to whether the RPA was indeed 
measuring what was originally intended.  For this reason a critical 
evaluation of the RPA is necessary.  
 
Repeated measures design.  When utilizing correlational methodologies, 
such as those in Experiments 2, 3 and 6 which associated WMC with AR, it 
is important to consider alternative ways in which the primary variable may 
interact with the experiment and experimental environment. In the RPA one 
possible WM factor not associated with the primary manipulating of 
relational objects is remembering the relational object you chose last.  In the 
RPA there are 20 objects with 4 conditions, all of which use the same 
images in more or less the same locations.  This means that if a child does 
the complete RPA in one sitting they will encounter each problem four 
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times.   If a child does this over the course of one or more sessions, those 
who have higher WMC might perform better, and crucially negate any 
complexity factor in favour of previous response recall.   The RPA might 
then become a test of remembering previous responses and not complexity.  
The alternative is to conduct the RPA as a between groups paradigm, which 
has already been shown to significantly reduce the statistical power of the 
task (especially in featural analyses) or to leave ample time between 
sessions.    An easier method might be to introduce more problems than the 
current 20 using the between conditions design.   
 
Despite these recommendations it should be noted that a visuo-spatial STS 
(in this case representing the ability to remember location and type of 
objects) was not reported in Experiment 3.  However, the ability to hold 
these objects in mind against interference may have been indicated through 
the Mr.X effect (a visuo-spatial WMC measure).     It is suggested that 
performance comparisons between repeated and between measures designs 
be conducted to determine any possible differences in relational or featural 
scoring. 
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Figure 21. Same or Different? Base (left) and Target (right) scenes showing 
an almost identical featural object (truck) on the top and a non-identical 
„transformed‟ featural object (boy) on the bottom.  It is anticipated 
participants might have a harder timer relating the boy as the same boy in 
the base scene. 
 
 
Reduced distraction.   It is uncertain what role distraction is playing in the 
RPA.  Many featural distracters represent conceptual binding, that is so say 
that they are not identical to the base query item and have been 
„transformed‟ into more relational forms of response (i.e. “cat walking” 
rather than “cat sitting”).   Complicating the desired distraction effect, it is 
not always clear that the item in the target is the same as the item in the base 
(see Figure 21).   A proportion of featural objects are identical.  Oberauer 
(2005) suggested that base objects that are held in mind may require 
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inhibition if they are displayed in the target scene, so it is logical to assume 
that the inhibitory demand of a problem may be being increased by making 
it more like the target object.  Further research is needed in order to deduce 
the inhibitory demands of certain types of distracter item.  
 
Reduced complexity.  According to Halford (1992, 1993, 1998) as well as 
Gentner‟s taxonomy of relations (Gentner et al., 1993), a ternary relation is 
defined by the presence of an interacting relationship consisting of three 
arguments.  In the RPA this appears as two extra objects on either side of 
the relation one.   Unfortunately because an end object in the ternary 
relationship can only ever have one relational argument (chased or chasing) 
this means that the response is always the middle of the relationship.   There 
is some concern that chunking the term “being chased by and chasing” may 
be reduced into “middle”, reducing the WMC load for AR.    This load may 
be further reduced if the child works out that the solution is always the 
middle response, thus making complex conditions easier.  Hence, WMC 
may be correlated with the ability to deduce the task demands from a few 
simple trials, without the need for further processing. 
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Figure 22.  Location of relational objects in the RPA as a percentage. 
 
 
Signposting.   One possible reason for the reduced variance in the complex 
conditions and a high proportion of relational responses is that relational 
responses were signposted.  Already discussed in detail in chapter 2, eye 
tracking experiments have shown that meaningful interactions on a page 
fixate attention more than isolated objects (Henderson et al, 1999). As 
relational objects attract longer cycles of attention in the RPA (Gordon & 
Moser, in press), this makes it more likely that a relational response may be 
selected.   A further issue is that complex relationships are always presented 
in „threes‟ (compared to „twos‟) taking up a large proportion of space on the 
page, thus increasing the likeliness that they are the desirable form of 
response (see potential distracters below).  
 
Potential distractors.  Although it was claimed that the size and location of 
the 5 objects in each scene was controlled (Richland et al., 2004), some 
objects are clearly disproportionately represented, no consideration 
appearing to have been given to object size, appearance or location (see 
below).     Whilst a larger, unusual or more central relational object (for 
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example) may or may not necessarily be the correct relational solution to the 
problem the combination of any or all of the factors mentioned here may 
have made certain objects more or less noticeable (i.e. a distracter) resulting 
in some problems being unintentionally easier or harder.   
 
Control of location.   Although the RPA has a good left-right distribution of 
targets, the majority of relational responses are presented in the middle of 
the page (see Figure 22 above), potentially priming a child where to look.   
During testing, children frequently responded, with “it‟s always in the 
centre,” (referring to the item location not the relational objects location in 
the ternary pattern).   Obviously, having the relational responses signposted 
in this manner (see complexity) may reduce task difficulty.  Conversely, 
moving the featural object to a similar location within the target scene as it 
inhabited in the base may increase its distraction effect. 
 
Control of object size.    Some objects in the RPA are observably larger than 
others, which may lead them to be recognised more quickly.    Eye-tracking 
experiments have previously shown that larger objects are more likely to fix 
attention, and are easier to locate at high speeds (Djamasbi et al., 2011). 
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Figure 23. Example of a complex image from the RPA with poorly defined, 
over-complex visual boundaries 
 
Control of appearance.  Eye-tracking experiments by Henderson and 
Ferreira (2004) showed that items of interest were more likely to attract 
attention.   Some objects in the RPA task stood out, many were animals, 
leading to children to comment on the number of rabbits and dogs in the 
paradigm (the dog was often the solution or the base query item), and some 
were unorthodox (a man with no hair feeding a bird was commented upon 
frequently).  Any task dealing with potential effects of inhibition would 
need to reduce the background semantic „noise‟ of such stimuli to make the 
effects of experimental stimuli (featural responses) stand out.  
 
Drawing style.  Whilst it may appear trivial to criticise a design because it is 
hand drawn or over-complex (see Figure 23), both in fact make recognition 
and selection difficult whilst also making it harder for the researcher to see 
what is precisely being pointed at (i.e. is the brush being pointed to, or the 
clown-doll?).  It is important in today‟s age of computer aided design that 
such factors are presented with clear precise designs, or in the case of 
computerized tasks: more forced choice (i.e. highlighting the entire object 
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and not just the sleeve) in order to remove the possibility of guesses or 
ambiguous responses which are concealed by the finger (i.e. pointing at the 
clowns brush rather than the clown).  An alternative way to alleviate this is 
for the child to verbally state what they pointed at after selection (this may 
load WM further so a control study using the original methodology may 
have to be used)   
 
4.2 Directions for future research 
 
Manipulation of the similarity constraint. Quasi analogies have been 
around for some time (Levinson & Carpenter, 1974). However at the time of 
writing this paradigm has not been applied to scene based problems.  By 
design the RPA does not account for the recognition process underlying the 
similarity-constraint (relational primacy theory), but highlights the query 
object in the base scene with an arrow and relying on the child‟s ability to 
maintain the instruction “See? they are the same but look different.”   As 
Richland herself recognizes (Richland et al., 2006) the word “the same” can 
be considered ambiguous.  
 
One way to reduce task ambiguity is to give the child a verbal analogy 
problem before the presentation of the base. i.e. “what is being chased and 
chasing?”  When the child has identified the correct item, the child would 
then be directed to find the same similarity in the target scene.   
Theoretically (see Richland et al., 2004, 2006) this would not make the task 
any easier, as the same distractions/levels of complexity would still exist.  
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Richland et al. (2006) argues that children doing the RPA always knew the 
similarity-constraint. However, it is predicted that that by making the 
similarity-constraint explicit in each scene (i.e. removing the relational 
primacy aspect altogether) performance might be increased.  
 
Increase potential distraction load in the RPA.  Following the guidelines 
suggested above, it should be possible to construct a new version of the 
RPA.   This may help us to better comprehend the overall load the current 
task places on the reasoning processes and allow individual variables, such 
as increased size, location, detail, type etc., to be more accurately 
manipulated in order to determine their potential demands on processing 
resources. 
 
One possible example of how further research may be conducted is to 
compare the inhibitory demands and RT‟s associated with transformed 
featural (i.e. a cat sitting in the base scene compared to a cat 
walking/different type of cat in the target) compared to non-transformed 
(using the same, identical image in base and target scenes) featural objects.   
It is hypothesized that objects held in mind which are closer in appearance 
to the image of the base featural object might place greater emphasis on the 
inhibitory system than objects which share a semantic concept, but are 
visually dissimilar.   The reasoning being that that there would be greater 
level of interference for more similar objects simply because the featural 
object is concurrent, whereas a non-visible relationship has to be retrieved 
via a developed strategy.   
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Understanding how similarity may affect inhibitory processes would be of 
significant interest for future research.   
 
Eye tracking.   Gordon and Moser‟s (2007) eye-tracking paradigm has 
provided a useful platform from which to understand the value of individual 
responses in the RPA; particularly how the comparison process works.  
However, the paradigm has limited explanatory value for the current 
research in that it was both centred around an older (undergraduate) 
population and the whole analogical process (saccades and the movement 
from target to base rather than focus on individual relational objects) rather 
than which objects act as a fixation point.  A comparison between such 
points in older and younger children, highlighting any changes which may 
be present might help us understand the reasoning differences in maturation 
reported in this thesis, whilst also allowing further insight into the appeal of 
distracter and other forms of objects mentioned above.  
 
Comparison of analogical tasks.  One of the biggest failings in AR has 
been the lack of best practice in the field, particularly in terminology and 
understanding of the theoretical „glue‟ that binds different analogical tasks 
together.   It is suggested that in order to test the concept of analogical skill, 
WMC/STS comparisons between a range of widely used analogical tasks 
should be conducted to establish if similar operations are involved in 
different forms of task (such as the People Piece Analogies, or forms of 
classical or problem analogies), and whether analogical ability is 
transferrable between measures.  
287 
 
Repeat dual task measures.  It is suggested that the dual task methodology 
of Experiment 5 be repeated, with different forms of visuo-spatial, verbal 
and executive interference (i.e. instead of RNG, which children found too 
hard, verbal fluency tasks such as “name as many animals as possible”).  
Ascertaining which dual-task might best represent the executive process or 
processes shared by AR (if any) would provide important insight into the 
functions involved in the resolution of the RPA.   
 
Test older and younger children.  Richland et al. (2004, 2006) examined a 
wider age range in her original experiments.  Although children younger 
than 5 are difficult to test effectively due to issues surrounding experimental 
understanding, simpler WM and executive measures might still be 
employed to determine a child‟s ability.  Possibly answering questions as to 
whether individual differences in WMC may constrain relational responding 
(as predicted by Halford, 1998), or whether the same factors exist as has 
been observed in their older peers (i.e. fluid intelligence mediates relational 
responding). 
 
Use additional WMC measures.   Expanding the range of executive tasks 
(to include Executive VSSP and PL measures outside of the AWMA) would 
increase our understanding of how the modules of WMC interact with 
aspects of the RPA such as complexity or distraction.   As mentioned, the 
Mr.X effect reported since Experiment 2, combined with the lack of other 
WM data from other measures suggests that Mr.X possesses certain 
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attributes necessary for the solution of scene based problems.  It may be that 
other WM measures from other batteries are able to better establish the 
involvement of visuo-spatial or phonological capacities (executive or STS).   
In the current research the potential involvement of other WMC measures 
(other than Mr.X) was indicated in Experiment 3, however the relationship 
between the other WMC measure (listening recall task) and relational 
responding failed to achieve significance.   
 
In order to further test the hypothesis that Mr.X is either particularly 
sensitive to WMC due to its high executive and storage demands, and/or 
that it requires specific executive processes in common with that of the 
RPA: the addition of further WM measures is recommended, specifically 
ones that are equally (or more) demanding to children of the age ranges 
tested.    Such research could also provide additional evidence for whether 
the capacity demonstrated by Mr.X is visuo-spatial specific or more global 
in nature (as has been hypothesized here). 
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Appendix A: Ethical procedures and consent form 
 
Contact phase.  Schools were contacted using on cold-call basis, either by 
email or phone.  If the school was interested in participating a meeting was 
arranged face to face with that schools head-teacher wherein the research 
was explained.  Consent forms were then left at the school for review and 
the school given no less than 24 hours to review all the documents and 
discuss the research with staff, before a second interview was arranged.  The 
second interview consisted of a question and answer session with the 
Principle Investigator, at the end of which the school could consent to take 
part or decide to withdraw from the process.  
 
Consent phase. If the school agreed to take part, the consent procedure 
would begin.  Experiments used a two tier consent system wherein the first 
tear (opt out) „Head-teacher consent‟ was the preferred method of 
recruitment.    The second tear (opt in) was made available if the head-
teacher preferred.  In both cases letters were sent out the parents/guardians 
of all children involved informing them of the participation of their child‟s 
school and giving them the option to opt in/out respectively.   Parents were 
given at least a week to return their forms, although this recruitment period 
normally ran between 2 weeks and a month depending on how the school 
wished to proceed.  The consent forms used follow at the end of Appendix 
A.  This was adapted for parents/teachers and for each experiment 
performed, by altering the bold text. 
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Data collection phase. All children were individually asked if they wanted 
to take part prior to testing.  The only personal information taken was the 
child‟s name, age, school and class which collectively made up what 
became the child‟s Personal Information or PI.   For each child their PI was 
then randomly associated with a unique number known as the „Personal 
Identification Code‟ or „PIC‟ which had been randomly generated prior to 
the experiment.    Thus, the only way to identify a participant by name either 
post-testing or during the analysis later was the PI (enabling ethical security 
and un-biased anonymous analysis). 
 
Data protection: All PI was stored on a 128-bit encrypted, password 
protected Excel file.  This was stored in a fingerprint accessed laptop keyed 
to the Principle Investigator only.   Only one file was made per experiment 
and all passwords consisted of 7 randomly generated numbers suffixed with 
a letter (denoting which experiment it related to).  The original hardcopy 
paper version of the PI was then destroyed after the recruitment phase.   
 
Backup data of the encrypted PI file was done once a month, replacing a 
duplicate PI file at an unspecified location in a locked cabinet.  Passwords 
for the PI files were stored in a separate undisclosed secure location with no 
reference as to what they were.  
 
Hardcopy data collected (such as WISC scores) was stored in secure 
locations in a locked room, and used the digital PIC system.   
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Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Project:  ‘Working Memory and Analogical Reasoning’ 
Principle Investigator: Adam Robson. BSc (Hons), MEd. 
 
Information Sheet 
Please ensure you have read and initialled each page.  
 
 
1.  PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: 
 
Your School is being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose 
of this study is to investigate the relationship between children’s memory 
and their analogical reasoning ability. 
 
Analogical reasoning is the ability to find a comparison between two 
dissimilar objects.  It facilitates learning by allowing us to understand 
difficult concepts, solve novel problems, discover new facts and make 
scientific discoveries.    
 
A better understanding of the processes behind analogy could determine 
how we comprehend our children to think, and perhaps how they might be 
taught.  As a result, analogical reasoning is thought to be crucial in a child’s 
development.  
 
337 
Your School qualifies for this study because it contains any number of 
children aged between 5 and 12.  
 
2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: 
 
This study is being performed for research purposes.  It is part of the PhD 
Psychology programme at Durham University, England.  It is intended that 
approximately 50 participants be enrolled for this particular phase of the 
project, however it is not necessary or intended that all of these be 
recruited from your school.   
 
Each child participating in this study will conduct two one-to-one sessions 
with the experimenter lasting approximately 20-30 minutes each, 
depending on the individual child.   Each child will conduct only one session 
per day, with a gap of at least 1 day in between sessions.  The specific 
days upon which each session takes place will be at the discretion of the 
individual teacher involved and/or head teacher.    
 
Sessions will consist of 2 measurements of Analogical reasoning ability, 
and a short battery of tasks looking at executive functions of working 
memory, namely: a) Inhibition b) task switching c) attentional focus and d) 
memory refreshing/updating. 
 
In total the estimated contact time for each child will therefore be 40-50 
minutes on average, after which the Childs participation will be considered 
complete. 
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All tasks used have been specifically designed for children.  No physical 
measurements will be taken, and the majority of the answers given will be 
of a verbal nature.  Some pencil based tasks will be used. 
 
3. COSTS: 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary; no costs or reimbursements 
to either the individual, Parent/guardian’s or the school will be incurred or 
appropriated through participation. 
 
4. POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS: 
 
This Study is considered Minimal Risk by the Principle Investigator: the 
definition for Minimal risk being that the probability and magnitude of harm 
or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of 
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological tasks. 
  
Although this study is non-invasive the Principle Investigator is aware that 
the potential Risks for the children participating in the study may include 
task-stress and/or anxiety.  If this occurs, testing will stop immediately and 
the teacher overseeing the Childs class will be consulted, possibly resulting 
in the child being withdrawn from the project.  The likelihood and severity of 
such an event are considered low. 
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5. POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
 
Although there is no direct benefit to either the participants or the schools 
involved it is hoped that this research with further the scientific 
understanding underlying children’s analogical reasoning ability and its 
development.    
 
6. ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION / VOLUNTARY 
PARTICIPATION: 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and the only alternative is not 
to participate. If you decide not to participate, your decision will not affect 
the school or any of the individuals concerned.   
 
In addition, any new information that develops during the course of the 
study which might affect your decision to continue to participate will be 
given to you immediately.  A signed copy of this consent form will be 
offered to you for your records as the head of the school/institution (i.e. 
head teacher). A simple, written summary of the project will be 
offered/made available to you following the project, should you desire it.   
 
 
7. INCLUSION CRITERIA 
 
This study operates an equal rights policy.  Children will not be excluded on 
the basis of gender, disability, or ethnicity.  However, children participating 
in this study must be able to speak English well enough in order for them to 
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be able to understand and follow instruction.  Children must also be able to 
hold (and use) a pencil.    
 
The principle investigator reserves the right to exclude any data from the 
study which he believes has been impaired due to language ability and/or 
physical or mental difficulties. 
 
8. CONFIDENTIALITY: 
 
The identity of participants (including which classes they attend/attended), 
as well as the information obtained during the course of this study (the 
research record) will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by law.  In 
addition to this, the participants identities will be kept confidential in any 
publication of the results of this study.   However the research record may 
be reviewed by government agencies, individuals who are involved in or 
authorized to supervise or audit the research, the Ethics Advisory sub 
committee at Durham University, and the Principle Investigator himself.  
 
 
9. TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION: 
 
As the contact person for this study you may discontinue the participation of 
your school/institution or any individual or class therein.  A child may also 
be withdrawn from the study by the parent/guardian, the relevant class 
teacher, or by the child him/herself.  Withdrawal may take place at any time 
without penalty or loss of benefits to which the person or institution 
terminating participation is otherwise entitled.  Withdrawal means the right 
341 
to insist that all data previously provided by the child, school or class, be 
removed from the dataset. 
 
The principle investigator reserves the right to withdraw participation of the 
school, class or individual at any time. 
 
10. DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS: 
 
None. 
11. CONTACT PERSON(s): 
 
If you have any questions about this research, or want to discuss any 
possible study related injuries please contact the Principle Investigator 
Adam Robson at: 
 
Telephone number: Mob:   
Email Address:   
Mail Address:  Department of Psychology.   
Ebsworth building 
University of Durham, Queen's Campus.  
University Boulevard 
Thornaby, Stockton-on-Tees. TS17 6BH 
 
Alternatively if you still you still have questions regarding the study and do 
not wish to speak to the Principle investigator, then you may discuss them 
with the person supervising the research: Dr. John Adams by telephone: 
0191 334 0108 or email: j.w.adams@dur.ac.uk 
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12. SIGNATURE: 
 
The project has been given advisory approval by the Ethics Advisory Sub-
Committee at Durham University. 
 
By signing the line below I have read and understood the above 
information, initialling each page (including this one) as is required, and 
acknowledge that I have had an opportunity to ask questions regarding the 
study. 
 
Teachers Signature: 
 
NAME: __________________________ TITLE ____________________  DATE:  _______ 
 
 
Researchers Signature: 
 
NAME: __________________________ TITLE ____________________  DATE:  _______ 
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Appendix B: Standardized instructions for the RPA (Richland 2006) 
 
“Are you ready? We are going to play the picture game. Let me 
show you how it works. On every page there are two pictures like 
this. There is a certain pattern in the top picture, and the same pattern 
happens in the bottom picture, but it looks different. Let me show 
you what I mean on this page. See up in the top picture, there is a 
bigger boy and a smaller boy. This is the bigger boy, and this is the 
smaller boy [the experimenter pointed to each object as it was 
described]. Now in the bottom picture, there is a bigger bear and a 
smaller bear [the experimenter pointed]. See, the same pattern 
happens in both, but it looks different. Now, in this game, first you 
have to figure out what the pattern is that happens in both pictures. 
Okay? Then I am going to point to one thing in the top picture, and 
your job is to tell me what is in the same part of the pattern in the 
bottom picture. So, on this first page, if we have a smaller boy and a 
bigger boy, and a smaller and a bigger bear, if I point to the smaller 
boy, which one is like the smaller boy in the bottom picture? Which 
one is in the same part of the pattern in the bottom picture? [the 
experimenter pointed to each object as it was described].” 
 
If the child responded correctly, the experimenter gave feedback and then 
moved to the next sample problem. If the child responded incorrectly, the 
experimenter gave feedback and then repeated the description of the 
relational objects in the top and bottom pictures. The experimenter then 
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asked the question again. If the child again gave an incorrect answer, the 
experimenter pointed out the correct answer (the smaller bear) and moved to 
the next sample problem.  
 
“Now sometimes the pattern will have two parts, like the one you 
just saw with the bigger boy and the smaller boy, and sometimes the 
pattern will have three parts.  Let me show you what I mean. In this 
top picture, there is a mom reading to a girl, who is reading to a 
teddy bear [the experimenter pointed to each object]. Then in the 
bottom picture, there is a dad reading to a boy, who is reading to a 
doll. See, the pattern is the same in both pictures, but it looks 
different. Now, if I point to this girl, you can see that she has 
someone reading to her and she is reading to someone else. She has 
two things happening to her. Now, if I point to this girl, who is like 
her in the bottom picture? What is in the same part of the pattern?  
What is in the same part of the pattern in the bottom picture? [the 
experimenter pointed to each object as it was described]” 
 
If the child answered correctly, the experimenter responded with „„Good job, 
perfect because this boy is the only one that both has someone reading to 
him and is reading to someone else. Great, let‟s do some more.‟‟ If the child 
answered incorrectly, the experimenter gave feedback and then repeated the 
instructions above beginning with the description of the pattern. If the 
child‟s answer was still incorrect, the experimenter continued with this cycle 
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a third time and then gave the answer and went on to the experimental 
problems. 
 
On each page, the experimenter pointed to the object with the arrow in the 
top picture and asked, „„What is like the [Insert appropriate]in the bottom 
picture?‟‟  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
